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Forging the Enemy in Soviet Fiction and Press, 1945-1982 
Abstract 
 
My dissertation offers a new approach to the study of Soviet official prose in the 
context of Soviet politics and of the Cold War. The Cold War was an ideological contest 
between two blocs: capitalist and communist. To gain victory, the Cold warriors needed to 
shape the minds of both foreigners and their own people. 
An excellent way to understanding the Soviet political consciousness is literature, the 
“second government,” to use Alexander Herzen’s words. In Russia, since the 19th century, 
literature has been a unique realm where public discourse could be expressed. In 1932 
Socialist Realism became the official doctrine, consequently, the language of power. 
Aesthetics aside, in my PhD study I consider official prose as purely political texts. The 
dissertation focuses on a number of Soviet novels written between 1941 and 1981, most of 
which gained various State Prizes. Although these novels were the most read at the time, 
today they have fallen into oblivion. However, by reading these novels one can draw quite an 
accurate picture of Soviet cultural life and mentality of that period, revealed in particular in 
the images of the enemy and in relation to the West. In my research, I take into consideration 
the German political thinker Carl Schmitt, for whom ‘the specific political distinction to 
which political actions and motives can be reduced is that between friend and enemy.’ 
The thesis argues that, during forty years, the enemy has become more subtle: in the 
Stalin period the “Western threat” was destructive, but under Khrushchev the same threat 
became seductive. The danger came from the appeal for Western values capable of 
contaminating Soviet citizens. Under Brezhnev, the introspective questioning of the 
intelligentsia was considered as the seed of ideological and moral corruption. Thus, the 
analysis of the crafting of the enemy in various case studies from the late Stalinist period until 
the “Stagnation period” will allow me to track the evolution of the Party line. As Alexey 
Yurchak proved, these metamorphoses of ideology have progressively led to the rift between 
the official discourse and the Soviet reality, making the collapse of the empire 
‘simultaneously unexpected and unsurprising, and amazingly fast.’ 
The originality of my research lies in its interdisciplinary approach to decipher Soviet 
ideology, resorting to political scientists, historians and anthropologists. Moreover, it includes 
authors not previously studied, unpublished materials I collected in the archives of the Soviet 
Writers’ Union (Moscow), and the literary criticism of the epoch. 
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 I don't believe in a man's love for his friend or for his banner if I don't see in it the efforts to 
understand the enemy and his banner.  
 
José Ortega y Gasset 
Introduction 
 
The new world that emerged after World War II is, for todays people near and far, 
familiar and unknown. Indeed, it seems quite unrealistic for my generation and even the 
previous one (‘the baby boomers’), who have only known peace and a comfortable life, to 
imagine the mentalities of those Europeans struck by bombings, hunger, devastation and 
death. For sure, such experience bequeaths singular and incommunicable fears and sufferings, 
and also, once the war was over, new hopes and expectations. But, at the same time, the 
United Nations, the European Union, the ambiguous relationship with Russia and the whole 
contemporary geopolitical balance date back from that period. In that sense, the Yalta 
Agreement was the last Peace of Westphalia. Since then, the history of the last seventy years 
– and in particular of the Cold War – has permanently been written and told in the media, in 
textbooks, by heroes, politicians, scholars or simple citizens. The enormous amount of such 
narratives and the high frequency of memorial practices (such as the celebration of Victory 
Day in Russia or the interest in Nazi camp survivors’ testimonies) hint at the feeling that we 
still live – at least mentally – in post-war Europe. 
 
Deciphering Soviet Ideology 
 
On this new map of Europe, the Soviet Union was hidden behind the “Sovietological 
curtain”: Soviet studies happened to be entangled with the ideological contest between East 
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and West,
1
 and with the domestic struggle for power. The latter implied control over the 
national narrative, i.e. over the archives and oral memory. Hence, most of the existing 
literature on the Cold War Soviet Union resembles an indictment – or a plea – meant to 
disqualify – or praise – the Soviet rule as such. I admit that the work of the historian cannot be 
done without resorting to moral concerns, but sometimes by imposing our own moral 
categories on a foreign reality, one can conceal a part of the object of study. 
 
Katerina Clark, in her monograph on Socialist Realism, brings the reader’s attention 
precisely to the fact that, “some of the problems derive from applying Western “highbrow” 
literary criteria in studying a literature that was not intended to meet them.”2  At the beginning 
of the book, she suggests three reasons according to which an analysis on Socialist Realism is 
                                                          
1
 During the whole conflict, the ‘Sovietological approach’ (in other words, the trend observed by the American 
Sovietologists) played a significant role in the relationships between the two blocs; it was almost one of the 
protagonists of the contest. There were three main different schools in American Sovietology, corresponding to 
different epochs of the Cold War. At the turn of the 1950’s, we find the Realist School (Adam Ulam and George 
Keenan). With their refusal of moralistic and ideological bases of the Soviet rulers, they thought that the Soviet 
Union could change, but that it would take time. Later the Political Cultural-historicist School appeared (Richard 
Pipes, Zbigniew Brzezinsky), assuming that the Kremlin was motivated by a set of ideological values in 
continuity with the Czarist regime. They were supposing that the Soviet Union was aggressive to Western values. 
The Pluralist School (Jerry Fincher Hough, Harold Gordon Skilling) argues that some Soviet elites supported 
détente and an increasing of exchanges with the West. 
In the 1960s and 1970s a revisionist stream emerged, questioning the Soviet imperialistic-expansionism 
and acknowledging American imperialism, see William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American 
Diplomacy (New York: World Publishing Co, 1959). Then the neo-revisionist trend materialized, assuming that 
the hardening of the American Foreign Policy was detrimental for domestic individual liberties, see Daniel 
Yergin, Shattered Peace. The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin, 1977). 
Besides, the question of Soviet expansionism, led by the Communist ideology, was at the core of all the 
debates. John Lewis Gaddis, in We Now Know (Oxford University Press, 1997), eventually reaffirms the 
importance of the imperialistic-expansionism in the Soviet doctrine, legitimizing the American policy of 
containment. 
“American studies” in the Soviet Union have believed in this ideological component from their Western 
counterparts. Boris Marushkin argues in History and Politics (Moscow: Nauka, 1969), that the Cold War 
historiography itself, and Sovietology in particular, were used as a “weapon against the Soviet Union” (p.377); 
Gennady Kostyrchenko embraces the same view, saying that, “historiography was between history and politics,” 
see Khrushchev’s Secret Policy (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye Otnoshenya, 2012), p. 450. Georgy Arbatov’s A 
Prolonged Recovery. 1953-1985 (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye Otnoshenya, 1991) gives an idea as thorough as 
possible of the perception of the US by the Soviet elites. 
2
 The Soviet Novel. History as a Ritual (Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, 1981), p. xi. One 
century before, anthropologist Gustave Le Bon had pointed to the cultural gap between different nations, 
noticing that “Napoleon had a marvellous insight into the psychology of the masses of the country over which he 
reigned, but he, at times, completely misunderstood the psychology of crowds belonging to other races; and it is 
because he thus misunderstood it that he engaged in Spain, and notably in Russia, in conflicts in which his power 
received blows which were destined within a brief space of time to ruin it.” in The Crowd. A Study of the 
Popular Mind (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications Inc., 2002, first published in 1895), p. xiv. 
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a taboo topic in Slavonic scholarship: “it is patently bad literature (…) it derivates from a 
historical experiment which has cost so much human suffering (…), and it is lifeless and 
dull.” 3  Notwithstanding those objections, she bravely undertook an interpretive cultural 
history of the Soviet novel. My research was to a great extent influenced by her purely 
scientific approach, free of any moral – and, as it seems to me, reductive – prejudice. I like the 
way she deals with Socialist Realism as a historical phenomenon and as a ritual – namely, a 
collective practice for Soviet society to describe and maintain itself. I find particularly 
illuminating the comparison between Soviet writers and medieval icon painters; for Clark, 
“Socialist Realism is a canonical doctrine defined by its patristic texts.”4 She draws on what 
she calls the “master plot” – the general scheme of all Socialist Realist novels, which is 
divided into six stages and where, she notes, “the tale of task fulfilment fuses with that of the 
hero’s ritual maturation.”5 
I was fascinated by the way Clark applies anthropological methodology to Soviet 
novels in order to extract their symbolic meaning, such as Van Gennep’s rites of passage, and 
the portrait of the positive hero (on the basis of the Soviet medievalist Likhachev’s works). As 
for me, I endeavour to do the same, for example, when I resort to Aleksandr Panchenko’s 
analysis of the holy fool in ancient Rus’ in order to explain Daniel’s trial. That said, my 
research adds another anthropological scheme, which does not appear in Clark’s work: the 
idea that the Thaw is inscribed in the realm of the carnival, according to Bakhtin’s theory (see 
Chapter 4.2). For this reason, I cannot agree with Clark’s statement saying that “the 
Khrushchev years do not constitute a homogenous era. To mark them off as a distinctive time 
period is to make a rather arbitrary time division, motivated by a sort of “cult of personality” 
of its own (Khrushchev’s, that is).”6 I see the Thaw as a consistent cultural and time unit, and 
                                                          
3
 Katerina Clark, The Soviet Novel, pp. ix-x. 
4
 Clark, The Soviet Novel, p. 4. 
5
 Clark, The Soviet Novel, p. 256. 
6
 Clark, The Soviet Novel, p. 212. 
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the phenomenon of the carnival looks to me as a key without which it becomes hard to 
understand the complexity of that period, reflected in such features as: the tightening of space; 
the use of masks (and the literary production was one of them); popular scenes of collective 
rejoicing as well as Khrushchev’s theatrical performances and, last but not least, the reversal 
of values explaining why, as Clark herself notices, “the attempt at a ‘heroic revival’ [has] 
failed.”7 
Apart from her normative and anthropological contributions to the study of Socialist 
Realism, Clark underlines the great importance in that genre granted to politics and ideology. 
When I began my dissertation, her remark reinforced my opinion on the fruitful potential for 
an academic research on the trope of the enemy in the Soviet novel. Resorting to the scholar 
of myth Mircea Eliade, when studying the opposition between a mythic Great Time and a 
profane time, Clark widens the scope of the novel and characterizes its role as “repository of 
official myths (…). According to her, Socialist Realism performs an essentially mythological 
task.”8 Indeed, I think that the mythological approach is by far the most relevant in the Soviet 
context and in the case study of the enemy in particular, because it links the revolutionary and 
Stalinist cosmogony to epics and characters of Soviet literary and cinematographic production. 
Hence, the mythological study of Soviet novels is a big help to understand Soviet ideology. 
To this extent, one can regret that in the part of the book dedicated to Soviet fiction since 
World War II, Clark does not address at all the issue of the Cold War – although it was a 
crucial point since 1947, which also displayed its own mythology. Besides, it is a common 
feature of Soviet post-war literary scholars not to include the impact of the Cold War in their 
field.
9
 In my research, I tried to remedy this omission and to show how the two mythologies 
                                                          
7
 Clark, The Soviet Novel, p. 233. 
8
 Clark, The Soviet Novel, respectively pp. 10 and 252. 
9
 There are two exceptions. First, Olga Voronina’s work, A Window with an Iron Curtain: Cold War Metaphors 
in Transition, 1945-1968 (unpublished doctoral thesis, Harvard University, 2010), where she analyzes the origins 
and use of Cold War metaphors. But except from the last chapter dedicated to Anna Akhmatova, most of the text 
deals with materials taken from political speeches and the media. As for David Caute, in his book, Politics and 
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were interwoven: which role the Cold War has played in the Soviet novel and reciprocally, 
how the tropes created by the Soviet writers had an impact on Cold War mythology. 
Explaining those interactions is very useful to have an insight into the “pictures in the 
heads”10 of the Soviet people, its citizens and elites and in the final analysis, into Soviet 
ideology. 
 
Another strategy to apprehend Soviet official literature is to focus more on its 
producers that on its products; such is Evgeny Dobrenko’s methodological choice. I agree 
with him when he says that, “the main issue is the changing of the “artist’s” blood 
composition <…> this problem allows to remove the conversation on Soviet literature from 
the endless debates on the Soviet writer’s freedom / lack of freedom <…> according to that 
binary logic the Soviet literature cannot be properly understood.”11 So, the best way to have 
an accurate picture of Soviet literature, he suggests, is to study the peculiar relationship of its 
members with power. 
In my dissertation, I resort to Dobrenko’s approach based on his two main 
assumptions. The first one is that the nature of Soviet literature is essentially dynamic, “the 
historico-literary process is [understood as] the living process of human activity, the meeting 
of different political, ideological intentions, the confrontation of interests and personalities, 
the real struggle between people.”12 Soviet writers are typically viewed as an army of docile 
executioners at the service of the propaganda state, which is by far, too simplistic. I think that 
the presentation of official literature as an evolutionary process is much more credible and 
interesting. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
the Novel during the Cold War (New Brunswick – London: Transaction Publishers, 2009), he studies literature 
from the point of view of the Cold War historian. Besides, the title is a reference to Irving Howe, Politics and the 
Novel (New York: Horizon Press, 1957). Caute is more interested in their impact on the Cold War narrative than 
in the authors themselves. Moreover, his comparative perspective on the world scale counts only a few pages 
dedicated to Soviet novels, most of which relate to dissident prose. 
10
 Walter Lippmann Public Opinion (New York: MacMillan, 1922), p.25. 
11
 Evgeny Dobrenko, The Making of the Soviet Writer (Saint-Petersburg: Akademicheskiy Proyekt, 1999), p. 7. 
12
 Dobrenko, The Making of the Soviet Writer, p.7. 
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From this perspective, the ultimate outputs of Soviet literature are the Soviet readers 
and writers themselves – this is the second approach of Dobrenko’s thesis that I lean on.13 
Further, he points to the paradox of co-authorship between power and individuals, “The rough 
reduction of authorship in Soviet literature, when the real author of ‘artistic production’ is 
power itself, does not prevent the obvious fact that Soviet literature was after all created by 
concrete prose writers.”14 To Dobrenko, that paradox is solved, thanks to the concept of self-
censorship, allowing the writer to epitomize the intention of power, “The most rugged censor 
of the Soviet writer is the Soviet writer himself: the Soviet writer is a censor. In this way, the 
Soviet culture was able to overcome the gap between art and life.”15 So, as a reminder of 
today’s financial traders thoroughly following the curve of the stock exchange index, the 
Soviet writers were operating a permanent attunement between their prose and the evolutions 
of the Party line. Finally, Dobrenko concludes that, “Socialist Realism is a form of 
bureaucratic writing.”16 In my research, I take over the axiom establishing Socialist Realism 
as the language of power. I consider official prose as purely political texts; the specific 
question of political literature will be elaborated below in this introduction, in relation to 
propaganda and national narratives. 
However, despite the fact that Dobrenko himself regrets that many studies on Socialist 
Realism are one-dimensional and exhorts scholars to apply a multidisciplinary approach 
(admittedly, it seems difficult to produce a pure literary comment on Socialist Realism that 
would not relate, de facto, to Socialist Realist criticism), my objection is – like Clark’s study – 
that the international dimension almost misses in his theoretical frame, not to mention the 
impact of the Cold War. And yet, one can hardly deny the weight of the relationship with the 
rest of the world in Soviet self-perception. Notably, since the nineteenth century conflict 
                                                          
13
 “The genuine products of socialist realism are people: readers and writers,” in Dobrenko, The Making of the 
Soviet Writer, p. 12. 
14
 Dobrenko, The Making of the Soviet Writer, p. 8. 
15
 Dobrenko, The Making of the Soviet Writer, p. 13. 
16
 Dobrenko, The Making of the Soviet Writer, p. 479. 
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between Slavophiles and Westernizers, the United States and Western Europe has always 
been an ambivalent object of marvel and fear, attraction and hatred. The various answers that 
were given to this question have divided the intelligentsia and played the role of a compass to 
define Russian identity, urging sometimes an inferiority complex, sometimes waves of 
national pride, sometimes both (see Chapter 4.3 on the fear of contamination of Soviet society 
by Western values during the Thaw). Such topics as Soviet messianism or the peace 
movement make little sense in the narrow limits of the domestic politico-literary debate. On a 
more empirical level, the alternation of phases of tensions and détente in the Cold War have 
had major influence on Soviet mentalities, especially concerning the perception of the 
enemy.
17
 
My second reservation is that The Making of the Soviet Writer may perhaps rely on 
“too productivist” premises: all happens as if ideology were the one and only ‘mould’ of the 
Soviet consciousness. Nevertheless, one can observe common cultural trends across a number 
of European countries, independently from their political regime, but which share similar 
historical backgrounds and generational watersheds: the post-war youth movements 
(shestidesiatniki including the stilyagi in the USSR, ‘baby boomers’ and hippies in Europe 
and the United States); the debates on new forms of the novel in the 1950s and 1960s; the 
fascination for space and the literary genre of sci-fi; the fear of the nuclear threat and so on. 
Moreover, inside the totally ideological state, the overwhelming quantity of information and 
cultural production makes it dubious that ordinary citizens were aware of it, even partly. For 
sure, Socialist Realism was a mass phenomenon and people were exposed to the signals sent 
by the ideological machine from an early age and all their life long: at school, at work and 
                                                          
17
 Yuri Aksiutin, a historian specialized in the relations between power and the mass, has underlined the 
importance of international issues (such as the reconciliation with Yugoslavia, the building of the Berlin Wall or 
the Caribbean crisis) in the formation of public opinion. See Khrushchev’s ‘Thaw’ and Public Opinion in the 
USSR in 1953-1964 (Moscow: Rosspen, 2010), pp. 135-151, 345-359, 360-388. Boris Grushin, a philosopher 
and sociologist who founded the Institute of Public Opinion in 1960 under the auspices of the newspaper 
Komsomol’skaya Pravda, has studied the role of foreign models in the perception of the future and the shaping 
of values amongst youth, see Four Lives of Russia in the Mirror of Public Opinion Monitoring, in four volumes 
(Moscow: Press-Traditsia, 2001), vol. I pp. 69-111, 159-222, 391-430. 
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everywhere in the public space. But, after all, is today the democratization of the Internet and 
the availability of Wi-Fi in every home, restaurant and railway station, proof that every single 
owner of a laptop or a smartphone (the equivalent of the Soviet literate public) reads the daily 
press and has watched the last blockbuster?
18
 I do not think so. Some people do not have time, 
others are focused on their relationship with their beloved or on the conflict with their 
relatives or neighbours, and others are interested in nothing except in their collection of 
butterflies or the latest model of Volga… To put it briefly, the big narrative of Socialist 
Realism, and hence of Soviet ideology, has definitely produced its own heroes – the Soviet 
readers and writers. But those characters also belong to other stories, both universal and trivial. 
In spite of the efforts of the total ideology to promote the Soviet New Man, the latter never 
became the totally ideological subject.
19
 Unlike the purely conceptual gaze of the literary 
historian, he could not escape from the material and emotional uncertainty proper to his 
human condition. 
 
 In this respect, Polly Jones looks closely at the gap between theory and practice, 
between official ideology and human reality. In her impressive monograph on the official 
Destalinization rhetoric,
20
 she analyzes the popular reaction that followed Khrushchev’s 
                                                          
18
 In the realist novel L’Assommoir (1877), the heroine Gervaise, a washerwoman, heads with a group of friends 
and relatives to the museum of the Louvre, “Gervaise asked the subject of the Wedding at Cana; that was stupid 
not to write the subject on the frames. [Her husband] stopped in front of Mona Lisa and found she resembled one 
of his aunts. Boche and Bibi-Grilling were sniggering at the sight of naked women.” (Paris: Gallimard, 1977), p. 
66. In that satirical episode, Emile Zola deals with the issue of access of the masses to art and with popular 
emotion. Although the workers are shown as ignorant, the author prefers their naive interest and spontaneity to 
the dogmatism of art critics (embodied by the character of Madinier, the most educated of them). Also, by 
showing the discrepancy between the works of art and their reception by the public, Zola questions one’s ability 
– and willingness – to get rid of his everyday crude reactions and to become familiar with high culture. In the 
Soviet Union and today, the question remains just topical as ever, concerning high and mass culture as well. 
19
 See also Elena Zubkova, Stalin and Public Opinion. 1945-1953, in Stalin’s Cold War Decade: facts and 
hypothesis, edited by A.O. Chubaryan and N.I. Egorova (Moscow: Nauka, 1999). In her paper, Zubkova 
analyzes Stalin’s failure to mobilize Soviet society, which was not politicized. She explains Stalin’s involvement 
in the Cold War as an attempt to divert people from the post-war despair and to channel their anger toward the 
West. 
20
 Polly Jones, Myth, Memory, Trauma. Rethinking the Stalinist Past in the Soviet Union, 1953-70 (New Haven 
and London: Yale University Press, 2013); on the same topic, see also Polly Jones, ‘From the Secret Speech to 
the burial of Stalin: real and ideal responses to de-Stalinization’, in The Dilemmas of De-Stalinization. 
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Secret Speech. Displaying a huge quantity of archival material, she aptly shows that the 
Soviet power was not at all expecting how people would react to the process of 
Destalinization. Fearing the unintended consequences of the latter, the party tried to keep 
control over the Destalinization process, by launching attacks on critics considered as 
excessive (such as Dudintsev or the journal Voprosy Istorii in 1957) and so drawing the line 
between the tolerated discourse on Stalin and the forbidden one.
21
 By describing the 
fluctuations of the memorial policy, Jones gives a fascinating account on the complex 
relationship to Stalin across the Thaw and the first years of the Brezhnevian Stagnation. 
Moreover, her methodology using literary works to track the evolution of Soviet ideology was 
very inspiring for me and I tried to reproduce it in my research. 
 
 More incidentally, the collective monograph edited by Evgeny Dobrenko and Galin 
Tikhanov on literary criticism,
22
 as well as John and Carol Garrard’s History of the Writers’ 
Union
23
 are essential to have a good grasp of the mechanisms of Soviet censure and self-
censure. We find also valuable descriptions of post-war literature in the books by Neil 
Cornwell,
24
 Geoffrey Hosking,
25
 Naum Leiderman and Mark Lipovetsky.
26
 Ivan Zhukov’s 
Fadeev
27
 is a great help to become familiar with the numerous protagonists of the Soviet 
literary life, since my research addresses the issue of the evolution – and sometimes new 
forms – of the Socialist Realist novel. Apart from Ilya Ehrenburg, most of the writers in my 
scope are barely known – rather ignored – by Soviet scholars for the reasons mentioned above. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Negotiating cultural and social change in the Khrushchev era, ed. by Polly Jones ( London: Routledge, 2006), 
pp. 41-63. 
21
 See Jones, Myth, Memory, Trauma, Chapter 3, entitled ‘Forgetting within Limits: Censorship and the 
Preservation of the Stalin Cult’, pp. 97-130. 
22
 History of Russian Literary Criticism. Soviet and Post-Soviet Times (Moscow: NLO, 2011). 
23
 John and Carol Garrard, Inside the Soviet Writers’ Union (London-New York: Tauris, 1990). 
24
 Neil Cornwell (ed.), Reference Guide to Russian Literature (London: Routledge, 1998). 
25
 Geoffrey A. Hosking, Beyond Socialist Realism. Soviet Fiction since Ivan Denisovich (London: Harper 
Collins, 1980). 
26
 Naum Leiderman and Mark Lipovetsky, Contemporary Russian Literature, 1950-1990 (Moscow: Akademya, 
2003). 
27
 Ivan Zhukov, Fadeev (Moscow: Molodaya Gvardia, 1980). 
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Because of the “Sovietological curtain,” and even more after the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
the status of “official writer” is likened to be the “first violin” in an orchestra, which would 
have played out of tune. As a result, even after seventy years and the opening of most of the 
archives, many questions still remain: who were these writers, what was their intellectual 
background, path, and convictions, in particular, related to the party? I also try to understand 
the interdependence between literature and ideology, and the role it played by the writers: 
have they only implemented the policy from above, getting explicit orders? Or, were they 
unconscious reproducers of the ‘general ambiance’ resulting from the Cold war context and 
inner Party debates? Or did they obey specific motivations - political, philosophical or 
personal? Did they get access to restricted-access collections in order to strengthen their 
credibility or did they feed themselves from the phantasmagoric mythology they contributed 
to? To what extent did they create new mythologies or tinker with the representations created 
by their Soviet colleagues, by the Americans? Can we retrace their genealogy and East-West 
journeys of some of the Cold War tropes, like the incendiary capitalists, as did Olga Voronina 
in her study on Cold War metaphors?
28
 Among all those post-war imaginary and cultural 
tropes, the main one is the trope of the enemy to which this study is dedicated. 
 
In Search of the Enemy: Towards a Methodology 
 
Enemy is the true hero of fiction. Along with the cult of the positive hero, the figure of the 
enemy is also central in novels and films of late Stalinism. Often the trigger of the plot, he is 
also the point at which all the actions of the protagonists converge and being unmasked, his 
disappearance from the scene concludes a story. For sure, the enemy is also the main character 
in Cold War mythology. 
                                                          
28
 Voronina, A Window with an Iron Curtain: Cold War Metaphors in Transition. 
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Generally, the enemy can be boiled down into two approaches: subjective and objective. 
On the one hand, the very concept of enmity is often put into doubt by a number of the 
authors who studied the topic – that is the subjective approach.29 On the other hand, in my 
research, I consider that the enemy has an objective dimension by the simple material rivalry 
of interests. This is true for the contest between two empires when the very existence of one 
empire questions the universal value of the other. By and large, in geopolitics and in particular 
in the case of the Cold War, it seems difficult to define the enemy as a sort of delusion we 
have to struggle with and eventually, deny it as such. That is why I support rather the 
objective definition of the enemy, in the wake of Schmitt’s theory.30 
 
Carl Schmitt (1888-1985) is the main thinker of enmity. A German jurist and a political 
theorist; he remains controversial due to his allegiance with the Nazi regime. However, his 
scientific works have influenced many philosophers and political authors, including Giorgio 
Agamben, Hannah Arendt, Jacques Derrida, and Slavoj Žižek. Schmitt defines the enemy as 
the genesis of the political, of any political and cultural struggle, “the specific political 
distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced is that between friend and 
                                                          
29
 Some authors, like Sam Keen
 
(Faces of the Enemy: Reflections of the Hostile Imagination (San Francisco: 
Harper and Row, 1986)), and James Aho (This thing of Darkness: A Sociology of the Enemy (Seattle: University 
of Washington Press, 1994)) consider the concept of enemy as a somewhat artificial construction. To them, the 
other would be a projection of a part of ourselves that we cannot stand, of our “dark side.” Keen cherishes the 
hopes of Homo amicus to whom he devotes the last chapter of his book Facing the Enemy; Aho tries 
psychoanalytically to deconstruct the enemy revealing his nature as a shadow of our own fears and thus totally 
unoriginal. Droit, whose work is focused on the term “barbarian” (for him it is an equivalent to enemy) 
eventually concludes that it would be “wiser” to get rid of the very concept of “barbarian.” Hence, according to 
Droit, any enunciation of a norm or cultural standard is denounced as totalitarian, see Généalogie des barbares 
(Paris : Odile Jacob, 2007). As for Robert Robins and Jerrold Post, they consider the perception of an enemy as a 
“political paranoia” that must be fought against; paranoia is a mental illness developed to avoid “the humiliation 
of helplessness,” see Political Paranoia: The Psychopolitics of Hatred (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1997), p. 301. Aleksander Fateev is more pragmatic: to him the concept of the enemy is nothing else than the 
gimmick of power to “make the Soviet people fool and control them,” see The image of the Enemy in Soviet 
Propaganda, 1945-1954 (Moscow: Institut Rossiiskoi istorii RAN, 1999), p. 126. 
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enemy.”31 In other words, according to Schmitt, the distinction between friend and enemy 
represents the extreme degree of unity or disunity, so the essence of the political. In the next 
sentence, he postulates “this provides a definition in the sense of a criterion and not as an 
exhaustive definition.” Such a criterion is particularly appropriate in the Soviet case. Hence, 
official literature, with its wide collections of characters, friends and foes, mirrors the 
ideology of the party. By studying the enemy in various Socialist Realist novels, my goal is to 
identify the political discourse at a precise time. 
Besides, Russian sociologist Lev Gudkov does not question Schmitt’s hypothesis, pointing 
to the archaic instinct to share the world between “we-them.”32 He even extends it by saying 
that it creates a culture of fear and hope and such a political consciousness capable of 
mobilizing the masses; he defines the paradox of enmity as a “necessary lethal threat.” Yet, by 
mobilizing itself against the enemy and the threat it stands for, the Soviet Union, expresses 
itself as a vital organism making its ideological choices. In other words, to represent the 
enemy in artistic works is to construct its own identity. 
 
Throughout history, Soviet politicians have often resorted to the perception of the enemy 
in order to create the image of a common communist camp. As early as 1937, in his speech 
Vyacheslav Molotov, Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissar, identified enemies as 
“parasites, saboteurs, and spies from Trotskyite and foreign intelligence.” 33  He also 
distinguished the enemies at the Shakhty Trial (1928-1930), linked to “the bourgeoisie, the 
White guards movements abroad and foreign spies, far from our Party”34 and the new ones, 
“who have a Party card and use it to deceive us and edge their way to places they could never 
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access otherwise.”35 One can notice that between 1930 and 1937 the enemy was grafted onto 
the Party, which has made him especially dangerous and elusive.
36
 Such an invisible threat 
‘naturally’ legitimized terror and the mass purges of 1937-1938. On the exterior front, 
enemies were the “White Finnish,” the “White Poles” and the Japanese militarists.37 
The Cold War period is more complex. Unlike the debates of the 1930s, where the pursuit 
of the enemy for the Soviets remains a domestic (or at worst neighbouring) ‘witch-hunt,’ the 
enemy after 1945 already reaches the world scale and he corresponds to the standards of 
international law. Indeed, the ground for the Cold War is to be searched in the aftermath of 
World War I and its political philosophy. What I mean is the moment when war per se was put 
under the ban of the Treaty of Versailles. Here I allude to Julien Freund’s thesis,38 according 
to which pacifist legalism and its derivatives (the Society of Nations, the Brian-Kellog Pact, 
the Organization of United Nations, and the Cold War itself) transformed international society 
into “a kingdom of judges and culprits.” Instead of recognizing the legitimate interests of 
sovereign nations, pacifist legalism replaced war by a moral court. Consequently, 
international relations are no longer aimed at finding a political compromise but their goal is 
to assign blame. The enemy is no more considered as a political interlocutor, no bargaining is 
possible. 
The paradox of the Cold War nemesis was that it occurs in the time when the (political) 
enemy was denied as such. According to the universal laws bequeathed by Versailles, the 
enemy cannot exist philosophically. He is converted to an ideological enemy, i.e. to a political 
shade with neither rights nor legitimate means to defend his interests. Another proof of the 
ideological nature of the conflict is its high emotional intensity whereas, according to Schmitt, 
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the political enemy has nothing to do with personal hatred, but only with power rivalry. No 
wonder propaganda and cultural war play the unprecedented role during the Cold War and 
public opinion becomes the new battlefield and judge in the final analysis. We use the term 
“battlefield” because, as Schmitt states, outlawing the war does not suppress the distinction 
between friend and enemy. On the contrary, the new ways to point to these concepts give 
them a new content and a new life. Both adversaries are not allowed to declare themselves 
‘enemies’ that quite naturally results in the game of moralizing one-upmanship. During the 
Cold War, good examples of this tendency are the ‘convergence theories,’ which have treated 
the US and the USSR as subjective and temporary enemies. 
During the periods of Détente (just after Stalin’s death and in the 1970s) the ideological 
vision again became political (in Schmitt’s sense): as soon as the Other’s power ceased to 
represent a direct lethal threat, he was no more considered as an enemy. The reasons for this 
shift were three-fold: economic reasons, because the Soviet Union needed to import the 
consumers’ goods, which could not be produced in the country, and so to support its economy; 
political reasons corresponding to the ideas of the new leaders who came to power in both 
countries; and finally, psycho-social reasons, since the population of the two superpowers 
were exhausted from the first round of the Cold War and were supporting the peace 
movement. 
In the present research the focus will be laid upon how the two superpowers practically 
used enmity in propaganda and fiction in particular. Production and reception of literature and 
press are processes, which reveal as much the perception of the Other by the Soviets as their 
perception of themselves. To this extent, the definition of the enemy corresponds to the trope 
of the “imagined Other.”39 
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But like Socialist Realism itself, the main feature of this “imagined Other” in Soviet 
novels is its fluidity. Actually, there is little in common between the American financial 
magnate John Vandengheim, who appears in 1930s in Shpanov’s book, and Bondarev’s Soviet 
painter Vasilyev forty years later. In his monograph on the late Soviet Union,
40
 Alexey 
Yurchak analyzes the evolution of the Soviet discourse, “This book set out to explore the 
paradox of the Soviet system by closely examining the internal shifts, at the level of everyday 
life, in the discourse language, ideology, ethics, social relations, time, and space on which this 
paradox was predicated.”41 Yurchak’s thesis consists of the observation that with time, the 
official discourse has become totally disconnected from the Soviet citizens’ life. The latter 
were keeping up practising the same rituals, not because of any feeling of faith or fear of 
punishment, but because they were giving new meanings to those rituals. Hence, little by little, 
the Soviet Union disintegrated and eventually, its collapse was at the same time 
“unpredictable and unsurprising.”42 Further, he explains that “the very feeling of Soviet life’s 
fixed, eternal and immutable nature was necessarily and constitutive of the system’s 
continuous and internal and deterritorialization. The more the system seemed immutable, the 
more it was different from what it claimed it was.”43 The dynamic nature of Socialist Realism, 
already underlined by Dobrenko, is widened in Yurchak to the whole ideological discourse. 
 
I decided to apply Yurchak’s approach to the trope of the enemy, and it appears that its 
permanently changing faces argue for the fundamental instability of Socialist Realism. Hence, 
the enemy belongs to such representations, whose meaning varied in order to safeguard the 
seeming consistency of Soviet ideology. Furthermore, my thesis on the culture of the Thaw 
related to the realm of carnival goes in the same direction. As early as under Khrushchev, the 
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rift between the state discourse and reality had become so obvious and unbearable that people 
were seeking for release in common celebrations, in the private space, wearing masks 
(practically or metaphorically) and reversing official values. To put it briefly, the carnival 
performance was allowing them being vnye (in Yurchak’s sense).44 But, finally, this literary 
illusion failed and the initial version of Socialist Realism was not sustainable throughout the 
whole history of Soviet literature. The party’s political fiction was able to preserve neither 
politics – the Soviet state ultimately disappeared –, nor fiction – Socialist Realism as a literary 
style did not survive after 1991. In order to better understand this process of decay, it is 
important to have a good knowledge of what political literature is. 
 
What is political literature? On the ‘storytelling animal’ and propaganda 
 
I call political literature the codified genre of novels dealing with political events and 
where the protagonists (i.e. their physical, psychological and moral qualities) are determined 
by the camp they belong to. In such novels, narrative and images suggested by the text are 
meant to convey to the reader a set of ethical as well as aesthetic values supporting the given 
ideological model. Concerning literary categorization, in the same way as Leona Toker
45
 
proposes creating a sub-genre out of GULag narratives, it might be interesting to define 
political literature as a sub-genre of Soviet literature, with such topics as: the World War II 
novel, the Cold War novel, and the novel about an artist. Also, a good definition of the 
political novel was given by the Russian-American novelist, screenwriter and political 
philosopher Ayn Rand in 1943, “It’s time we realized – as the Reds do – that spreading our 
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ideas in the form of fiction is a great weapon, because it arouses the public to an emotional, as 
well as intellectual response to our cause.”46 
 In The Storytelling Animal Jonathan Gottschall precisely offers a stimulating study of 
how fiction influences our lives. The title is taken from Graham Swift’s Waterland, “Man – 
let me offer you a definition – is the storytelling animal. Wherever he goes he wants to leave 
not behind a chaotic wake, not an empty space, but the comforting marker buoys and trail 
signs of stories. He has to keep on making them up. As long as there is a story, it’s all right.”47 
The hero of the book is “homo-fictus (fiction man), the great ape with the storytelling mind.”48 
The author mentions that when we experience a story, we allow ourselves to be invaded by 
the storyteller. Fiction subtly “shapes our beliefs, behaviors, ethics.”49 Gottschall also includes 
in his study the last discoveries of neurosciences. For example, he quotes one study where 
psychologists gave personality tests to people before and after reading The Lady with the 
Little Dog: in contrast to a control group of nonfiction readers, the fiction readers experienced 
meaningful changes in their personality profiles directly after reading the story. Moreover, 
“knowing that fiction is fiction does not stop the emotional brain from processing it as real.”50 
The author draws the attention to the fiction paradox discovered by Aristotle in his Poetics: 
fiction gives pleasure but what it contains is mostly unpleasant. What he means is that reading 
about murderers, tragedies and sorrow makes us excited, whereas we get bored by a story 
about untainted lives emerged in an everyday happy routine. As author Charles Baxter puts 
boldly it, “Hell is story friendly.”51 Following that, one can add, “Enemy is story friendly.” 
Further, Gottschall describes the role of stories in sacred fiction, such as religions and 
national narratives. So “fiction tends to preach… [and] poets are unacknowledged legislators 
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of the world.”52 Just as Soviet writers, whose novels were “forms of bureaucratic writing,”53 
as we have already put it. In my research I make an attempt to follow the print left by political 
debates on official literature and to record to what extent they propose their own literary 
answers. As “legislators of the world,” Soviet writers were involved in the Cold War. After 
1945, the major battleground was the cultural one; as President Truman declared in his speech 
on April 20 1950, “the Cold War was, above all else, a struggle for the minds of men.” After 
the intense work during World War II, the Soviet and American media were well trained to 
produce effective tropes, both at home and abroad. 
These representations were systematically nourished by facts and phrases taken from 
international politics. As an example, one can mention the appearance of the theme of the 
American and German neo-fascist militarism in autumn 1950, just after the beginning of the 
Korean War and the Pleven plan aimed to create a European army, which implied ipso facto 
the remilitarization of Germany. In that way, knowing the precise events that shaped the Cold 
War atmosphere allows us to better understand the different faces of the enemy. The aim of 
our research is to study the features and the evolution of the post-war Soviet ideology and 
power through the representation of the enemy. The study of the content of ideology from 
both sides of the ocean is required to learn the techniques of propaganda
54
 and in particular, 
the historical phenomenon known as the cultural Cold War.
55
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My analysis is based on narrative texts and contemporary literary criticism; I also use 
documents from the State Archives (letters, stenographical reports from the Soviet Writers’ 
Union...) gathered during a specific training scheme in Moscow led by Oxford University 
(Spring 2013). The materials of this study were chosen with regard to the political topics they 
cover, and in such a way as to have a representative overview of the main international issues 
of each period. So, Shpanov engages with the alleged causes of World War II (including the 
European and Asian theatres of operations) and with the beginning of the Cold War from 
behind the scenes; Ehrenburg deals with the same events, but he chooses an epic style to show 
the suffering of people across Europe; Eriomin’s Storm over Rome is a unique literary 
testimony on the 1948 Italian elections. Maltsev’s book, which came out three years after the 
Stalin-Tito split, is focused on the liberation of Yugoslavia and to the leading role of the Red 
Army. Kochetov, a Stalinist orthodox, addresses the typical question for the Thaw 
conservative wing: how to avoid being contaminated by Western values and to remain faithful 
to the Stalinist dogma? As to Bondarev, the official author of high Brezhnevism, he presents a 
double interest: he represents the generation of writers who have fought the war and their 
psychological maturation during the next thirty years; his life experiment – as well as political 
consciousness – includes both the dawn and the twilight of the empire. 
All the authors I selected offer typical examples of political fiction. In history, the use of 
propaganda has been widespread in numerous revolutionary contexts. Charles Walton, in his 
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monograph dedicated to the problems of the limits of free speech and public opinion in late 
eighteenth century France, argues that, “the French Revolution produced lethal repression and 
moral fanaticism in the short term <…> [then] the Terror ended [but] the policing of public 
opinion did not.” 56  He shows that the French government launched what he calls the 
‘remaking of mœurs’ in order to secure the gains of the revolution and to build the new 
society. That policy was conducted through legal means and press campaigns at the same time. 
In the Soviet case, the policing of Soviet mentalities was being operated on mainly through 
political fiction and remarkably, it was far from being a unidirectional activity. 
 
Policing Soviet Mentalities: an Interactive Process 
 
 The fashioning of Soviet mentalities was not only the result of an ideology imposed 
from the top to the masses; even a dictatorship, as the Soviet Union was, was innerved by 
strains from the bottom. Those strains are mainly of two kinds; social and intellectual. 
 As the revisionist historian Sheila Fitzpatrick has shown, thanks to the invalidation of 
the previous elites’ privileges and to the educational policy launched by the government in the 
frame of the First and Second Five-Year Plans in 1929 and 1933, a large part of the Soviet 
population had a direct interest in supporting the Stalinist regime in order to improve their 
social and material situation. For sure, the ruling party, in its turn, has taken advantage from 
this source of legitimization.
57
 By playing an active role at work and in the party committees, 
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the members of this new elite have brought with them in the public space – and in particular, 
in places of cultural consumption, such as public readings, theatres, cinemas, art exhibitions, 
and so on – their own expectations, personality and sensibility. That is why Vera Dunham, in 
her study on the relationship between power and the middleclass citizen in the Stalin’s last 
decade, argues that, “literature [was standing] between the regime and the people, and 
[constitutes] the conversation between the two.”58 Her famous expression “Big Deal” means 
that Stalinist literature was expressing a consensus between rulers and middle-class values. 
That idea, according to which no shift in public opinion can happen resorting to external 
strains only and exists in dialogical relation toward the inner state of the masse, is confirmed 
by the ideological evolution of journals like Novyi Mir: “the case of Novyi Mir and its readers 
suggests that for large groups of people to begin thinking differently in such a society, new 
ideas need to work from within the established culture, to take forms acceptable and familiar 
to the environment in which they spread (…) Tvardovskii and his colleagues worked from 
within the existing order rather than attempting to negate it.”59 Last but not least, Socialist 
Realism was under the readers’ influence not only because it was taking into account their 
“horizons of expectations,” but also because all of the writers were readers too.60 Hence, the 
making of the Soviet novel, as well as of the Soviet public, was definitively an interactive 
process. This research proposes to study the respective inputs of the various participants to 
literary production, resorting not only to prose works by the writers, but also to their private 
correspondence or political articles, to official party documents, Cold War events, as well as 
to opinion polls, and readers’ letters. 
 
Summary 
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My research falls into three parts, corresponding to the rules of the three Soviet leaders, 
from the end of the war until the beginning of the 1980s. The thread of the dissertation will be 
the trope of the enemy in its various metamorphosis during almost forty years. Leaning upon 
Schmitt’s thesis, defining the enemy as the highest criterion of the state’s political essence, 
my research examines the succeeding faces of the enemy in order to decipher the slow 
degradation of Soviet ideology, from its moment of glory until the eve of its demise. 
The first part begins with the last Stalinist decade. Our goal in Chapter 1 is to get a 
clearer picture of how certain political and cultural moves at the end of the World War II and 
in the first years of the Cold War truly contributed to the shaping of the two superpowers’ 
mutual perceptions – and rather misperceptions. During this period, Socialist Realism has 
been epitomizing the Stalinist canon (Clark). According to Schmitt’s theory, the more 
precisely defined and assertive the communist ideology was, the more its enemies must have 
been identified with absolute certainty and graphic details. So, the triumphant state has 
produced the triumphant narrative on mythical enemies, taken from the postwar geopolitical 
landscape, including the capitalists, the European corrupted elites, the Nazis who survived the 
war, and Tito’s followers. Chapters 2 and 3 both examine the outside enemy; the former is 
dedicated to the enemy in capitalist countries, whereas the latter concerns the enemies inside 
the Communist movement. 
The second part of the research offers a new perspective on the Thaw. Chapter 4 
shows the vanishing of the outside peril and the shift from the lethal enemy to a (too) 
seducing rival; the chapter ends with a case study of Kochetov’s novel What Do You Want 
Then? This book is relevant here because Kochetov embodies the typical neo-Stalinist writer 
during the Thaw and the work illustrates some Stalinist tenets and fears that have remained 
after the 20
th
 Congress. Relying on Jones’ findings on the complexity of the Destalinization 
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process, I put forward in Chapter 5 the hypothesis that the Thaw was a carnival period, 
characterized by the reversal of the former (Stalinist) values. The ‘small society’ – like the 
one of the carnival – of the Thaw was then threatened by the social parasites that did not 
observe its moral rules. The risk has also come from the appeal for Western values, able to 
‘contaminate’ the Thaw microcosm. To this extent, the liberal intelligentsia, as the vehicle of 
these contagious ideas, was the special target of the Party sentinels. In Chapter 6 I trace 
precisely how, during the Thaw, the Party guards were operating as a literary ‘morality 
police’. Hence, getting back to Schmitt’s model, the progressive disintegration of the enemy 
(the physical and visually identified character was transformed into an undistinguished Soviet 
citizen praising dangerous values or ways of life in a convoluted way) reveals the deep crisis 
of the communist rule following the revelations of the 20
th
 Congress. 
The third part is dedicated to the enemy during the Stagnation, the post-carnival period. 
As I try to demonstrate in Chapter 7, this time of re-Stalinization and stability was suitable for 
reassessment of the past and psychological introspection. At that stage the cracks in the 
ideology were irreversible and the language of power had nothing in common with reality 
anymore (Yurchak). Even as soon as twenty years later, the system would break apart. The 
collapse of Soviet ideals is mirrored in the erosion of the enemy. The heroes of Yuri Bondarev 
are the subjects of Chapters 8 and 9. As representatives of the intelligentsia, they show the 
features of a vanishing and even invisible enemy, hidden at the heart of the Soviet self. 
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First Part: The Stalin Era.  
The Enemy with a Cloak and a Dagger 
 
 
 
Chapter 1 – The Cold War begins: Historical and Cultural Background 
 
Marshal of the Soviet Union, Stalin came out of the war endowed with glory and a 
stronger legitimacy so that, in the late forties, Stalinism was at its height. As Clark put it, “the 
most dominant clichés of Stalinism derived from literary models (…) The story in myth 
(Socialist Realism) informs the rituals of the culture in which it exists.”61  Hence, Soviet 
ideology was at the same time the mould and the product of Soviet novels. Literary works 
were determining the main rituals of Soviet society concerning, among others, the hierarchy 
inside the factory, the rites de passage to be accepted by the group and to become a full-
fledged Communist citizen, as well as the distinction of heroic features. But on the opposite of 
rituals, meant to preserve society, literature has also generated a broad mythology of enmity, 
of those who threaten the power order. By his destructive projects and denial of the 
fundamental values of society, the enemy highlights the specificity of the state as the political 
body. For this reason, according to Schmitt, the enemy is the criterion par excellence of the 
political. In this chapter, we analyze how the ‘super-ideologized’ state and the ‘super-enemy,’ 
visible, cruel and almighty, have funded and reinforced each other. This ‘super-enemy’ 
emerged from the ruins of the war and from the first skirmishes between the two blocs. 
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1.1.A Fragile Grand Alliance 
 
 At the outbreak of the Cold War, almost everyone in the world was wondering how 
the yesterday allies so rapidly became sworn enemies. The rupture of “personal continuities”62 
may be viewed as one of the reasons, however one must acknowledge that the “seeds of 
discord” evoked by Stalin in his interview of March 1946 (in response to Churchill’s Fulton 
speech) really existed from the very beginning of the conflict. As Robert Cronin puts it 
provocatively, “it is now a common place to say that the Grand Alliance was neither Grand 
nor much of an alliance. Certainly there were built-in stresses and suspicions in the coalition, 
as there were clashes between the Allies over the basic strategies to win the war. Furthermore, 
there were fears on each side about the other side making a separate peace, and finally, there 
was serious disagreement over the fate of Eastern Europe and the way the postwar world 
should be run.”63 In particular, the bone of contention between the Allies is the opening the 
long-awaited second front on the West. 
 As early as in September 1941, Ivan Maisky, Soviet ambassador in London, demands 
a second front from Churchill. But until the counterattack launched by General Zhukov on the 
6
th
 December, Great Britain and the United States don’t believe that their Soviet ally would 
withstand the Nazi advance. In spite of Roosevelt’s inclination towards Stalin’s request, the 
priority is given to landings in North Africa, Sicily, and Italy.
64
 The climax is reached in June 
1943 when Roosevelt informs Stalin that the opening of the second front is out of question 
before the spring 1944. Stalin is upset: “The Soviet Union confidence in its Allies is subjected 
to severe stress.” On June 24, he recalls his ambassadors in London and Washington. On the 
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eve of the Overlord operation, Churchill personally sends a message to the Soviet leader 
about the Allied landing on the French coast, but Stalin cannot believe it. 
The long-awaited second front brings some appeasement to the coalition. And from August 
21 to October 7, at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, the delegations from the three allies and 
from Republic of China deliberate over proposals for the creation of the United Nations to 
maintain peace in the world. However, the Tolstoy conference held in Moscow two days later 
shows that Stalin’s trust in Churchill is more than moderate; evoking Rudolph Hess flight to 
Britain in May 1941, the master of the Kremlin “refuses to believe that nobody in the British 
government has discussed peace terms with him.”65 Time and again, the Soviets complain 
about what they consider like compliance from the Anglo-Saxon powers toward trhe 
representatives of the Nazi regime in general and towards Hess in particular. This grievance 
gives start to the figure of the “capitalist-Nazi conspiracy” which appears in the Soviet press 
from autumn 1945 and, after no compromise was found at the London conference, in Sove 
cinema (The Secret Mission, 1950) as well as in the overt criticism of western militarism in 
Korea and Europe. Nevertheless, during the winter 1944 and until the Yalta conference in the 
next February, the anti-Hitler coalition keeps up working on military plans to hold final 
victory and to prepare the post-war world. In Yalta Stalin appears as the victor imperator who 
negotiates from the position of strength: the Red Army is at less than hundred kilometers from 
Berlin. He wants the confirmation of the division of the Balkans and Poland decided in 
Moscow. As to Roosevelt and Churchill, their goal is to get Stalin's promise of a military 
campaign against Japan within three months after German capitulation. Both sides leave the 
conference with a feeling of achieved goals. 
 
 
                                                          
65
 See Steven Merritt Miner’s commentaries in Kenneth M. Jensen (ed.), Origins of the Cold War: The 
Novikov,Kennan and Roberts ‘Long Telegrams’ of 1946 (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 
1995), p. 89. 
30 
 
1.2. The Bipolar Brinkmanship: First Round 
 
 After President Roosevelt passed away in April 1945, partnership is quickly 
transformed into a silent hostility. The stance of the Kremlin is simple: they want to maintain 
at all cost the anti-Hitler coalition and rely on an American loan to rebuild the country 
devastated by the war. As to the new Truman administration, its main fear was the growing 
Soviet influence in the Eastern Europe, namely Stalin's expansionist policy threatening the 
whole continent.
66
 Already during the first months of his presidency Truman draws an anti-
Yalta line on three occasions: firstly, in a telegram to Churchill he disapproves the Polish 
issue; secondly, during his first (and tough) meeting with Soviet ambassador Gromyko; and 
thirdly, by the position of the American delegation at the San Francisco conference. In 
January 1946, Truman's declaration that he is “tired of babying the Soviets” is two months 
ahead of Churchill’s famous Fulton speech on the Iron curtain. In his interview one week later, 
Stalin blames both leaders for being “war incendiaries” (opposed to the alleged peaceful 
Soviet policy) and for their unwillingness to apply the Yalta and Potsdam agreements. At the 
moment international affairs are focused on Greece, Iran, the German problem, and Eastern 
Europe. In July 1946 and following the Baruch Plan, the leitmotiv of American “nuclear 
diplomacy” shows up in the Soviet press,67 however the Soviet leaders try not to exacerbate 
tensions still relying on American credit. Soviet Censorship even tries to cool down those 
propagandists who demonstrate too virulent anti-Americanism. Moreover, certain Soviet 
diplomats, led by former ambassador in Washington Maxim Litvinov, share an opinion that 
after the war the United States would return to isolationist policy and will have no part to play 
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in Europe.
68
 One year later, the Truman doctrine, hammering Soviet expansionism, and the 
Marshall Plan, targeting above all the countries of Western Europe, put an end to any hope of 
financial aid from former Atlantic partner. Initially Secretary of State Viatcheslav Molotov 
intended to take part in the recovery plan as proposed by Washington, but after he went to the 
reconnaissance mission to Paris, Molotov viewed the absence of the Soviets as rather an 
advantageous punch to the exacerbation of tensions between the capitalist states. He finally 
rejects the plan in July. 
  
The ghost of coalition, formally died in Fulton, definitely disappears in the summer 
1947 and gives way to open confrontation. The Zhdanov doctrine echoes Truman’s one and 
divides the world between the “imperialist and anti-democratic” and the “anti-imperialist and 
democratic camps.” It marks the definite return to the political line of Revolution and the 
Civil war, stressed in the 1924 Constitution and erased in the 1936 Constitution.
69
 
At the same time a political journalist Walter Lippmann publishes booklet named The 
Cold War where he criticizes the concept of containment proposed by another key political 
player George Keenan. Without questioning the Soviet expansionist drive, Lippmann treats 
Kennan’s doctrine (aka Mr. X) as too optimistic70 and badly conformed to American military 
power. He recommends separating the Red Army from the Red International and enabling the 
instauration of a balance of powers in Europe. 
In January 1948, the conflict expands towards historiography. The US department of 
State publishes a collection of documents titled Nazi–Soviet Relations, 1939–1941: 
Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Office. It includes accounts on the 
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meetings between Soviet and German officials during negotiations regarding the Molotov-
Ribbentrop Pact as well as the “Secret Additional Protocol” on the division of Eastern Europe 
into spheres of influence between Germany and the Soviet Union. One month later, the 
Sovinformburo retaliates with Falsifiers of History. Stalin personally edits the book and 
rewrites the whole sections. Falsifiers holds European and American leaders responsible for 
the outbreak of the war in 1939: the rearmament of Germany by American bankers and 
industrialists, cowardice at Munich in 1938, knowing that it would encourage Hitler's drive 
toward the East (Drang nach Osten). The Soviet Union plays the role of the white knight 
trying to negotiate a collective security against the Nazis and to defend its kingdom against an 
unavoidable aggression. 
During the year 1948 a series of skirmishes and local wars by proxy take place 
between the two superpowers: the Czech coup (February), the Italian elections (April), the 
Berlin blockade, the turn of the Israeli leaders to the capitalist camp, and the Tito-Stalin clash 
(all in June). 
But far from the battlefields and the electoral campaigns abroad, the cold warriors in 
their headquarters improve their propaganda apparatus. The National Security Act of 1947 
creates the Central Intelligence Agency,” a bureaucratic structure to launch a campaign of 
“peacetime” psychological warfare aimed to undermine the Soviet and East European 
regimes.”71 After their return from a tour of Europe, Republican senator H. Alexander Smith 
of New Jersey and Representative Karl Mundt of North Dakota are outraged by the “Soviet 
campaign of vilification and misrepresentation” targeting America. To straighten up that 
situation, the Smith-Mundt Act of January 16, 1948 is passed “to promote the better 
understanding of the United States among the people of the world and to strengthen 
cooperative international relations.” To a historian of cultural war Walter Hixson, “under the 
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impetus provided by the Smith-Mundt Act, Washington launche[s] an aggressive campaign of 
anti-communist propaganda.” Invoking the “vicious covert activities of the USSR”, the NSC 
10/2 authorizes in June a new CIA covert operations branch. It previews measures such as 
propaganda, economic warfare, sabotage and anti-sabotage, subversion against hostile states 
including assistance to the underground resistance movements, guerillas and refugees, and 
support of indigenous anti-communist elements. 
On the Soviet side, Stalin, feeling not sufficiently informed, creates in May 1947 the 
Committee of Information, a super agency for intelligence and analysis. Molotov gets under 
his supervision the First Directorate of State Security (MGB) and the Main Intelligence 
Directorate (GRU). It comprises, among others, the setting of intelligence stations and illegal 
networks in Soviet embassies in London and Washington.
72
 The writers are also granted a role 
on the frontline of the Cold War: in April 1947 the Office for Agitation and Propaganda 
launches a “Plan of measures for the propaganda of ideas of Soviet patriotism among the 
population.” On July 31 the resolution on Literaturnaya Gazeta transforms a modest literary 
newspaper into “a socio-political and literary organ under the same name.” Since then its aim 
is to maintain “propaganda of the Soviet socialist culture and its world significance; divulging 
the reactionary essence of modern bourgeois culture and affirming ideas of Soviet patriotism 
and national pride of the Soviet people; mobilizing public opinion against war incendiaries 
<…> against all ideological agents of imperialism; unmasking lies and slanders on the Soviet 
people and culture; struggle for enhancing ideological and artistic level of Soviet literature 
and art…”73 The number of copies is increased by ten (until 500 000) and the frequency by 
two. Each edition is divided into four sections: domestic life, international life, science and 
technique, and literature and arts. Literaturnaya Gazeta comes after Kultura i Zhizn, the 
review of the Office for Agitation and Propaganda, created in June, 1946 and which became 
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“the compass of the ideological staff.” 74  On October 16, 1947, a few weeks after the 
announcement of the Zhdanov doctrine, Sovinformburo is given an international organ: “For 
a strong peace and popular democracy!” Its print run reaches 110 000 copies and comes out 
in Russian, English, and French. The political line is oriented towards “the unsmasking of the 
US expansion and of the rightist socialists, struggle against bourgeois ideology, and 
promotion of the peaceful campaign.”75  
The most significant phenomenon is the effort made by the Soviets to coordinate the 
numerous actors of the ideological war. International affairs involve the propaganda and 
diplomatic apparatus, and the World Committee of Partisans for Peace; the domestic policy 
resorts to the Office for agitation and propaganda, the Committee on artistic affairs, the 
Russian Orthodox Church, and the Soviet writers’ Union. The mobilization of all the branches 
of the propaganda machine and their systematic work will play from 1949 onwards a key role 
in psychological warfare. 
 
In 1949 we witness the strengthening of the blocs as much inside as outside. NATO is 
founded in April (joined three years later by Turkey and Greece); then in May the Federal 
Republic of Germany emerges, followed on the East by the German Democratic Republic in 
October of the same year; the Kremlin-led COMECON offers a symmetric equivalent to the 
Marshall plan. Two major events let think the Reds call the tune: the successful test of the 
Soviet nuclear bomb and the Mao's conquest of China. The Sino-Soviet Pact four months later 
increases Washington worst fears. Against a backdrop of economical moroseness in Europe 
and anti-colonialist movements in Asia, the Soviet propaganda proclaims the beginning of the 
"era of the collapse of capitalism.”76 
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The harsh refreshing of international climate brings about political purges and the 
hardening of the political line on both sides. In the previous year, the term “cosmopolitan” 
was coined in an article in Literaturnaya Gazeta as a concept resulting from “sycophancy” 
(nizkopoklonstvo) toward a foreign culture to “treason.”77 During summer and autumn 1948, a 
series of article deals with the complicity between the US and the so called “cosmopolitans.”78 
From January to March 1949, the Soviet press bolsters a poignant “anti-cosmopolitan 
campaign,” colored with unabashed anti-Semitism. Having as its primary target “a group of 
antipatriotic theatre critics,” it then oozes into a larger public such as “peoplesʼ traitors”79 and 
“enemies of Soviet patriotism.” 80  After the creation of NATO, the campaign swayed to 
denouncing “cosmopolitans” in the capitalist states and in Eastern and Central Europe to not 
erode the “moral and political unity of the Soviet camp.” 
 Over the Atlantic, the Red Scare reaches its peak. The Executive Order 9835 signed 
by President Truman in March 1947 has created the “Federal Loyalty Programs” aimed at 
determine the “Americanism” of Federal Government employees and dismiss those convinced 
in spying for the Soviet Union or suspected of being “Un-American.” Afterwards several state 
legislatures’ loyalty acts are passed.81 The investigations of the House Committee on Un-
American Activities (HUAC) and the committees of Senator Joseph McCarthy investigate 
people deemed as being “American communists.” The Department of State is the core target 
of the campaign.
82
 McCarthy and his inquisitors ruthlessly threaten (and often breakdown) the 
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careers of high-ranked diplomats including George Kennan himself.
83
 The militarization of 
the Cold War in 1950 through the Korean War and the Pleven Plan accumulates fears in both 
camps providing of ammunitions for the psychological war. 
In April and May 1949, on the suggestion of writer Konstantin Simonov to Georgy 
Malenkov, the Office for Agitation and Propaganda launches a “Plan of measures for the 
strengthening of anti-American propaganda in the near future.” It allows a systematic work 
with the mobilization of all the Soviet propaganda players in media, cinema, literature, theatre, 
and so on. Impressive polemical production blossoms in the coming years until Stalin’s death 
in 1953. 
The American psychological salvo begins later but with much power. In April 1950 
the NSC 68 is issued, increasing the pressure against the Soviet Union and its satellites. 
Indeed, the goal of containment of communism is replaced by the “liberation” of the countries 
from the Eastern bloc: "The issues that face us are momentous, involving the fulfillment or 
destruction not only of this Republic but of civilization itself." It sanctions a more than 
tripling of military expenditures, including augmenting the arsenal of tactical and strategic 
weapons; it supports the construction of a chain of military bases and the intervention in other 
nations’ internal affairs in the name of “national security.” Six days later, President Truman 
unveils his ‘Campaign of Truth’, “a struggle, above all else, for the minds of men <…> in 
reaction to imperialistic communism <…> or we will lose the battle for men’s minds by 
default.” The Council for Cultural Freedom (CCF) is created in June in West Berlin on behalf 
of the CIA in order to aggregate intellectuals against Communism and to promote an artistic 
production founded on the liberal democratic principles. The CCF has operative offices in 35 
countries and produces many publications, musical works and international events. In October 
the project TROY defines “the intellectual framework for waging total Cold War” and 
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proposes models of cooperation between universities and National State bureaucracy to get 
information into the Soviet Union. One year later, Soviet authorities will bear a double strike. 
On 10 October 1951 Mr. Truman, the President of the United States of America, signed the 
“Mutual Security Act of 1951” which provides for special appropriations to the amount of 
100 million dollars for the financing of persons and armed groups in the territory of the Soviet 
Union and a number of other states for the purpose of carrying out subversive and 
diversionary activities within those states. Two weeks later, the US magazine Collier’s 
gathers contributions of Western politicians, economists, and writers expressing their hostility 
to communism. The editorial board elaborates the scenario of a nuclear attack on the Soviet 
Union. Needless to say, this opus is a reason for Soviet cold warriors to emphasize the threat 
of a “third World War” and “Wall Street militarism”, and ironically denounce “Washington 
peacemakers.”84 As Alexander Fateev observes, “at the beginning of the 1950s the American 
propagandist apparatus exceeds the Soviet one but still remains inferior on the ideological 
plan until 1956.”85 
 
1.3.The Soviet ‘Peace Offensive’ 
 
 Just after the outbreak of mutual animosities, pacifism becomes the core task of Soviet 
diplomacy. This fact needs an explanation. First, this priority responds to the imperative of 
domestic policy: the population exhausted by the war would not understand if its leaders 
would have promoted another motto but peace. Moreover, any would-be war could provoke 
waves of panic along with the clearing out the stores of unrationed consumer goods such as 
matches and salt.
86
 Second, as the historian Lawrence Wittner argues, the Soviets fear an 
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American attack at a time when the United States have become the first military power and 
the only owner of  the nuclear bomb.
87
 Third, “propagandists [need] to underscore the “peace-
loving nature of Soviet foreign policy” in order to give the USSR higher moral grounds than 
the bellicose, warmongering Americans.” 88  Fourth, after the Fulton speech, the Truman 
doctrine, the booklet “Nazi-Soviet Relations,” and regular speeches focused on the Soviet 
expansionism, the Kremlin takes on a defensive position. Incidentally, this position lasted 
until nowadays. 
  
Let us dwell on the main events that characterize the pacifist movement in the early Cold 
War epoch. Although since 1945 there have been many circumstances when Soviet 
representatives have exposed the Soviet peaceful intentions,
89
 the Peace Offensive really 
begins with the Zhdanov doctrine of September 1947 which puts forward the idea that the 
world is divided between a democratic and peace-loving camp, led by the Soviet Union, and 
the anti-democratic, belligerent camp led by the United States. A couple of days before, on 
September 18, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Vyshinsky delivered his speech 
“For peace and friendship among nations, against the war incendiaries” in which he supports 
the ban of nuclear weapons declaring that President Truman’s policy does not respect the 
principles of United Nations.
90
 Members of the Writers' Union in their turn carry on the 
Soviet “peaceful offensive” and publish the collective letter “Masters of American culture, 
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Who Are You Staying With?” warning against the fascist threat and war incendiaries.91 At the 
same time Ilya Ehrenburg, one of the future founders of the Movement of the Supporters of 
Peace, writes an article “On Friends and Foes”92 responding to Walter Lippmann’s Cold War 
booklet: he accuses those “who have called themselves our allies. In 1942, they used to say: 
“Why rush into a second front?” and now: “Why tarry the third war?” “Who are on earth 
these defenders of the “European Culture?,” he angrily goes on, "are they the Hiroshima 
experimenters who erected a monument in memory of the goats perished during the nuclear 
bomb tests in Bikini?” Further, he condemns “those supporters [of Europe] who support 
German industrialists… nuclear usurers… on their order blood is shed across the whole 
world… our struggle against rude predators… leaders of high culture defend life from death, 
art from the world of Ku-Klux-Klan.” 
On 6 August 1948 the World Congress of Intellectuals for Peace meets in Wroclaw. The 
participants elect a Permanent International Committee of Intellectuals in Defence of Peace 
and call for the establishment of national branches and national meetings. Consequently, a 
Cultural and Scientific Conference for World Peace is held in March 1949 at the Waldorf 
Astoria Hotel in New York. 
During the first half of 1949, more than fifty articles dedicated to peace appear in the 
Soviet press.  The fourth conference of Cominform held in Hungary in November of the same 
year states that “the struggle for stable and lasting peace… should now become the pivot of 
the entire activity of the Communist Parties and democratic organizations.”93 In April 1949 is 
held The World Congress of Advocates of Peace in Paris, inspired by the Zhdanov doctrine. It 
establishes a World Committee of partisans of peace and chooses Picasso’s dove as its symbol. 
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At the end of the year, committees are created in 70 countries. October 2
nd
 is declared the 
“International day of the struggle for peace”. Central newspapers publish about forty articles 
criticizing America and its allies.  
In October 1949, Literaturnaya Gazeta publishes 50 000 copies of Conspiracy against 
peace: Notes of an English journalist by Ralph Parker.
94
 He puts forward the thesis of “the 
knife in the back” and blames Western allies for preparing a plot against the Soviet Union at 
the very moment when the Red Army was struggling for the anti-Hitler coalition. He also 
proclaims that American diplomats carry out intelligence activities. Parker’s work is part of 
the “Plan of measures for the strengthening of anti-American propaganda in the near future” 
launched in April 1949. Along with other books,
95
 the journalistic style of the Conspiracy 
allows to convey the political message of the Kremlin and to set the ideological tone among 
the masses. 
With the Stockholm Appeal in March 1950, the World Peace Council makes a new step 
forward: the supporters of peace present petitions gathering more than 273 million signatures 
(including the entire population of the Soviet Union) and “demand the outlawing of atomic 
weapons as instruments of intimidation and mass murder of people and strict international 
control to enforce this measure.” At the same time the Supreme Council passes a law where 
war propaganda is strictly forbidden. The second World Peace Council takes place in October 
and November 1950 in Warsaw. The initial venue was scheduled in Sheffield but the British 
authorities considered the Congress as a "bogus forum of peace with the real aim of 
sabotaging national defence" and refused visas to many attendees. The delegates condemn 
anew the atomic bomb and the Korean War. On the other side of the world these claims are 
echoed in Vyshynsky’s speech at the tribune of the United Nations.  
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The international climate is still tense, as one can see in the propaganda posters of 1952: 
“Peace activists are against the war” (V. Briskin) on American militarism, “A Curse upon the 
Butchers” (L. Samoilov) on the victims of the Korean War and “Peace to the World!” (V. 
Briskin) where the Anglo-Americans appear as armed to the teeth half-human and half-animal 
fanatics. But the Congress for Peace held in Vienna in December 1952 announces the first 
signs of the Détente. It contributes to the evolution of the conflict in Korea, and eventually to 
the armistice signed in next July. 
 
So, pacifism becomes a cross-disciplinary subject appearing in many works of the post-
war period: in cinema The Russian Question (1948) and The Meeting on the Elbe (1949), in 
literature Struggle for Peace by Fedor Panferov is awarded the Stalin Prize in 1951 and the 
collections of poetry works Peace to the world by Alexei Surkov and At the Second World 
Peace Congress by Nikolai Tikhonov in 1952. Furthermore, struggle for peace becomes the 
plot in the majority of “political fiction,” especially in the authors tackled in this research 
(Ilya Ehrenburg, Dmitri Eriomin, Orest Maltsev, and Vsevolod Kochetov). But the most 
eloquent and wordy stalwart of pacifism is undoubtedly Nikolai Shpanov. 
His novel Incendiaries (1949) is dedicated, as we learn from the editor’s preface, to “the 
revelation of the secret springs of American ‘peaceful’ policy, leading to the cunningly 
masked support to aggression and conflagration of World War II.” Later, in “Peace to the 
World!,” the last chapter of his political essay Diplomats with a Cloak and a Dagger (1952), 
Shpanov condemns the “criminal plot against the entire humanity, masterminded and 
organized over the ocean” (p. 77). He blames “the American monopolists for displaying 
strategic raw material to German factories” (p. 77); according to Shpanov, “NATO is a 
creature of Wall Street and an instrument of aggression directed at the peaceful people of the 
world” (p. 78); he quotes a letter to Dean Acheson from Ayvor Montaigu, an English film 
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director and a member of the permanent Committee of the World Peace Council who was 
refused a visa for his trip to the US.:  “The time is gone when people obeyed cannon fodder. 
The gibbet of Nuremberg awaits the war incendiaries” (p. 79). “They can dress their 
‘diplomats’ with angels’ immaculate white clothes, nobody will hold them for angels of 
peace” (p. 80). Further he mentions with irony “the American flying fortresses” (p. 82) and 
compares the US to a “gangster with a knife in his teeth and rolled up sleeves who cleanses 
his victims’ pockets” (p. 83). 
 
Besides, except the Diplomats and other polemist texts such as Ilya Ehrenburg’s “War 
Incendiaries are the Worst Enemies of the Peoples” (March 1951), made in a journalistic 
genre, writers usually prefer to convey their political messages in fiction. Indeed, “at the end 
of World War II, Soviet literature-centrism [is] at its peak <…>  there is a remarkable craving 
for the printed word in the immediate postwar years <…> Literature remains at the center of 
the intellectual and linguistic order.” The writer Yuri Trifonov explains it by “the atmosphere 
of heightened expectations from literature that existed among the readers in the late 1940s and 
early 1950s.” 96 
 
1.4.  Postwar ‘Politerature’ and the ‘Manufacture of the Enemy’ 
 
Aesthetics aside, we consider official prose as purely political texts i.e. ‘politerature’. 
Besides, politerature is not the prerogative of the Communists. Walter Lippmann (1889-1974), 
an American writer and political commentator, who coined the “Cold War,” considers that in 
democracy, crowds are not able to grasp political issues. Consequently, governments must 
organize the “manufacture of consent” through the media and propaganda of all kinds. In 
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1922 he writes: “the manufacture of consent is capable of great refinements <…> and the 
opportunities for manipulation open to anyone who understands the process are plain enough 
<…> within the life of the generation now in control of affairs, persuasion has become a self-
conscious art and a regular organ of popular government.”97 Later on, the founder of public 
relations industry Edward Bernays (1891-1995) and the prominent political scientist Harold 
Lasswell (1902-1978) follow Lippmann’s path recommending the use of propaganda for 
“democratic social engineering.”98 In 1953 Edward W. Barrett, former assistant to Secretary 
of State and a coordinator of the "Campaign of Truth," puts forward that “the newcomer [in 
the State Department] <...> soon recognizes that the mass opinions of large groups or of entire 
populations, abroad and at home, have far more impact on international developments than in 
years gone by. <...> A minority [of diplomats] look upon this potent new force as a challenge 
and an opportunity. <...> We Americans have no wise choice but to master the techniques of 
international persuasion.” 99   These techniques include psychological warfare and cultural 
infiltration. Indeed, “both Soviet and American policymakers realize that to “win the minds of 
men” in Europe, they need to appeal more to their cultural than to their political identity.”100 
More precisely, “culture in the study of international relations may be defined as the sharing 
and transmitting of consciousness within and across national boundaries.”101 
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 In the world of literature, the convention of fiction invites myth as a guest of reality; 
thus, “the novel rides escort to contemporary history,” 102  providing “Soviet and Western 
fictional responses to the Cold War”103 and shaping the consciousness of the readers. Taking 
into consideration Schmitt's concept of the enemy and its high political potential, one can say 
that the ‘manufacture of the enemy’ in Soviet novels can be seen as the other side of the coin 
of what Lippmann refers to as the ‘manufacture of consent.’ If Fateev argument can be seen 
too unequivocal when he says that the enemy is used by power (and nomenclature in 
particular) only as a tool to manipulate and hoodwink the minds of the masses,
104
 it is of 
course true that the image of the enemy is displayed by propaganda to create political 
consensus. Actually, “there are millions of people being exposed to exactly the same stories 
[on the enemy] and undergoing exactly the same process of neural, emotional and 
physiological attunement <…> story is the grease and glue of society <...> story homogenizes 
us; it makes us one.”105 
 
 In 1932 Socialist Realism becomes the official doctrine of the Soviet Union, 
consequently, the language of power. Socialist Realist novels show the archetypal portraits of 
the post-war enemies. These characters give birth to the Cold war mythology, the first world 
epic over the next fifty years. At the beginning of the Cold War the Soviet Union already has 
a twenty-year experience of propaganda literature. In the 1930s the Red Army viewed fiction 
as "one of the most powerful tools for the organization and education of the masses."
106
 
According to the axiom proposed in 1934 at the First Congress of the Soviet writers, “socialist 
realism is the basic method of Soviet literature and literary criticism. It demands of the artist 
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the truthful, historically concrete representation of reality in its revolutionary development. 
Moreover, the truthfulness and historical concreteness of the artistic representation of reality 
must be linked with the task of ideological transformation and education of workers in the 
spirit of socialism.” As Yuri Olesha puts it, the writer is “the engineer of the human souls” 
whose task is to make people support the Party and its struggle for the victory of Communism. 
This doctrine is maintained after Stalin’s death. In 1954, at the Second Congress of writers, 
Aleksej Surkov, First Secretary of the Directorate of the Writers’ Union, proclaims that 
"Literature is the sharp-edged weapon of socialist-political action. It is tightly connected to 
politics and is subordinate to the latter."
107
 In other words, Socialist Realism is a story 
between writer-politicians and people-reader. 
Importantly, Socialist Realism is – or, at least, ought to be – a mass phenomenon. 
“Saying “readers,” one implies “people.” In our country almost every literate person is a 
reader, as to the illiterate they are rare, it is an anomaly. The “people-reader” believes us, the 
Soviet writers.” 108  Such “people-reader” (or “worker-readers”) 109  is a great asset in the 
cultural war. Soviet literature has a strong social dimension. As Vera Dunham argues, 
“literature [stands] between the regime and the people, and [constitutes] the conversation 
between the two”110. It is an agora where the members of society can meet and deal with 
political issues. Besides, many fiction writers used to taking on a political function, producing 
texts with a totally political content. That is, for example, the case Nikolai Shpanov (The 
Diplomats with a Cloak and a Dagger, 1952 mentioned above or “Writer and Vigilance,” 
1953), Orest Maltsev (“Tito’s Chronicler,” 1949) and yet Vsevolod Kochetov (“The Naked 
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Kings. On the United States’ Aggressive Politics,” May 1960). Because of this social 
interaction “literature [is] not only a receiver of signal but a sender of them <...> [and] the 
most dominant existential clichés of Stalinism derive from literary models.”111 
 
From 1941 to 1943, the Party focuses its attention mainly on the war affaires and arts 
are not of paramount importance. However after the Stalingrad battle, zhdanovism 
(zhdanovshchina)
112
dissipates any hope of appeasement; on the opposite, the series of 
‘ideological resolutions’ passed at the suggestion of the Head of the Propaganda and Agitation 
Department of the Central Committee, Andrei Zhdanov, lets the Soviets an aftertaste of the 
late 1930s. After manifestations of bravery by the conscripts and their exposition to the West, 
the goal of these documents is to muzzle intelligentsia and to prevent any lack of loyalty to 
the regime: “The more will last the incontrollable flow of military memories <…>, the more 
definitely will appear the image of the disaster that has just occurred. The victory cannot 
conceal the failures of the regime. There is no doubt that Stalin understands it.” Besides, even 
the spontaneous expressions of enthusiasm are forbidden: “sincerity frightens by its 
unexpectedness.”113  Zhdanov dies in 1948, but the high ideological tension resulting from the 
resolutions (combined with the Cold War escalation) lasts until Stalin’s death. Concerning 
their form, one has to keep in mind that the “main difference between the 1946-1948 
resolutions and the previous ones is revealing: these are public documents <…> they are 
symbolic documents demonstrating power itself <…> they are the prelude of the campaign 
“against cosmopolitism” and of the new purge that Stalin planned to launch if death had not 
stopped him before."
114
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The first “ideological resolution,” which comes out on December 3, 1943: “On Raising 
the Responsibility of Secretaries of Literary Journals,” means to keep an eye on all possible  
ideological and political mistakes. New debates now focus on truth in the representation of 
war warning against “polishing” (lakirovka) as well as on the articulation between the 
individual and collective epos. Since Zhdanov was appointed by Stalin to direct the Soviet 
Union's cultural policy in 1946, he comes to grips with problem. Already on August 14, 1946 
he issues, perhaps, the most sensational resolution under the title “On the Journals Zvezda and 
Leningrad.” Both journals face a barrage of criticism from Zhdanov after welcoming 
Akhmatova and Zoshchenko on their pages. During his speeches at the meeting of the Party 
leaders and at the meeting of the writers in Leningrad Chairman of the Soviet of the Union 
hammers Zvezda and Leningrad for “the serious errors” as to have published the bourgeois, 
individualistic works of the poet and the satirist. The polemic talks are a mixture of the RAPP 
rhetoric of the 1920s-1930s (“apoliticism, bourgeois aristocratic aesthetics” and the like) and 
of the Terror of the 1930s (“sycophancy toward the West”). As a result, after such severe 
criticism of the editorial board, Leningrad is closed. On 14 May, 1947 a meeting takes place 
in the Kremlin gathering Stalin, Molotov, Zhdanov, and the leadership of the Writers’ Union. 
The meeting concludes in a document, edited by Stalin himself that prescribes to struggle 
against intelligentsia bent toward “sycophancy toward the West.” This was the beginning of a 
wide-scale campaign against the influence of the West. Fadeev re-enters the fray a couple of 
weeks later at the meeting of the Writers’ Union, and opposes the revolutionary tradition to 
the Veselovsky School based on comparatism and stressing the importance of Western 
European contribution to the Russian culture. Fadeev speech urges a debate on Veselovsky 
during the summer and autumn of 1947 in Literaturnaia Gazeta and Oktiabr. For the critic 
48 
 
Lev Plotkin, the comparative method, presenting Russian culture as a permanent borrowing to 
Europe, is “self-humiliating.”115 
 
The resolution on music (February 1948) and the article in Kul’tura i zhizn “Against 
bourgeois liberalism in literary studies” (March 11, 1948) shows the shift from sycophancy to 
“cosmopolitism.” The latter is systematically opposed to the “patriotic education of Soviet 
people.” The press widely echoes the message: “The dark henchmen of Churchill and Truman 
work in the shadows under the flag of cosmopolitism.”116 
The anti-cosmopolitan campaign hardens in January 1949 with the article “Against the 
antipatriotic group of theatre critics.”117 It is also a weapon of internal bureaucratic war for 
Fadeev, the general secretary of the Writers’ Union, to struggle against the rising influence, 
after Zhdanov death, of the chief of Agitation and Propaganda Dmitry Shepilov. Indeed, the 
latter has published the articles of these critics on propaganda fiction. In 1947-1948, following 
Zhdanov resolutions, many plays were focused on patriotism. But from this 1949 campaign, 
cosmopolitism is clearly associated with anti-Semitism. The Pravda article is soon followed 
by a series of arrests of the members of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee as well as voicing 
in press “international Zionist conspiracy.” Soon the literary critics are included in the 
“cosmopolites without kith or kin.” Most of them, who took part in the Zhdanov policy, lost 
their job and party card. Some of them even praised the “patriotic plays.” Regardless of their 
blind loyalty, they become part of numerous victims of the post-war purge orchestrated from 
above. The only relevant criterion is the national one. Gradually, the campaign extends in all 
the spheres of art and culture (music, cinema, philosophy…). After the creation of NATO in 
April 1949, cosmopolitanism  is given the second place due to the tightening of the Soviet 
bloc. Moreover, the fear of the “Tito virus” draws the attention of the propagandists to trace 
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cosmopolitan traitors in the Eastern bloc and among the capitalist countries. However, some 
articles on the “poison of cosmopolitanism” concerning USSR can still be found in 1950.118  
 With the reinforcement of the Cold War and the financing of covert action (Mutual 
Security Act, October 1951), the leitmotiv of vigilance toward the “diplomats with a Cloak 
and a Dagger” is on everyone’s mind. The surfacing of this word announces the return of the 
internal enemy after almost four years of absence (since the press campaign were previously 
focused on the external enemy, see Chapter 2) . Khrushchev’s speech at the XIXth Congress 
of the Party in October 1952 is dedicated to this topic along with “the encirclement by 
capitalist countries, which send us their spies striving to take advantage of oblivious citizen 
and to conduct subversive actions.”119 
  
So, simultaneously with the Red Scare in America, issues of domestic policy 
combined with the Cold War pressure have resulted in the solid taking in hands of the arts – 
and especially literature – by the Party. Stalin, “the first reader in this country of readers”120 is 
personally involved in the cultural policy: he reads himself the main novels, oversees the 
content of the literary journals, and holds the last word in attributing the Prizes. But “besides 
Stalin’s benevolence and the editors’ agendas, another force that shaped literature <…> is the 
readership itself <…> more often they write to praise the work, but occasionally the readers 
could be quite critical. At times they even write to object to an opinion expressed in Pravda 
<…> although massive, widespread, and open defiance of officially expressed viewpoints 
<…> that would in a few years become central to the atmosphere of the Thaw are not yet 
visible.”121 Hence, the possibility for the readers to demonstrate their vigilance and take an 
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active part in the ‘enemy hunt.’ Like a stock market index, these books record with precision 
any significant change in the domestic debates or international relations. 
 
Confirming Schmitt’s theory, the highest intensity of Communist propaganda during 
Stalin’s last decade correlates with the representation in fiction and press of a concrete and 
powerful enemy. Thus, the analysis of the crafting of the enemy in the coming case studies 
will allow to better understand the Soviet policy and mentalities of that time. 
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Chapter 2. Case Studies: The Enemy Outside. The Works of Ilya 
Ehrenburg and Nikolay Shpanov 
 
1- Presentation 
 
The four novels below investigate the roots of World War II. They consist in two sets of 
two-volume books by Ilya Ehrenburg and Nikolay Shpanov, both stalwarts of Socialist 
Realism. In them the enemy ideally corresponds to the Stalinist tenets: he is the political 
enemy (the capitalists or their allies) and represents a material, physical and lethal threat to 
the Communists and to European proletarians, whom the Soviet Union pretends to protect 
 
Ilya Ehrenburg 
Ilya Ehrenburg (1891-1967) was a writer, journalist, play writer, poet, and translator. 
After his childhood in Kiev and Moscow, in 1908 he set off for Paris where he had stayed 
eight years, then came back to Russia. In the 1920s and 1930s he has frequently traveled 
across Europe and the Soviet Union working as a reporter for the newspapers Izvestia and 
publishing his novels and poems. He saw the rise of totalitarian ideologies and the birth of 
fascism in Europe: he happened to be in Austria before the Anschluss, in Spain at the moment 
the civil war burst out in July 1936, and he sheltered in the Soviet embassy of Paris when the 
Nazis invaded the city in June 1940. Then Ehrenburg flew back to Moscow and, after the 
Barbarossa began one year later, he became a prolific war correspondent who wrote about 
three thousand newspaper articles during the war period. His propagandist columns were 
aimed to support actively the Soviet people both on the front and behind the lines. After the 
Allied Victory, Ehrenburg, already a notorious cultural figure with “boiling energy, always in 
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movement,”122 devotes himself to the struggle for peace and against fascism. As a leader of 
the communist peace movement, in March 1950 he took part in the Stockholm Appeal of the 
Permanent Committee of the World Peace Congress. In his speech, Ehrenburg stresses his 
“hatred towards the warmongers” and calls for the total prohibition of nuclear weapons.123  
 Because of his intense political activities, some critics have thought that in Ehrenburg 
the journalist prevailed over the artist. In her paper devoted to the 70th anniversary of the 
writer,
124
 the literary critic Galina Belaya makes clear this question by quoting Pablo Picasso: 
“when I hear people talking about the growth of the artist <…> it seems they don't understand 
that it is all the same image, reflected at various surfaces;” the critic goes on: “Ehrenburg is a 
lyric poet <…> he creates pictures that touch us by their humanity.” This statement is 
confirmed by the writer himself when he says in one interview that “a book cannot be written 
on order. “One should go through the novel first.”125 In the article “Ernest Hemingway,” he 
also states that “a book cannot be written according to a plan: "One has to fall sick with the 
book.”126 But “at the same time," Belaya continues," Ehrenburg reaches an epic scale <…> he 
shows the life of society through the stories of numerous human destinies <…> he puts time 
to the test of man and man to the test of time <…> his works reveal not as much the nature of 
the people than the nature of the epoch.” 
  
The Fall of Paris was written from September 1940 until January 1942 and first came 
out in the journal Znamia (1941, №3-6; 1942, № 3-4) and then, in 1942, as a separate book. 
His essays “Defeat of France”127 and “The Fall of Paris”128 on the same subject preceded the 
novel, but then the theme of the Nazi invasion of France was marginalized due to the 
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Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. The plot develops from the early 1936, tainted with the climate of 
hope and fervor before the elections, until July 14th, 1940 in the “dead and occupied Paris”.129 
The aim of the novel is to show that “defeat of France didn't happen on the shores of the Maas 
but much more earlier, in the silent Parisian cabinets during autumn 1938.”130 Speaking of his 
work twenty years later, the author points to some defects: “Where was I wrong? Showing 
people totally engaged in the political battle <…> I haven’t found enough colors, I often used 
black and white brushstrokes to describe them <…> and I eventually oversimplified some 
characters or situations.”131  
It is interesting to compare Ehrenburg’s novel with the book written by Herbert R. 
Lottman
132
 under the same title which came out half a century later.
133
 Based on many 
unpublished archive materials, it looks like a day by day chronicle of Paris life from May 9
th
 
until June 23
rd
. The reader can discover a crowd of refugees, native Parisians, diplomats, 
government officials, and foreign journalists including Ilya Ehrenburg. One can learn that 
after the German invasion, the Red herald found refuge in the Soviet embassy where he “was 
watching the exodus” (p. 281). Walking around the garden of the embassy, he would hear 
“happy shouts and singing wafting from inside the Italian compound. He could even identify 
the song, the fascist hymn Giovinezza” (p. 252). The book also reveals that Ehrenburg was on 
a diplomatic mission: on the recommendation of Charles Hilsum, the head of the Paris Soviet 
Bank, on May 24
th
 French Public Works Minister Anatole de Monzie asked Ehrenburg to 
convey a request for Soviet planes to the chargé d’affaires Nikolai Ivanov. Ivanov did send a 
cable to Moscow but Paul Reynaud, Prime Minister and Minister of War, eventually objected 
and stopped the case (p. 113-115). 
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Ehrenburg’s novel is composed of three parts. The first one, covering the period from 
early 1936 until Spring 1938, deals with the victory of the Popular Front at the Parliamentary 
elections, the wave of strikes that followed, also the decision of the government not to 
intervene in the Spanish Civil War broke up in July 1936. The second part runs from the 
moment Daladier came to power until the beginning of the “phoney war;” it is the time when 
the Munich agreement was signed, dividing France between two camps. Moreover, a part of 
public opinion considered that the Popular Front had weakened the country with a number of 
social reforms. Pacifism is very popular among the “generation of fire”134 which has gone 
through the World War I. As to France, she is diplomatically isolated and unprepared from the 
military point of view; the headquarters expect a defensive war having nothing in common 
with coming Hitler’s Blitzkrieg. The third part of the novel describes the “phony war” with its 
demoralized, downtrodden soldiers and the lightning defeat followed by the armistice in June 
1940. The main protagonists can be gathered into three groups: French elites (generals Breteil, 
Lerideau, Picard; politicians Paul Tessa, Auguste Viard, Foujé, Grandel; businessmen 
Montigny and Desser; journalist Joliot). All of them – except Desser who repents during the 
novel – are preoccupied with their own career, wealth, and narrow wellbeing. The second 
group of protagonists stands for the French people who, on the contrary, join the Resistant 
movements and are ready to sacrifice their lives in order to save their motherland: painter 
André Carnot, engineer Pierre Dubois and his wife Agnès, actress Jeannette. Among the 
resistants one can find the faithful communists such as Michaux, Jeannot, Legré, and Denise. 
The last group counts some foreign officials, German officers and Anglo-American diplomats 
who represent the threat or, at best, show themselves unable to provide any help against the 
enemy invasion. 
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 The novel was warmly acclaimed by the critics. In order to understand the context of 
such a reception, one has to keep in mind that “the book came out in 1942, when the Soviet 
people were enduring the bitterness of retreat and it was particularly important to unveil the 
genuine reasons of the French defeat.”135 As Alexandr Fadeev writes, it is “a novel on the 
recent past from which one can learn a few historical lessons”136; Alexandr Dymshits holds 
with this opinion saying that the “book that teaches much 137 <…> one needs it and it is 
indispensable to life.” Evgeny Petrov considers the book as “one of the most convincing 
testimonies (документов обвинения) against the genuine culprits of the French defeat”.138 
Even the “bourgeois newspaper” Daily Telegraph139 could not hide that “in Ilya Ehrenburg’s 
novel one can find the clearest presentation of the events which have led to the French 
defeat.” No wonder that Western newspapers were much less enthusiastic: “the author is 
unkind only to the socialists,”140 regrets the rightist socialist Pierre Motal; “the Soviet author 
is not a philosopher <…> he describes the ruling class as if it were composed exclusively of 
indecisive and shabby people <…> as to the working class, in the book it is deprived of any 
apparent defect.”141 The book itself has become a symbol of resistance; according to some 
testimonies in 1942, in Novocherkassk, the Germans shot down an old school teacher for the 
only reason that they found in his house a copy of Ehrenburg’s novel.”142 At home the Soviet 
critic N. Filippov
143
 evaluates The Fall of Paris as the “artistic triumph of Ehrenburg and of 
the Soviet literature as a whole” since the “Soviet Union is the only country where an 
instructive chapter of French history can be written.” Indeed, he laments, “the majority of the 
works dedicated to the French defeat (memoirs, military and strategic studies, diaries, political 
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pamphlets) written by the French authors are nothing else than the perpetuation of the 
political struggle of the Third Republic <…> Ehrenburg’s task is much more grave and 
noble.” Along with other critics, such as T. Motyliova 144  and I. Lezhniov, 145  Filippov 
appreciates the character of the communist Michaux: “this representative of French worker, 
clever and resolute, is very nice.” Motyleva states that “the reader expects the mass print of 
The Fall of Paris;” “the book will be greedily read with the tireless attention, and it deserves 
it.” She considers the book as historical because the described events are not only shown but 
also interpreted.” Illustrating Belaya’s remark, Motyleva asks the following question: “do we 
have here a novel or a report? One thing is certain: the Ehrenburg as a journalist helped much 
Ehrenburg as a writer.” The book was awarded the Stalin Prize (first grade) for 1941. The 
same year the Stalin Prizes were given to the works which show “the titanic struggle of Soviet 
people for the honor and freedom of its motherland <…> which reveal the villainous and 
bestial face of German fascism.”146 
 
 Six years later, Ehrenburg was anew awarded the Stalin Prize, already for his novel 
The Tempest published in the thick review Novy Mir.
147
 “Thoughts on The Tempest, as the 
author later recalls, dated from the war period <…> To me, the war began in the summer 
1936 and, when it finally ended on May 9
th
, 1945 I wished it ended for me as well. I knew if I 
began to write this book, the war would remain in my office, on my desk, in my 
consciousness and heart. I started this work because I could not escape from my memories, I 
could not shirk what I felt was my duty.”148 The literary critic S. Obraztsov is not far from the 
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truth when he says that “Ehrenburg could not refrain from writing The Tempest since it 
contains the overall results of the whole part of his life.”149  
 The beginning of the Cold War matched with the years when the book was written: 
“these years convinced Ehrenburg that peace is still fragile.”150 In his article “Word as the 
Weapon,” he stresses an aspect of war especially important to him: “Absorbed by the war, 
many failed to notice the extent to which the world changed.”151 According to Belaya, “like in 
The Fall of Paris, the writer focuses his attention not on the battlefield but on the subjective 
perception of the world at a time of huge social changes. That is why the main conflict of the 
epoch – the confrontation between fascism and antifascism – is exposed in The Tempest 
through the abundance of individual fates all dependent on the enormous social conflicts 
<…> Like in his previous book, Ehrenburg’s aim is not to recreate the clash of two worlds, 
the struggle of two ideologies but to reveal the psychological context of politics, to write “on 
the break of the front, not like on a military operation but like a movement of the people’s 
conscience”152  <…> Ehrenburg sees the roots of the German defeat not so much in the 
strategic miscalculations of the German generals but in the instability and corruption of the 
German society <…> the writer is concerned about the way fascism depraves people and 
“dulls” of their  minds.”153 
 The novel is divided into six parts: the first one describes the climate in the pre-war 
Europe, characterized by carelessness and treasons in France and, on the contrary, obvious 
tensions in Moscow; the second part deals with the Phoney War in France, seen from the both 
sides of the front and waiting for the war in Moscow; the third part describes the Nazi assault 
on the Soviet Union, retreat of the Soviet troops, and the fight for Moscow; we also find in the 
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novel some pictures of France during German occupation. The fourth part is dedicated to the 
battle of Stalingrad and the expectation of the second front. Stalingrad becomes the symbol of 
victory over fascism. The fifth and sixth parts show the final defeat of fascism, the fall of 
Berlin and the liberation of European countries. 
 Because of the huge scale of the novel, the number of characters is very significant. 
Using the critic Y. Lukin's words, to understand the plot becomes harder “because of the 
kaleidoscopic flickering of faces, events, and countries.” 154  To Obraztsov, however, “the 
kaleidoscopic nature of the novel is not a problem;” he thinks that “Ehrenburg’s novel is not 
really written but written down (“ne napisannyi, a zapisannyi”) like a diary, like letters from 
the frontline. And this is not the defect in the novel but its strength.”155 By and large, one can 
gather all the protagonists according to the same three groups we meet in The Fall of Paris 
perhaps with slight changes peculiar to the Soviet characters: the French and Russian 
antifascist resistants (Sergey Vlakhov, “the intellectual and emotional center of the novel,”156 
and his siblings: brother Vasili, sister Olga, mother Nina Georgevna; Doctor Krylov; the 
French communists Mado Lancier, engineer Lejean, painter Roger Samba, professor Dumas, 
old wine grower Désiré, and the German communist Anna Rot);  traitors including the French 
elites and some Soviet citizens (businessmen Lancier, Pinaud, and Berthy, Roy and the poet 
Nivelle, the school teacher Stechenko); the third group includes the Germans Hans Shirke, 
anthropologist Keller and architect Richter, Willy Weber. All of them serve in Hitler’s army. 
In general, the reception of the book was very positive: “Ilya Ehrenburg wrote a work 
of great significance.”157 Once again, V. Kaverin raises the question about the literary genre: 
“One can wonder whether Ehrenburg’s activities as a war correspondent <…> are a sort of 
bridge between his two novels, The Fall of Paris and The Tempest. Indeed, the first one 
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foreshadows the coming of the tempest whereas the second one depicts the conclusions and 
shows the deep roots of victory.”158 Belaya adds: “the talk started in The Fall of Paris is 
followed and widened in The Tempest.”159 She underlines a “tragic dimension expressing the 
contradiction between the desire to live of the characters and their awareness that life is 
disrupted by the war.”160 It appears through the death of the main protagonist Sergey Vlakhov 
and the tune extracted from the resistant song repeated on several occasions in the book: “We 
would've liked to live but such is our destiny…” According to S. Obraztsov,161 “everything in 
the novel is settled in the movement of time  <…> the enormous role of the Communists in 
the struggle against fascism and for democracy and happiness of the people is the central topic 
of the book <…> the most valuable thing in the novel, although all events are accomplished, 
is that the end is not deprived of a feeling of historicity.” Fadeev goes further saying that “the 
ideological implication of the novel is directed not only towards the past but also towards the 
future.” 162  L. Skorino 163  sees The Tempest as a “philosophical novel based on the duel 
between two hostile ideas, two consciousnesses – the bourgeois individualistic and the Soviet 
socialist.” To him, the main feature of the book is its large scale: “Ehrenburg is the first who 
gives a picture of the whole World War II from its beginning until the fall of Berlin <…> 
Ehrenburg's epic novel is dedicated to the Soviet winner.” However, not all share this point of 
view: “the psychological aspect of the novel proved to be incoherent. The subject of the book 
required a clear epic plot <…> a monumental epos and pathos of heroic art.”164 
Debates on the epic character The Tempest take a new turn after M. Shkerin's critical 
remarks,
165
 they go beyond the particularities of the novel and now concern the literary canon 
in general and the figure of the Soviet hero in particular. In his paper Shkerin blames 
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Ehrenburg for “showing us the remnants of capitalism, showing us the monsters of our society 
and incapacity to show the definitely leading Soviet people:” the main character Sergey 
Vlakhov behaves spinelessly during the ideological talk; journalists are depicted with irony 
and appear ignorant, amoral, and jealous; women are obsessed with material comfort; 
engineers never take the initiative and admire their superior’s wisdom… The author doesn’t 
show the “genuine creative forces of the Soviet people; <…> the character and spiritual 
posture of the protagonists are not ours" («. Shkerin speculates on the economist Ossip Alper: 
“Are [his] features typical?” (p. 188). Indeed, 'typicality' («типичность») is the key criterion 
to define to what extent a text corresponds to the patterns of the Socialist Realist canon. As T. 
Trifonova will put it five years later: “The typical is the main sphere of expression of the 
loyalty to the Party in realist art. The problem of typicality is always a political problem.”166 
“Until 1952, the problem of the typical had been solved in a quite simple way: good is typical, 
no good is untypical.” 167  So when in 1948, when Shkerin criticizes the characters in 
Ehrenburg’s novel for not being enough ‘typical’, it means that the author doesn’t observe the 
canon. 
Needless to say, such an accusation of the living Soviet classic could not remain 
unnoticed, so the choir of critics gathered their efforts to defend the writer. Nevertheless, the 
real motive of their disagreement is still unclear: Shkerin’s insolence or the content of his 
arguments? Y. Lukin, for example, complains that M. Shkerin “totally ignores many positive 
sides of the novel <…> his judgement is mostly unfair <…> and one cannot avoid to express 
reservations regarding the sharp tone of the paper.”168 But in the same text, he underlines that 
The Tempest “does not illustrate clearly enough how the typical features of the genuine Soviet 
man reveal themselves in the struggle with [negative] characters;” further, he is outraged that 
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Olga’s marriage of convenience is “not typical.” Similarly, Nikolay Zhdanov 169  roughly 
declares that “Shkerin’s partisan critique has nothing to do with the sane ideological and 
aesthetic standards.” At the same time he notices that in the novel “there is no hero 
corresponding to the scale of the book.” He wonders: “maybe the abundance of characters, 
events, and situations <…> urged the fragmentation of the novel into tiny bits and episodes?”  
S. Shtut
170
 dislikes the “loud bass voice” of Shkerin’s paper. She assumes that the latter did 
not get the main idea of the author: “the characters are neither monsters, nor ideal good-
lookers <…> by liberating his characters from their inherent defects <…> Ehrenburg wants to 
show the growth of the Soviet people during the war.” Fadeev holds with the same thought171: 
“reading the first chapters, most of the characters cannot be qualified as heroic, but these 
people become brave and heroic during the war <…> showing the movement of their 
destinies is the ground task of literature.”  So, all the critics paradoxically argue that 
Ehrenburg follows the canon although the characters of the novel are untypical. 
The most accurate interpretation of The Tempest can be found in B. Brainina’s 
paper:
172
 “M. Shkerin’s article broke the record of scholasticism and rationalism. He takes a 
position of the prosecutor or investigator who tries to catch the criminal. The criminal is the 
author himself and his characters because they do not fit to the crude and rough scheme to 
which M. Shkerin wants to reduce the diversity of [the book’s] ideological conflicts and 
human destinies.” Time and again, one may assume that the characters in The Tempest are not 
typical, rigorously speaking, and that the writer skews the canon. Perhaps the reason of such 
skewing lies in Ehrenburg's long war experience that finally transformed the stalwart Stalinist 
into a more sober observer of his contemporaries. During the war, he saw the heroes who felt 
anxiety, like the ordinary people, and the ordinary people who behave as the heroes. The 
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writer is never a machine, but a human being. And after such an existential discovery, 
Ehrenburg may have wished to write not a “story of the true man,” told by Boris Polevoy, but 
a “story of the true people.” Unlike The Fall of Paris, whose simplistic narrative was later a 
matter of regret, the kaleidoscopic Tempest is less unequivocal. In a certain sense the novel is 
at a literary crossroads: it follows the Chekhov tradition of the “small man” and anticipates 
the Khrushchev Thaw literature. 
 
Nikolay Shpanov 
 
As for the conventional critics, some writers perfectly hold with the Socialist Realist 
canon. It was the case of Nikolay Shpanov (1896-1961).
173
 Born in 1896 in Ussuriysk (near 
Vladivostok) to a railman family, Shpanov graduated from the Polytechnic Institute and the 
High School for Aeronautics. He took part in World War I. In 1918 he volunteered in the Red 
Army and served about twenty years in the Naval Air Forces. The author of thirty books, he 
started writing regularly from 1926 and became a professional writer in 1939 when he 
published his first novel The First Blow. During his service in the 1920s, Shpanov had also 
written many publications on air force, including a monograph on the aircraft engines and a 
handbook for flight schools; later in the 1930s he is involved in the 'conquest of Arctic' and 
takes part in several expeditions to the polar circle.  
The First Blow. Story on the Upcoming War (Pervy Udar. Povest’ o Budushchei 
Voine) made Shpanov famous; the novel appeared in the collection called “Soviet military 
fiction.” The plot is about a conflict between the Third Reich and the Soviet Union. The 
Soviet Air force launches a successful raid into Germany. In 1938 the film Deep Raid 
                                                          
173
 For more details about Nikolay Shpanov see Советские детские писатели: био-библиографический 
словарь. М., 1961; Русские советске писатели прозаики. Т.6. Ч.2. М., 1969; КЛЭ. Т.8. (В.Н.Чуванов); 
Некролог // Литературная газета. 1961. №119. 5 окт. С.4. see also the leading article by M. Lepekhin on 
http://www.az-libr.ru/index.htm?Persons&000/Src/0010/de0d5c70 consulted on March 24th, 2016. 
63 
 
(Glubokiy Raid) came out, directed by Piotr Malakhov with Shpanov as a screenwriter. The 
story of the film will be echoed in The First Blow. Vsevolod Vyshnevsky, a writer and a 
future laureate of the Stalin Prize, deemed the novel “successful”: “it captivatingly describes 
the future war of the Soviet people against the aggressors, the final war against the enemies of 
socialism") As the ‘avant-garde’ of the Stalinist war doctrine, both the book and the movie 
were witdrawn after the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. During World War II, Shpanov wrote a 
number of popular episodes of agitation literature entitled The Secret of Professor Burago 
overwhelmed with his favorite characters: cruel spies, witty counterintelligence agent, 
reckless superiors, and vigilant Soviet citizen. Later he went to political novels: the trilogy 
Incendiaries (1949), Plotters (1951), and Hurricane (1961). In 1952 he published the 
pamphlet Cloak-and-Dagger Diplomats whose "noble task [was] to tear off the masks of the 
war incendiaries, to reveal the criminal activity of the revenge-seekers, and to call on people 
of good will to join the struggle against the threat of war. He made a substantial contribution 
to adventure fiction, since he saw the latter not only as a leisure reading, but as one of the 
ways to educate the young generation.”174 Incendiaries and Plotters gained wide popularity 
among the Soviet readers and were republished in several dozens of editions.
175
 This success 
was not haphazard. The novelty of the subject, suspense and references to some secret reports 
along with the meticulous updating by the author at each new issue placed Shpanov's work at 
the front of the Stalinist literary propaganda. Besides, one can also consider Incendiaries and 
Plotters as an attempt to write political thrillers, like John Le Carré nowadays, that fed the 
feeling of a constant threat common to the Soviet people of the epoch. According to the 
                                                          
174
 Obituary, Literaturnaya Gazeta, № 119 October 5th, 1961.  
175
 M. Lepekhin mentions “several dozens of republications (Ibid.) He explains it as follows: “due to the lack of 
adventure novels, many readers were more inclined to see in such books an adventure story than its ideological 
content. In spite of the fact that Shpanov used to draft all the documents he was quoting <…>, he gained a 
reputation of being informed in the state secrets.” The website laboratoria fantastiki says about eleven editions 
of Incendiaries from 1949 until 1955 (five of which date back from after Stalin’s death) with the total number of 
765 thousand copies: https://fantlab.ru/blogarticle36451 (consulted on March 25th, 2016). Another source tells 
that “From 1952 to 1954 Plotters was reprinted seven times that reaches half a million copies.” See 
Zapreshchennye knigi russkih pisateleyi literaturovedov. 1917-1991. Index of the Soviet censorship with 
commentary, A. Blum (ed.), (Saint-Petersburg: Ministry of Culture of the Russian Federation, 2003), p. 198. 
64 
 
journalist Sergey Slavgorodsky, Yulian Semyonov resorted to the same conspiratorial scheme 
when he was writing his book series on Schtierlitz
176
 and encouraging his colleagues to “learn 
from Shpanov.”177 
In spite of his importance at the time, Shpanov preferred to keep his distance from the 
power and literary milieu. After 1955 he fell in disgrace: his books went out of print and two 
of them were withdrawn from libraries and bookshops. Plotters was banned because of its 
open anti-Titoist content and Diplomats because the book discussed the political processes in 
the Eastern Europe organized by the communist parties at the turn of the 1950s. After the 
XX
th
 Congress, he was doomed to be a rotten writer whose works appeared in such marginal 
publishing houses as Trudreservizdat and Voyenizdat. Many of his writings came out of 
oblivion in the post-Soviet period. For example, the publishing house Veche republished 
Incendiaries (2013) and Plotters (2014) in the collection “War adventures.” 
 
The plot of Incendiaries develops from December 1932 until the invasion of Prague 
by Hitler’s troops on March 15th, 1939. The novel is, perhaps, the first socialist political 
thriller in which the events are shown on international scale. It deals with the circumstances of 
the beginning of World War II. Quite in the same way as he has described the technical 
characteristics of the plane engines in his handbooks, in his two volumes of literary work 
Shpanov “shows the technology of how the imperialist predators with the help of socialist 
traitors unleash the World war.”178 The novel combines both fiction and reality, historical 
figures and imagined characters. For example, we find an interview given in 1934 by Stalin to 
Herbert Wells (p. 212) and the name of the French political journalist Geneviève Tabouis (p. 
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234, 264, 282).
179
 The story falls into five parts: the first one introduces the main protagonists 
who can be gathered into three groups: economic elites, such as the American financial 
magnate John Vandengheim, chief “incendiary,” who funds German re-armament; Carl Bosch, 
the head of the German company Farbenindustrie, and Lord Creffield, an English speculator 
and one of Vandengheim’s relatives. The second group includes Western military and 
political elites: Franklin Roosevelt and Foster Dollas (for John Foster Dulles); Hitler, 
Himmler, Göring, high-ranking officers (general Schverer), and the head of the SA (Storm 
Battalion) Ernst Röhm; the French generals Legasnier and Gamelin, Prime Minister Daladier 
and Minister of Foreign Affairs Barthou. Along with these “rulers of the world”, who only 
care about their private interests, we meet the communists who struggle for peace: the leader 
of German Communist Party Ernst Thälmann and the Bulgarian communist leader Georgy 
Dimitrov who were arrested after the Reichstag fire in 1933. They are supported by members 
of the international brigades (painter Tsikhauer, singer Zinn, violinist Louis) in Spain and 
Czechoslovakia and by some humble party members like the driver Frantz Lemke and floor 
cleaner Yan Boyce. The first part of the novel shows the Leipzig process against the 
communist leaders and internal rivalries for power in Germany. A special stress has been laid 
on the fight between the SA members and soldiers from the German regular army. The second 
part of the novel deals with Hitler’s seizure of power and, particularly after Hindenburg’s 
death, with the rise of anti-Semitism and the creation of Hitler’s recruits army. The reader is 
given much information about geopolitics through the diplomatic intrigues between 
Yugoslavia, France, Germany, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom: “Europe is sitting 
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on a powder keg” (p. 310). Meanwhile the Machiavellian Vandengheim gathers industrial and 
political leaders in his Swiss castle to prepare the awakening of the German war machine. The 
third part is focused on the Spanish war (1936-1937). The fourth part, unfolding in the spring 
1938, describes Hitler’s East European politics with the “route march to the East,” and 
Austrian Anschluss. At last, the fifth part depicts the preparation of the German attack of 
Sudetenland and Prague: Vandengheim ensures that the French and English elites will remain 
passive during the Nazi campaign; moreover, an assassination attempt of two English officials 
and one German general during their Czech journey is to legitimize Chamberlain’s and 
Hitler’s hostility toward the defenseless country. German general staff draws the plans of the 
operation while German, American, and English businessmen speculate on Czechoslovak 
economic jewels.  
Plotters covers the period from 1939 until 1949. The first half of the book, entitled 
“Crime,” describes the situation in America and Europe from March 1939 until the eve of 
Barbarossa: the White House, the Vatican, Germany, Spain, the invasions of Poland, and 
France, then the Franco-German armistice. The second part, "Before the Retribution", gives 
much room for the Far Eastern military theatre: the failed diversion against the pro-
communist government in Mongolia, the air battle between the pilots of Chiang Kai-shek, 
supported by the US, and those of the People’s Liberation Army, supported by the Soviets 
(chapter four); the sixth chapter concerns the communist partisans’ attack on the catholic 
mission in Taiwan where American and pro-Chiang officials gathered and planned 
bacteriological attack against China and Siberia. But happily, thanks to the skilful Communist 
agents, the stock of weapons is destroyed and enemy leaders, killed or captured, crown the 
crushing victory of the Reds. Chapters five and seven deal with the end of Hitler’s Germany, 
the Nuremberg trial, and the first skirmishes of the Cold War: threatening John Vandengheim 
entertain his dark intentions to submit economically Europe and rebirth the Nazi German 
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military industry; the Vatican, backed by Washington, keeps up its ‘crusade against the Soviet 
Union’. The reader also gets to know the struggle for influence in Berlin between the Soviet 
and the three other occupying forces. Naturally, American spies are eventually arrested by the 
Soviet commandant. The latter gives way to his hope for a peaceful Germany, whose future 
belongs to the German people establishing friendly relations with the Russian neighbour. The 
ultimate assassination of Ernst Schverer, a former SS soldier and member of the pro-Nazi 
militia in Western Berlin by his brother Egon, a pro-communist engineer living in Eastern 
Berlin, symbolises the emergence of a new antifascist generation. 
 
A brief glance at the archives shows that the first publication of the novel was a 
tormenting process. On March 29, 1949 Nikolay Shpanov addressed Stalin with a “two 
issues” letter motivating this step as his last hope. The “first issue” concerns his novel 
Incendiaries: “In 1947 I submitted it to the publishing house Molodaya Gvardiya. Since then 
there has been a lot of fuss and trouble around it, numerous arguments were invented to keep 
the book unpublished. The genuine reason is cowardice and playing safe. Even comrade 
Voroshilov's intervention didn't bring the publishers round. Neither the actuality of the subject 
nor the current political climate didn't make them recall the great Lenin’s words: “It is 
necessary to explain to the people the true circumstances, that big secret from which war 
comes into existence…” Reactions given by the journals worry me as well. In spite of the 
support of Simonov and Fadeev, both Novy Mir and Znamya declined publication. I 
wholeheartedly feel my righteousness as I felt it ten years ago when I was struggling for my 
First blow. I am convinced that people need such books, and that their publication must not be 
a matter of years but of weeks and even days. I request the Central Committee to help this 
project along.”180  
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Indeed, on February 28, 1949, the internal reviewer of Znamya B. Leontyev
181
 
reported that “Shpanov's manuscript doesn’t deserve publication <…> it is a fictionalized 
chronicle of the interwar period <…> the author illustrates a “historic note” of the 
Sovinformburo.” He found regrettable that the manuscript “provokes an unhealthy interest in 
Hitler’s private life and in the spies’ dangerous activities.” Besides, the critic G. Mdivani also 
expressed concerns about the fact that “Hitler’s caricature humanizes him.”182 However the 
main peril of Incendiaries is to show the “giddy success of Hitlerism.” He resumed: “showing 
the negative influence of the Anglo-American reaction on peace, the author overestimates the 
role and might of this bloc.” In the same vein, in January 1950 M. Meyman, PhD in 
economics, wrote to Stalin:
183
 “Instead of showing the vile treason of Czechoslovakia by 
Western countries, the author loses any common sense and presents the predatory Hitlerite 
Germany as an innocent Gretchen seduced by the Anglo-American Mephistopheles <…> 
such an approach diminishes the difficulty and importance of the Soviet victories <…> and 
such falsifications could be used by anti-Soviet propaganda.”  
 Finally, some other critics preferred using humour to castigate Shpanov’s deformed 
imagination. So we have Abram Markovich Intriguers (Intrigany),
184
 a “historico-politico-
international-documental epic with one thousand characters <…> the Martian United States 
ambassador’s rapacious profile against the window was prominent <…> Pope Eugenio 
Papacelli exclaimed – “I bless the whole solar system in the name of the holy Church… may 
Andromeda sell weapons to Orion” <…> Secretary of State Dean Sobacheson was holding a 
grudge against Khruman, Khruman was intriguing against Perchill <…> the Americans were 
buying the English for dollars, the English were buying the French for pounds, the French 
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were selling themselves for a breadcrumb <…> to keep track on the events, to remember 
anything was absolutely impossible <…> the facts were checked, not fully checked and fully 
unchecked <…> with such abundance of facts the author’s profile doesn't show up against the 
window.” 
The critics were far from being unanimous. Contrary to Leontyev and Markovich, the 
internal reviewers from the editorial board of Znamya have shared their enthusiasm: 
“purposeful and diverting, the novel presents the prewar international events, wrote M. 
Tolchonov to Vsevolod Vyshnevsky
185
 <…> it discloses major preparations behind the scenes 
of the Second World War <…> thanks to its enormous political significance, it allows to shed 
light not only upon the past (although that’s important too!) but also upon the postwar 
international situation and on the two camps standing now in the international arena <…> it 
could be useful to launch an abridged version <…> I am convinced that the book is 
worthwhile and needed”. Vyshnevsky replied: "Pyotr Vershigora, 186  the chairman of the 
military commission at the Writers’ Union, gave me Shpanov's manuscript and, you know, 
that’s interesting <…> the text should be shortened one-third of its length. The author has 
worked much with the sources, it deserves your attention.”  After the publication of the book 
on August 23, 1949, the same Tolchonov gave his feedback entitled “On the culprits of 
war”187: after having reminded of the writer’s goal (“when cannons keep silence and printing 
machines are shooting, each Soviet writer is a soldier”), he claimed that Shpanov’s project 
was to give an “artistic interpretation” (khudozhestvennaya interpretatsia) of Lenin’s 
statement about the capitalist union”: imperialists from all over the world necessarily unite 
with each other to protect their capital. Among the qualities of the book Tolchonov names 
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ideological saturation, the descriptions of Spain and Blum’s treason, and how the author 
shows the “machine of international intelligence;” the plot is clear and logic but, he regretted, 
“such print rates of the war literature are unacceptable.” He has also pointed to the absence of 
an index with historical and political names and events. On the occasion of the Stalin Prize for 
1951, the editorial board of Molodaya Gvardiya wrote an assessment to promote Plotters.
188
 
A. Rybin and A. Lipatov argued that the book very convincingly “unveils the dirty business of 
the Wall Street magnates directed against the democratic camp <…> it shows the greatness 
and power of the Soviet Union <…> as well as international brigades’ cohesion.” Sympathies 
between the author and the publishing house seem to be reciprocal: in a letter to his friend 
Beslaev, Shpanov shares his delight on seeing the success of the second edition of 
Incendiaries in Molodaya Gvardiya and the preparation of the third one.
189
 B. Krylov joined 
the writer’s supporters when he saw in Incendiaries a “useful and precious piece of work.”190 
A. Fateev notes that Literaturnaya Gazeta from December 28, 1949 stressed its “partyness” 
and that Grigory Malenkov gave orders to help Shpanov with the second volume.
191
 In his 
letter to the Commission of literary theory and criticism at the direction of the Writers’ Union, 
the soldier Ivan Lemeshko wrote that Incendiaries was translated in Hungarian and German 
and expressed his interest in possible futures translations: “I think that this book teaches us 
vigilance and hatred against fascism; the Soviet Union must be interested in showing to the 
people who are their enemies.”192 
Regardless of their opinion, many critics can’t avoid the question of literary genre. 
B. Krylov marveled that Shpanov “created a work of a new genre: the political novel.” Quite 
the contrary, B. Leontyev rued a “deleterious hybrid” (вредный гибрид) where 
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“irresponsiveness of the author’s fantasy replaces historical and scientific researches, also the 
faithfulness of memoirs.” Tolchonov preferred to speak about an “international novel” 
(международный роман) whose «artistic merit is a strong mean to influence the reader and 
to get him on our board <…> an artistic generalization intermingled with a journalistic 
digressions are not only tolerable but authorized and rational since they allow the reader to 
familiarize with the complex questions of international politics.” As for the author himself, in 
his letter to Beslaev he was not afraid of naming his book a “monster-novel” (роман-
монстр). One can assume that he had in mind its size or its topic: the titles of the books speak 
for themselves: both the volumes are focused on the enemies giving their detailed description. 
After this overview of our case-studies and their reception, let’s have a look at the frightening 
figures of these four “monster-novels.”    
 
2- Faces of the Enemy 
 
 In the novels of Ehrenburg and Shpanov we see four types of enemies haunting the 
1930s and 1940s. All of them can be related to the “capitalist camp.” To be specific, we have 
the Machiavellian enemy (the Anglo-Americans), the enemy on the battlefield (the Nazis, the 
Japanese, and the Guomindang warriors), and two kinds of Anglo-Americans’ allies (the 
Vatican, the Trotskyites on the one hand, and European elites on the other hand). To underline 
the main difference between the two writers, one can emphasize that Ehrenburg limits himself 
to “official characters” (ministers, military men, economic leaders), whereas Shpanov plunges 
into the underground world of spies and other agents operating behind the scenes. In this 
sense, it seems that Ehrenburg is much closer than Shpanov to such movies as Meeting on the 
Elbe (1949, on the relationships between the Soviet and the three other general staff) or The 
Russian Question (1948, on Western Press). The atmosphere Shpanov creates makes us rather 
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think of The Secret Mission (1950) where American and Germans plotters prepare together 
the German re-armament. Another difference between the authors is that “in Shpanov novels 
negative characters are described with more thoroughness than undifferentiated communist 
and partisans of peace.”193 On the contrary, in Ehrenburg the “face time” of the positive 
protagonists exceeds that of the enemies, their psychology is also elaborated in a more 
detailed way. For this reason, we find more quotes on our topic in Shpanov novels than in 
Ehrenburg’s. 
 
A- The Machiavellian Enemy: the Anglo-Americans 
 
 In his critical article devoted to Incendiaries Tolchonov notices that the book shows 
“activism of imperialist ideologues <…> it illustrates the defeat of cosmopolite ideas;”194 this 
appraisal could seem a herald of the future turn to the ideological enemy marking all the 
Khrushchchev era. He also appreciates that Shpanov avoids the Manichean temptation of 
political literature, “not showing enemies as idiots.” In more concrete terms, from the whole 
gallery of capitalist enemies in four novels, the most prominent character is without doubt 
John Vandengheim III. As B. Krylov writes: “he rarely appears but his presence is perceptible 
throughout the whole novel <…> he embodies American imperialism.” 195  An American 
billionaire, his endless fortune allows him to buy politicians, to defend his private economic 
interests and conquer new markets. This character is introduced by Shpanov in the opening 
pages of his novel: Vandengheim is an allegory of greed whose physiognomy reminds us of 
that of an ogre: “He was a dense man of great stature, far from old, although his hair was 
silvery, with short, cropped hair above his forehead, as pink as fleshy round cheeks. He had a 
heavy chin and protruding, like large sea shells, cartilaginous ears.” (Incendiaries, further I., 
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14) But more often, the words used to describe him evoke the image of the robber. There are 
many allusions to the pirates: « He could not boast that his ancestors had landed from the 
"May Flower", and generally preferred not to delve into their pedigree beyond two 
generations. In his heart, he condemned his late father John Vandenheim II for having a habit 
of jokingly bragging about his descent from a certain Caribbean pirate.» (I., 14) ; further his 
luxurious yacht is called « the Pirate » (I., 619) ; he is also compared to a gangster : « He 
could not have been the only one who knew that in reality this "pirate" Ion van deneme was a 
runaway Dutch convict and a completely overland man. The field of his activity was not the 
Caribbean Sea, but the slums of Chicago. And a million of them were left not in the form of 
pearls and rubies, stolen from the holds of foreign ships, but banknotes, obtained by crimes, 
among which not the last place was occupied by ordinary murders » (I., 15) ; in the second 
volume, Vandengheim has a "wolf instinct of the hereditary gangster" (Plotters, further P., 
48), « the pirate from Chicago » (P., 682). In all the four novels Anglo-Americans are 
systematically associated with gangsters: “It’s not the first time that our guys hire themselves 
at the service of gangsters” (I., 261); they are also compared to Shakespeare’s Shylock (P., 
723). The American spy Krone has “hands like a trickster or a pickpocket” (I., 102). Predatory 
instinct of the Anglo-Americans is visible when the speculator Lord Creffield and spy 
Winfred Row plan to steal resources from the Czech factories after Hitler’s invasion: “Do not 
we take our share??” (I., 606). It is strengthened by the common comparison of Churchill with 
a “bulldog whose strong jaws betrays his iron grip” (I., 718). At last, Anglo-Americans are 
associated with the traders: “Chamberlain, clever merchant” (The Fall of Paris, further FP, 
260), “Merchants, not soldiers, that's all” (FP., 413) ; “ Birmimgham’s businessman 
Chamberlain » (I., 633). A Nazi general tells an American spy: « We understand what it 
means to be defeated by such "business people" as you are. » (P., 716). 
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As a consequence of this mercantile mentality, they are accused of being deprived of any 
moral principle. Winfred Row, a journalist and a spy, acknowledges: “Neither Hitler nor 
Mussolini can be negotiated. None of them can not be trusted either in a half-word, as 
ourselves. »  (I. 285). Further, there is an allusion to "the exquisite lie and perfidy of Brits" (P., 
553). They are charged with cowardice: in a talk with Vandengheim, «Foster Dulles’ lips are 
mortified by fear <…> his eyes frozen open in fixed stare when he looked at John » (I., 624); 
general Barclay is also «paralyzed by fear» (P., 656); once caught by the Soviets, spy Krone 
tells them all he knows” (P., 702). When Admiral Leggy «was talking to the President on the 
great mission of English-speaking peoples” (P., 386), it echoes Churchill’s theory on English-
speaking peoples articulated in the famous Fulton speech and later in his four-volume 
work.
196
 Stalin himself considered this military association as a racial theory comparable to 
Nazism.
197
 The allegation of racism concerns also general Barclay (general Mac Arthur’s 
delegate in China) who calls the Japanese people “monkeys”; he adds: “Life taught me not to 
trust any yellow man <...> they are worth to be thrown into mayhem under the command of 
our guys» (P., 484); he totally despises his Asiatic allies and doesn’t care about their lives: 
«The evacuation of the Gomindang troops will be impossible in any case. So there is no need 
to protect them from infection. Let them die better than join the ranks of the Reds.» (P., 642) 
                                                          
196
 A History of the English-Speaking Peoples in four volumes (London: Cassel & Company LTD, 1956-1958). 
197
 In his Fulton Speech, British Prime Minister called to the geopolitical union of English-speaking peoples: 
“We must not let [war] happen again. This can only be achieved by reaching now, in 1946, a good understanding 
on all points with Russia under the general authority of the United Nations Organization and by the maintenance 
of that good understanding through many peaceful years, by the whole strength of the English-speaking world 
and all its connections. If the population of the English-speaking Commonwealth be added to that of the United 
States, with all that such cooperation implies in the air, on the sea, all over the globe, and in science and in 
industry, and in moral force, there will be no quivering, precarious balance of power to offer its temptation to 
ambition or adventure. On the contrary there will be an overwhelming assurance of security.” Stalin answered 
him in the Pravda dated from March 14
th
, 1946:  
“Indeed, Mr. Churchill is now on the side of the warmongers. <...> It is necessary to note that Mr. Churchill and 
his friends amazingly remind us of Hitler and his friends. Hitler began his unleashing of war by a racial theory 
saying that only German speaking peoples are a true nation. Mr. Churchill also begins his unleashing of war by 
the idea that only English speaking peoples are the nations chosen to rule the destinies of the whole world. <...> 
In fact, Mr. Churchill and his friends in England and in the United States issue a kind of ultimatum to the non 
English speaking nations: acknowledge our rule of your own volition and everything will be in order, otherwise 
the war is inevitable." 
On this issue, see also A. Fateev, Obraz Vraga v Sovetskoy Propagande. 1945-1954, M: IRI RAN, 1999, p. 24. 
75 
 
As Sam Keen argues in his book,
198
 the enemy is often shown as “an enemy of God.” 
So, profanation is a leitmotiv of the novels. As an example, one can mention the receiving of 
money by the Americano-nazi spy Krone: « The presence in his life of the forces of 
Vandenheim gold and Gover's power became something as organic as for the believer the 
divine will. » (I., 643) Further, “Fra” Foster Dollas and “Jesuit monk” George Warner, while 
sitting in cassock in the Vatican and smoking a cigar, recalls their bandit past: the first is 
accused of forging a check and the second of being a “former gangster” (P., 747). The 
windows of the building remind him of the Sing Sing prison which he seems to know quite 
well (P., 751). 
If the English are shown in the novels as the heirs of the world empire, then after the 
war, as Shpanov suggests, the leadership belongs to the Americans. This change in the world 
leadership is reflected in physiognomy: “those few teeth that were still sticking out in the 
slobbery mouth of a bulldog were now false. In their power, even his own allies did not 
believe. » (P., 753) Quite unexpectedly, Shpanov is benevolent to Roosevelt; his advisor 
Howe says: “He's too gullible, our FDR » (I., 455). Roosevelt is upset when he learns that 
some American businessmen finance the German re-armament: “What came up! The most 
outspoken way to arm the Germans. (I., 460);” American President considers Hitler as 
“greedy and stupid” (P., 28). On the contrary, the descriptions of other American officials are 
merciless. Truman looks like a «petty shopkeeper» (in Stalin’s terms): « While the upper lip 
was very thin, the bottom grumbled sagging. And together they made an impression of the 
mouth of the vicious old maid. <...> The bright suit in a large Christmas tree was carefully 
ironed - as if straight from the shop window. All this gave the newcomer the resemblance to 
the traveling salesman of the middle hand. » (P., 101) Allen Dollas is compared with a wild 
animal: “ Dollas laughed. He laughed with a raspy, interrupted laugh, like the howling of a 
                                                          
198
 Sam Keen, Faces of the Enemy, Ibid. 
76 
 
dying jackal» (P., 772) and Shpanov mentions Mc Arthur’s «ironic smile» (P., 66). Diplomat 
William Bullitt is also one of the targets: «I was told something about the intrigues of Bullitt 
in Moscow - a completely unfair game ... (I., 455) <...> Bullitt's features, which seemed a few 
minutes ago so open, even good-natured, did not now reflect anything but stubbornness and 
cruelty… (I., 486). He also appears in the Fall of Paris as a cynic politician: “Agnes ran to 
school - there's a radio. Moleben was given; Ambassador Bullitt raised the statue of Jeanne 
d'Arc red roses, with a sharp Anglo-Saxon accent he exclaimed: "Save them, Jeanne !”” (FP., 
472) 
The Anglo-American elites are Hitler’s allies: in June 1940,  "the ambassador of the 
"great transatlantic democracy" did not give himself the trouble of following the French 
government in the Tour William Bullitt stayed in Paris to meet his German friends” (P., 377); 
« Chamberlain decided to negotiate with Hitler. I'm telling you: it's a cunning old man. » (FP., 
261) ; Mayor Davis : « German offensive for us plus. » (T., 368) ; Hitler ponders: « If <...> 
loans promised by the Americans are practically unlimited, then the thought of mastering the 
whole of Europe is not at all such a utopia! (I., 106) ; transatlantic Goebbels (P. 726).  
 
The Anglo-Saxons are depicted as warmongers: «His Majesty's government always 
wants to avoid a small war, in order to give the opportunity to flare up … » (I., 604) ; « Ben 
considered war a very useful and effective tool in the hands of His Majesty's Government. 
<...> Yes, then Ben considered the war a positive phenomenon in the life of nations. Just like 
hunger and some epidemics » (I., 659). Businessman Vandengheim exclaims: «"And the 
war!" With the present means of extermination, we can grind millions, tens of millions of 
useless people. "(P., 75) <...>" Where are the billions that we invested in Hitler? .. Crash! .. 
Where is the money invested in Mussolini? .. Collapse! Where are the six billion thrown into 
the jaws of Chiang Kai-shek? .. Collapse! We, the business people of America, will never 
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forgive Mac for this heinous stupidity with China.» (P., 687). Further, a German communist 
explains: «After all, the Anglo-Americans, like the once German imperialists, view the war of 
aggression as the main way to achieve their political goals. After all, they have set as their 
goal the assertion of the domination of monopoly capital throughout the world and for all 
eternity. » (P., 739) As Nikolay Zhdanov observes, “in the Tempest, representatives of 
American imperialism depicted in the novel with great publicistic acuity. These are people 
who do not pay attention to the fact that human blood can not be paid with pig's stew. All of 
them are extremely fond of climbing, where they are not asked.»
199
 Hence, in the novels, the 
Anglo-Americans are the culprits of the Second War, alike mad tamers who has released wild 
beasts on the world. 
 
B- The enemies on the battlefield: the Nazi, the Japanese, and Guomindang warriors 
 
 First of all, both writers clearly distinguish between the Nazi government and the 
German people what echoes Stalin’s own position: “It would be ridiculous to identify Hitler’s 
clique with the German people, the German State. The experience tells us that Hitlers come 
and go whereas the German people and the German rule remain.”200 (P., 569) Ehrenburg also 
argues that the German people is not an enemy showing the friendly talk between artist André 
Michaux and the German ichthyologist Erich Nieburg from Lubeck. The latter appears as a 
polite and sensitive person: “bright naive eyes, short-cropped mustache, starched collar” (FP, 
78). When the war begins, André remembers him and feels sad about seeing him as an enemy 
(FP., 346). At the very end of the book, Erich appears anew, but this time in the military 
outfit: then André does not welcome him as a friend any more (FP., 540). Ehrenburg insists 
on the degradation of the German people by Nazism: a former anthropologist Keller and a 
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former architect Richter, two members of the German intelligentsia, radically changed when 
they became soldiers of the Nazi army: they show cowardice, fear for their career and are 
concerned only about their personal advantage. They happen to kill a peaceful Soviet citizen. 
As Belaya insists, “these characters play an extraordinarily important role in the philosophical 
conception of the novel.”201  
  
 The main enemy, in the eyes of both Soviet writers, is naturally the Hitlerite Germany. 
For the Fall of Paris, critic B. Pesis underlines “ the significance of the novel in the struggle 
of all freedom-loving peoples with a common enemy-Hitler's barbarism ».
202
 There seem to 
be two main puppeteers behind Hitler: “ The title of Reich Chancellor did not save him from 
the position of a lackey in the true masters of Germany. At the same time, he fell into the 
difficult position of lackey of two gentlemen - the Junker-General's Camarilla and industrial 
banking capital. » (I., 106) 
The Leipzig trial set by the Nazis to accuse the communists of the Reichstag fire is 
compared by Dimitrov to the Inquisition condemning Galileo (I., 73). Unlike the communists 
like Thälmann or Dimitrov, with their unbreakable devotion, enemies often experience a 
renouncement, showing the lack of braveness and spuriousness. Krone feels that he is losing 
his faith in the Nazi regime: “you need to pull yourself together, otherwise he will stop 
believing himself » (I., 769). They are also materialist like Göring who admires 
Vandengheim’s swimming pool (I., 263) or general Schverer's admission (“because of our 
interest in the trophies », P., 720). Nazi officers are obnoxious: « Germans marched along the 
street. The smart lieutenant looked condescendingly at the rare passers-by » (FP., 496); they 
consider  the refugees’ lives as a «detail» (FP. 524). 
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The main feature of the Nazis, the Japanese, and the American militaries is their 
cruelty: the SA commander Ernst Röhm proudly says that his barracks “smell blood” (I., 78), 
the author stresses “Hitler’s cruelty” (I., 137); during the process against German communists, 
we find “the investigator torturer Focht” (I., 63) and the cruel treatment of Thälmann make of 
him a Christian martyr: “he will be forced to fully understand what it means to be buried 
alive! I'll break it! <...> The Telman trial lasted forty-seven days. Forty-seven days - in a stone 
hole, where there was nothing but a cot and a sink where it was impossible to stand up, as the 
arch hung overhead at a height of one and a half meters; In the hole, inaccessible to the 
slightest sound, since even the jailers in the corridor walked on felt soles; In a hole devoid of 
all light, even artificial. » (I., 36, 127) This cruelty is also applied during the interrogatory of 
Lemke, a communist who prevented the terrorist attack aimed to legitimize the German 
invasion of Czechoslovakia (I., 766). The reader also discovers the sadistic execution of the 
plotters against Hitler on April, 20
th
, 1944 (P., 530). Along with cruelty, the Nazis are 
characterized by their bloodthirstiness: « In the blood spilled by these people <...>, it would 
be possible to sink Berlin” (I., 43); «tanks moved again. Fabre cried out: the tanks crushed the 
wounded: "Bastards!" Animals!! » (FP., 442); the French refugees evoke German soldiers as 
«wild animals (FP., 460) <…> entering in a Paris restaurant, painter André is struck by the 
German soldiers’ voracity: “Behind all tables sat the Germans. They ate greedily, quickly 
absorbed huge dishes » (FP., 478). German soldiers in Paris are described like ogres (FP., 
508), deprived of humanity ("Michaud, are they people?" FP., 535 <...> The Germans are the 
rats, FP., 523). 
 Moreover, the Nazi have in common with the Japanese army that both of them invest 
much into germ warfare: « Schweber was angry at all and all. He was angry with Goering, 
who was bothered with bacteriology. This, of course, is an extremely interesting and useful 
matter, but Schweerer was afraid that it would just as well remain as war gases. After all, they 
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were never fully used in the past war. <...> Schwerer's dislike also spread to General 
Nakamura, who dragged him into a detailed study of the issue of the bacteriological weapons 
of the Japanese. Schwerer seemed inadequate to what he had seen at the test site, where the 
porcelain bombs invented by Dr. Ishii had recently been flown from aircraft, in people tied to 
iron pillars. Bombs were filled with plague-infected fleas. » (P., 199). 
 In Plotters, the reader gets to know about the surgeon General Shirō Ishii (1892 -1959), 
a Japanese army medical officer, microbiologist specialized in biological warfare (P., 53, 583) 
He was invited by the Americans to purchase his research at Fort Detrick (P., 504, 583), the 
center of the US biological weapons program from 1943 to 1969. The presentation of the 
Americans as the sorcerer’s apprentice, working on the weapons of mass destruction, reminds 
one of Silver Dust (1953), a film directed by Abram Room based on August Jakobson’s play 
Jackals (1951). In the movie the Americans are also charged with racism; they conduct 
experiments on Afro-American people. Apart from germ warfare, the Japanese soldiers 
blindly commit destructions: « the Japanese destroyed the peaceful villages with such 
bitterness, as if they were fortified forts of the enemy » (P., 179). The character of the 
merciless spy Harada is threatening enough with his “big yellow teeth” (P., 399); he holds the 
bacteriologic vials meant to poison Mongol rivers (P., 418). He perpetrates an act of 
profanation when he uses the holy image of Buddha to hide an American radio device (P., 
499). In China, Guomindang spies cut a 14-year-old-girl’s hands and hang her by her feet (P., 
590, 616); the torture of a 12-year-old girl, a communist messenger, by a Japanese doctor and 
an American spy is particularly unbearable (P., 654). 
This cruelty is rooted in hatred: the Nazi educator teaches his pupils hatred for France: 
— You understand me: we are not afraid! We despise and hate. He looked at the guys. "Do 
we despise him?" - We despise! - the students answered in chorus. - Hating! Hate! Hate! (I., 
100). The Nazi perform sadist games, like Josef Belz, a Luftwaffe officer, who invites Egon 
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Schverer to shoot a lieutenant in the dark: “At the disposal of the captain three minutes and 
three shots. During this time, the lieutenant is obliged three times to give the light of his 
flashlight. » (I., 577). All this takes part in a morbid atmosphere, where the Nazis appear as 
ghosts: “Otto would have sworn that he was in front of him a corpse." A corpse or a ghost. 
The Gestapo's face was deadly pale ... The Gestapo hung up and stared at Otto with pale, 
expressionless, and, it seemed, not even seeing eyes. (I., 123) Some of them even have scars 
which looking as the “devil's marks.” Josef Belz, “ A fat man with a red and swollen face like 
a copper pot, cut by a deep scar on his right cheekbone (I., 74) < …> New Gestapo, - again 
two, - appeared in the waiting room and sat in armchairs on the other side of the table. One of 
them had a scar on his left cheek in the form of two crescents, converging ends. Otto 
determined the mark of the bite of a man <...> Brigadenfuhrer smiled, and the scar on his 
cheek formed into an ugly hieroglyph (I., 176, 182). 
Naturally, Hitler epitomizes Nazi insanity and monstrousness: often shown as a 
hysteric (screamer <...> a man with a crumpled face pop crocheted » (I., 249)), he also 
appears as a creature deprived of all the human. Shpanov portrays his unexpressive eyes, 
traditionally deemed as “the mirror of the soul”: “blank view (I., 484) <...> Gauss began to 
seem that the Fuhrer did not see either Ribbentrop or the others "(I., 560) <...> Hitler, with 
bloodshot eyes, looked around at those present (I., 627). In contrast with Hitler, the American-
Nazi Krone is afraid of « the mysterious depth of Czech eyes » (I., 646). The author also 
dwells on Thälmann’s eyes: « This is his eyes - the old, intelligent, burning with 
unquenchable fire courage eyes Ernst Thalmann. » (I., 770) Hitler looks like an inanimate 
dummy: « ragged rag doll » (P., 542) His smile betrays his cruelty: “A smile appeared on 
Hitler's face.” (I., 136). The Nazis are the most dangerous enemies of peace and civilization: 
— “"I will lead the war!" <...> The war is me! (I., 140) <...> "Well, yes, we are barbarians! 
We want to be barbarians ... This is an honor! "(I., 138) - Hitler. Humanism, culture, 
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international law - all empty words <...> - Himmler. Humanity can be managed only by 
applying fear "(P. 246) 
The novels insist on the threat of German militarism: Розенберг: " The German nation 
cannot abandon national imperialism. He is her life law. " (P., 247); General Schverer shows 
the benefits of a “profitable war” (P., 716). In addition to the Nazi generals, the reader is 
introduced to the German economic elites who have much in common with the characters of 
Secret Mission: banker Henry Schreiber, director of the Reichsbank Dr. Yalmar Schaht (I., 
21); “A magnate from the Ruhr came to Paris, Baron von Thiessen <...> Joliot coquettishly 
bent his head, smiled, began to talk about freedom, about the brotherhood of nations. Von 
Thiessen said: Excuse me, I'm busy.” (FP., 398). 
 
C- The Anglo-Americans’ Allies: the Vatican and the Trotskyites 
 
 The Vatican is presented by Shpanov as an American agent: « The course of the ark of 
the Roman church is run by radio from Washington. » (P., 742) <...> Americans enter into 
intimate relations with the holy throne » (I., 472) The Pope’s escort consists of American 
military policemen (P., 744). When French minister Barthou is murdered, the explanation 
necessarily comes from a world plot: “the turn of the German machine gun, directed by the 
hand of the Ustash mercenary, the Italian Italian bought for the American dollars, who came 
through the box office of the papal bank of the holy spirit" (I., 284).  
As a genuine enemy, the Vatican’s goal is to destroy the Soviet Union: « the turn of 
the German machine gun, directed by the hand of the Ustash mercenary, the Italian Italian 
bought for the American dollars, who came through the box office of the papal bank of the 
holy spirit.” (P., 109) Further, Cardinal Pacelli argues : The papal "fullness of power" and 
infallibility were invented for presenting the entire aggressive policy of the Vatican as a saint. 
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We command to fight against the Communists with the same ruthlessness with which the 
Holy Inquisition conducted it against heretics in the Middle Ages (P., 118) <...> Pius XII, 
preparing nails to crucify two hundred million Soviet people. "(P., 243) (P., 243) <…> "Again, 
like ten, twenty and thirty years ago, the obsession of the capitalists about a" crusade "against 
the Soviet Union arose ... Just like thirty, as twenty and as ten years ago, the" holy father 
"from Rome," the viceroy Christ on earth, "sent down his apostolic blessing to the initiators of 
this delirious "campaign". » (P., 742) » The prelates are characterized by their disdain for 
human lives ; Andrey Sheptytsky, the Metropolitan Archbishop of the Ukrainian Greek 
Catholic Church from 1901 until 1944, suggests: « Ukrainian nationalism must prepare for the 
fight against communism by all means, not excluding mass physical destruction, even if 
millions of people must fall victim to it » (P., 163).  
 Apart from the Americans, Shpanov novels relate an alliance between Hitler and the 
Pope: « both sides fulfilled the treaty: the pope expelled the German Catholics from the 
Hitlerite Reichstag, and Hitler signed a concordat with him (I., 318).... And soon they will see 
a new combination: the dollar and the cross" (I., 472) Сardinal Pacelli, the future Pius XII, 
declares: « Germany should be a sword of the Catholic Church (P., 120) <...> It was 
necessary to finish building the building of the fascist-Catholic empire of the world, the 
foundation of which [I] himself laid under Pius XI. » (P., 162)  
 For churchmen, the taste for materialism and profanation is much more unexpected 
and inappropriate than for the Nazis. Looking at the wooden statue of the Virgin Mary, pro-
Nazi priest August Gauss happily exclaims: "Two hundred thousand worshipers a year." At 
least twenty million francs in income. Augustus gave a crooked grin. "And you doubted the 
power of the church!" » (P., 107). The Pope himself is said to like comfort and wealth "Pius 
used an electric razor. Dad loved this device. He carefully monitored that the new models of 
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electric razors appearing on the market did not escape him. "(P., 161)" Dads need money, a 
lot of money. Everything is good - dollars and lira, francs, stamps and pesetas.” (P.,114) 
  
Along with the Vatican, the Trotskyites are considered as anti-Soviet agents at the 
service of foreign interests. Nazi general Alexander clarifies their role: « The Trotskyists are 
disintegrating the ranks of the French revolutionaries; The Trotskyists are excellent in Spain, 
where so many of our interests are concentrated. "You have the right to consider every 
Trotskyite as your man." <...> Look at the activities of the Trotskyists everywhere they are: in 
politics they perform only the functions assigned to them by foreign intelligence services. (I., 
348) <...> We need to make some theoretical intervention in the affairs of the Trotskyists. It is 
necessary to revive the Bukharin thesis about the peaceful growth of capitalism into socialism. 
If this can not be done in the Soviet press, we use the foreign language - in all languages.» (I., 
351). Later  General Alexander’s thesis is confirmed : The French Trotskyists have already 
rendered invaluable services to intelligence services to various countries, and especially to the 
USSR (I., 360) » Undoubtedly, the Trotskyites’ ultimate goal is to weaken and eventually to 
destroy the Soviet Union : « Seeger, expelled from the Communist Party for Trotskyism and 
returned to the Social Democrats, was now making efforts to establish contact with the 
Trotskyites who were engaged in underground subversive work in the Soviet Union. <...> 
Renegades, who were paid secret agents of German military intelligence, received from their 
owners a new set-up: to try to brake the rapid movement of the Soviet country along the path 
of economic development (I., 241). » 
 
D- The Anglo-Americans’ Allies: European elites, the opportunistic enemy 
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 From the Soviet point of view, European elites have betrayed their people and 
collaborate with the Nazi and the Anglo-Americans so they could preserve their private 
interests: wealth, electoral mandate, social status, and so on. The novels show the French, 
German, and some of the East-European elites. Most of them relate to the social-democrat 
camp. The communist see them as the traitors: “"Every German must be clear the mean role 
of traitors to the working class of Germany, the traitors of the whole German people, who 
sold his freedom and prosperity first to the bourgeoisie, and then to fascism." I speak about all 
sorts of shademannas, swords, socks, zveringas and other filth that for masking continues to 
be covered by the name of Social Democracy "(I., 49) <...> Social-democratic bonzes will 
once again, like many times before, betray the interests of the worker class and the German 
people as a whole; it is necessary to reckon with the fact that these corrupt souls will again 
change <...> the hereditary and consistent renegades <...> detachment of scoundrels "(I., 252) 
<...> The life of the German people, which the Anglo-Americans and the sellers they are the 
soul and body of the social democratic leaders from the gang of Schumacher and the company. 
"(P., 726) <...> We here understand quite well where Schumacher-Thyssen-Schmitz's 
triumvirate leads Germany. "The Germans for the Elbe" do not want to be slaves neither the 
Yankees nor their domestic servants. » (P., 728) Clara Zetkin compares the German 
government with the evil: «…To raise charges against the government before the Supreme 
Court is tantamount to complaining to the devil for the devil. » (I., 203) 
Viner, a fabricant of weapons and an art collector, belongs to this opportunistic elites. 
He supports Nazism and takes advantage of the pogroms to despoil the Jewish Germans. 
Gain's physical shape speaks for itself: « The loose yellow face of the manufacturer presented 
himself to him with such a vivid expression of the idea of profit, which in every fold of a 
greasy face, in every hair of his beard, in every movement of his yellow fingers and greedily 
squinting eyes » (I., 225) On the other side of the ocean, Allen Dulles mentions Vandengheim 
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in a list of «Balkan people» who collaborate with the US : "They were not Hungarian, or 
Yugoslav, or Bulgarian ministers, industrialists, or any political intriguers" (P., 692). 
 
 French elites are not more virtuous than the German ones: “In fact, the Third Republic 
was ruled by adventurers and embezzlers. (I., 265), political sharers (I., 266), "Munich 
sellers."(I., 749); "France was ruled by insignificant people” (FP., 71). On President Lebrun : 
« is the most whiny president of the Third Republic. But in general, he keeps decently ... - 
That is? .. - I say that Lebrun does what he needs - he does absolutely nothing, except that he 
cries. » (FP., 455). According to Lezhnev, Ehrenburg points with accuracy to the cause of the 
French defeat: «By joint efforts of the fascists, bourgeois radicals, socialists, the elite prepared 
the defeat of France. They are all moved by the fear of the revolution <...> The combination 
in one image of the features taken from several characters is not a deviation from the 
historical truth, but the approach to it.»
203
 For example, the character of Paul Tessa can be 
associated with several historical figures: Paul Marchandeau (1882-1968), or many other 
ministers of the 1930s. A typical careerist, he is obsessed with his reputation and neglects his 
relatives losing them one after another: his wife falls ill then passes away; his daughter Denise 
becomes a communist, his son Lucien joins the fascists before he fell at war.  
 It is interesting to compare the treasons of Lucien Tessa against his father (he steals 
working documents for the fascists) in the Fall of Paris and the one of Otto Schverer, who is 
ready to put a bomb in the hotel where the delegation lives including his own father, general 
Konrad Von Schverer (I., 669); then the youngest brother Ernst is ready to abduct his elder 
brother Egon for the Americans who want to learn his technical discovery (P., 702). So the 
enemy behaves as a traitor, and even the closest kin relations cannot change his determination. 
When he loses his wife, Tessa’s main worry is, again, about his political future: “Amalie 
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communicated before death, but Tessa ordered that the funeral be civil - why irritate the 
left? » (FP., 312). When German army invades France, his only thought is to organize the 
government’s escape from Paris (FP., p.463).  
 The journalists are strongly criticized by Ehrenburg through the character of Joliot, the 
head of the newspapers La Voix Nouvelle. Like a courtier “which does not understand what 
[he] writes (FP., 338), the latter is sold to the politicians of France and abroad; “Joliot settled: 
"La Vua Nouvelle" began to leave in Paris. From Vichy came the Franks, from the Germans 
Joliot received Marks..”(FP., 522) This description of European press reminds of Ehrenburg’s 
article “High heels and low souls. Against one big sold newspapers,”204 where he criticizes 
the anti-Soviet tendencies in Western press. 
As literary critic Lukin remarks,
205
 enemies in Ehrenburg’s novels are “the ones who 
betrayed France, the people of Petain and De Gaulle <…> who denounce the Red threat to 
hide their hatred of the workers »: “You are now afraid not of the Germans, but of the 
workers.” (T., 633), says the communist Josette to the notary officer Legland. But this blame 
is also directed toward the Pétainist and factory owner Maurice Lancier, poet Nivelle, and 
manufacturers Berthy, Pinault, Roy who serve as German agents; « Страну The country was 
given to the mercy of the enemy » (FP., 440). In the Fall of Paris, the manufacturer 
Montigny’s wife who is concerned about her domestic comfort much more than about the 
war: “It's Tuesday, an awful day!" No meat, no confectionery, no liqueurs.” (FP. 404) 
 The military elites (generals Breitel, Grandel, Lerideau in the Fall of Paris, generals 
Gamelin, Legasnier, and Major Henri in Incendiaries) are all pro-fascist (FP., « Hitler's spies 
in power” 454, see also127, 154, 272, 357; I., 716). They are cowards (FP., 429) and despise 
their soldiers (FP., 377, 401). Belaya stresses this as follows: “betrayal, like rust, roused the 
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soul of the people <...> they are all victims of the policy that, under the mask of appeasement, 
led France to war.”206  
 
For sure, after the war the Peace movement was triumphing all over the world. Stalin 
could not ignore the tremendous sufferings of the Soviet people caused by the conflict. So 
putting as usual official literature at the service of the state myth (Clark), he has promoted the 
narrative of the  Soviet Union as the leader of the pacifist camp. Hence, the main herald of 
Socialist Realism Ehrenburg was also a fighter for peace in the international arena. For this 
reason, it is not surprising that one can find in his novels – as in Shpanov’s ones – the enemies 
as the responsible for the war. Active or passive culprits, warmongers (like the capitalist 
magnates, the Nazis and the Japanese) or opportunist accomplices (like the European elites 
and the Vatican), the faces of the enemy mirror Stalin’s fears of the alleged Western 
conspiracy
207
 against the fatherland of Communism and justify Soviet expansionism in 
Eastern – but also Western – Europe. The next chapter deals precisely with the manoeuvres of 
the Soviet Union to “roll out” and to expand its influence in Italy and Yugoslavia. 
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Chapter 3. Case studies: The Enemy inside the Communist 
Movement: Storm over Rome (Dmitri Eriomin) and The Yugoslav 
Tragedy (Orest Maltsev) 
 
1- Presentation 
In 1948, Italy and Yugoslavia were on the front line of the Cold War. The Italian 
elections (eventually won by the Christian Democratic party over the left-wing coalition) and 
the Stalin-Tito split were two setbacks for the Communist camp. It was an unacceptable 
challenge to Moscow, since Rome and Belgrade were the main centers of communist 
movement across Europe. In order to safeguard the consistency of Soviet narrative concerning 
the superiority of communist model and the infallibility of Stalin, it was necessary to show 
that the enemy won those battles by unfair means. Time and again, Socialist Realist writers 
have been performing a mythical function (Clark) and supplying new characters, tropes and 
clichés to strengthen the Stalinist ideology. 
 
Storm over Rome 
 The story of Storm over Rome cannot be understood without having an idea of the 
Italian gamble and its huge symbolic importance in the early Cold War. Owing to the decisive 
contribution of the Soviet Union to the victory over Nazism, the Communist parties have 
gained a significant popularity in the post-war Western Europe. In autumn 1947, all the 
attention of the Cold Warriors is drawn by the upcoming parliamentary elections in Italy in 
the next April. Nothing less than the fate of the whole Europe, and therefore of the Cold War, 
is at stake. In September 1947 President Truman declares: “Should anything happen that Italy 
would go and the Jugoslavs [sic] should move in, France would go, and we have the Iron 
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Curtain at the Atlantic Ocean. There would be nothing for us to do then but move out 
completely and prepare for war. That we don’t want to do.”208 Kennan, the director of the 
Policy Planning Staff (the State Department’s internal think tank) goes as far as to propose to 
outlaw the Italian Communist Party and to support the direct military intervention in Italy in 
case of ensuing civil war: “this would admittedly result in much violence and probably a 
military division of Italy <...> but it might well be preferable to a bloodless election victory, 
unopposed by ourselves, which would give the Communists the entire peninsula at one coup 
and send waves of panic to all surrounding areas.”209 Truman does not follow Kennan’s plan 
but summons James Forrestal, the first secretary of Defence, to conduct “covert psychological 
operations designed to counteract Soviet and Soviet inspired activities <...> which are 
designed to discredit the United States in its endeavours to world peace and security”. These 
measures eventually lead to the victory of the Christian Democrats over the Communists.
210
 
 
Such is the real political background of Storm over Rome (1951) by Eriomin (1904-
1993), a former teacher of literature who became an active member of the Soviet Writers’ 
Union (1935), then the secretary of its Moscow section (1962). In 1966, his inflammatory 
article triggers the campaign against the writers Andrei Siniavskii and Iulii Daniel. Eriomin is 
also a script writer. The story of Storm over Rome begins in the Vatican: “His Holiness was 
old, sick, and immensely rich. Another time he would neglect the present and the ceremonies 
that follow <...> But this present was a sign of President of the United States’ special attention 
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after the recent trip of the American archbishop Spelman to Rome where he discussed the 
questions of the common struggle of the White House and Vatican against ‘the growing threat 
of communism’.”211 So is the setting.  
Storm over Rome is a book about the alliance between Washington and the Vatican, 
together with the Italian politicians and economic leaders, who push the country towards the 
capitalist hell. Except Rome, the reader discovers San Carmelino (near Milan) and Mirando 
(in the Southern region of Naples) and can see the epic struggle for survival of the workers 
and the peasants. Needless to say, the local communist politicians protect the oppressed; their 
leader, SerafinoVisconti, is even sacrificed for the Cause when his life is taken by a shooter. 
In the end, the rebellion of workers and peasants spreads over the whole country: “Gendarmes 
were shooting on poor people not only in San Carmelino or Mirando but also in Modena, San 
Salvatore, Rome, and everywhere where hunger and grief took on the great wrath. Therefore 
the storm was not calming down <...> The voices of Matteo Chiketti, Luigi Visconti 
[Serafino’s son] <...> and thousands of other people wafting from the roar of this storm 
stronger and stronger <...> But everyone who took this path knew that victory awaits him. 
Like dawn, it can’t be cancelled nor suffocated.” (p. 330-331) 
 
In 1952 Eriomin is awarded the Stalin Prize for literature (third grade). One participant 
of the Prize Committee recalls that Stalin, who has usually read himself the competing works, 
said about Storm over Rome to his literary board: “Everybody chooses the same topic. Here 
we have a new topic. I learnt that this man stayed in Italy for a while as a script-writer, he 
writes about the revolutionary climate there. This book is not flawless however it will be read 
with interest by our citizens. It will play a positive role.”212 Still the question of the genuine 
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reason of this decision can be raised. More than the originality of the topic, it seems that its 
very narrative corresponds to the actual political pattern: in 1949, the play The Conspiracy of 
the Doomed written by Nicolay Virta is awarded the Stalin Prize (first grade). Although the 
action takes place in “one of the East European countries liberated by the Soviets”, the plot is 
exactly the same as in Eriomin’s book. In 1951, the film by Mikhail Kalatozov, based on the 
play, is also awarded the Stalin Prize. We have to bear in mind that from 1948 this “Italian 
conspiracy climate” hangs over the Kremlin. It may be linked with the struggle for influence 
carried out by the superpowers behind the scenes of the elections in Europe and with the 
American programs of covert actions that Stalin must have been informed of. Concerning the 
“positive role,” it is not obvious but if the function of the novel is to enhance the reader’s 
political consciousness in Schmitt’s sense, there is no doubt that the importance of the enemy 
in Eriomin’s story, his polymorphic and precise features do their job. 
However, not all literary critics shared the enthusiasm expressed in high offices. In 
January 1951, Zvezda asks the members of its editorial board about their opinion on the 
book.
213
 A scriptwriter Boris Chirskov stresses that the Italian issue is “topical” and 
“politically significant,” he is pleased to find the description of the Italian social struggles in 
the novel; he also praises “everyday specificity (bytovaia konkretnost’) of human fates, 
especially the characters of peasants or workers.” To him, the key role of American 
imperialism is well shown at the beginning, but he regrets that this theme is not elaborated 
afterwards. Although he considers that some descriptions evoke verbatim reports and that “the 
author should resort to an expert in international relations,” Chirskov concludes that the topic 
is “necessary to the highest degree to Soviet literature.” His colleague, a poet Alexander 
Prokofiev shares Chirskov’s views on the “seriousness” and “importance” of the book in spite 
of the facts that “some positive heroes present physical defects.” However, he assures, 
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“Zvezda cannot miss out this novel. Work with the author must begin as soon as possible.” 
Ten months later, the journal publishes Storm over Rome. 
The opinions of the critic V. Potapova and the translator Nikolai Liubimov are much 
colder.
214
 Not denying that Italy is in the news, Potapova sees the book as the illustration of 
“how one must not treat this topic.” She puts forward three accusatory points: first, the book 
presents the Italian communists as “chaotic mass” (stikhiinaia massa) denying the 
organisational role of the Party and Palmiro Togliatti in particular whose strategy was to 
create a wide coalition and come to power on a constitutional basis; “Eriomin suggests that 
the Bolsheviks finance the war <…> he presents the communists in the same way than 
Americans do, like anarchists preparing putsches <…> the author should have assumed that 
his production might be read by the enemy.” Second, the book shows the joint actions of 
communists and socialists, whereas socialists are deemed by Moscow as traitors bankrolled 
by the US. Finally, the author “does not establish the link between the workers’ struggle and 
the movement for peace.” In sum, “the book shows the evident ignorance of the situation in 
Europe and can provoke very damaging consequences.” Liubimov keeps in mind the 
permanent threat, noticing that “our enemies would be glad to find here inconsistencies.” He 
points to a number of geographical and cultural mistakes such as Venice is not crowded in 
August or in Italy “it is impossible to drink red wine with fish. It is the same as drinking 
vodka with the marshmallows.” In the RGALI folder, containing criticism on the novel, there 
is a short note added to Liubimov’s letter (dated of July 1952) to Zvezda: “Following this 
declaration, Eriomin’s novel – which had already been sent to print – was removed; neither a 
single translation came out.” 
The lightning success of such books – before they fall into oblivion – shows once again 
the importance of the agenda in their publishing policy: as any “propaganda bullet,” their 
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function is to target the public with a brief and powerful signal at the right moment. It allows 
to focus its attention on a particular question and to drive society in accordance with the 
politics of the regime. The possible debates on historical accuracy or the omission/ excess of 
certain ideological arguments do not matter so much. In the Storm’s case, one can assume that 
Liubimov’s letter played a minor role in the removal of the book comparing to the following 
circumstances. First, in August 1952, after the Treaty instituting the European Defence 
Community (May 27
th
) including Italy, it is clear that the European integration is an effective 
process, so Rome is lost for the communist camp; second, the Détente is close and the Soviet 
regime prefers to avoid provocations. Besides, as soon as in January 1953, the propaganda 
apparatus is reorganized in such a way as to curb anti-American criticism. It is interesting to 
note that both of these ‘shooting star novels’ fall within the same ideological sequence: they 
appear at the end of 1951, receive the 1952 Stalin Prize, and vanish from libraries and 
bookshops within a six-month interval.  
 
The Yugoslav Tragedy 
During the early Cold War period the Soviet writers often resort to the perception of the 
enemy in order to create the image of a common communist house. After the Stalin-Tito split 
in 1948, Yugoslav President Joseph Tito turned out to be an excellent choice. 
After the war, the Red Army takes Eastern Europe and the Soviet Empire acquires the 
new boarders and new critical mass. The foundation of the Cominform, the economic and 
ideological tightening the screws are welcomed by the majority of the communists in the 
Eastern Europe. Tito’s Yugoslavia, however, a “national communist” state, is a black sheep. 
When the Yugoslav peasants joined the Communist Party during the war, they were rather 
urged by the defence of their motherhood than by the Marxist-Leninist ideology. At this time 
there were frequent conflicts between Tito, asking for help to struggle not only with the 
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Germans but also with his domestic rivals, and Stalin who has not considered the Yugoslav 
front as a major one since the Red army was called on other fronts. Thus the role of the 
Yugoslav communists in their own national liberation deprives Moscow of the legitimacy to 
impose on them its undivided authority after the war. The conflict takes its dramatic turn 
especially after three incidents. 
First, despite the fact that Yugoslavia follows the economic Soviet model, Tito’s 
regime is not willing to make the reforms on behalf of the Soviet Union and rejects Stalin’s 
attempts to transform the country into the Soviet satellite as well as he refused the Marshall 
Plan aid. Second, Tito begins to claim to be the leader of the Communist countries in the 
Eastern Europe. During the liberation of Trieste by his army, he affirms his regional 
leadership by demanding Istria, Zara, and Fiume to be “given back” to Yugoslavia. Stalin, 
unwilling to hurt the Italian communists, does not support Tito. Later, Tito goes as far as to 
propose a Balkan federation. Third, Tito’s active support of the Greek rebels against the 
British influence irritates Stalin wishing to avoid at any cost a conflict with his Western allies. 
In February 1948, Stalin calls Tito in Moscow but the latter declines the invitation, alleging 
illness. Consequently, Stalin displays the economic sanctions against Yugoslavia and the 
leaders start exchanging letters in which Stalin blames Tito for violation of the Communist 
dogma, for being a Trotskyite, and for his lack of democracy. As to Tito, he defends his vision 
of a “national communism.” 
Since the summer of 1948 until Stalin’s death, a pitiless anti-Yugoslav campaign is 
launched across Soviet political authorities and media. To understand all its intensity one has 
to keep in mind that, like Berlin, Yugoslavia is a frontline of the cultural war. Tito’s separate 
road to socialism challenges dramatically the communist dogma and Stalin’s project to 
integrate Eastern Europe in one monolithic bloc. For the Soviet leaders moving backward 
would mean a bandwagon effect and could eventually lead to the collapse of the Soviet bloc 
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as a whole. In June 1948 Stalin expels Yugoslavia from the Cominform and urges the “loyal 
Yugoslav” to get rid of the “Tito clique,” however acting that way he only strengthens the 
Yugoslav unity against its adversary. During the year of the economic blockade (1949-1952) 
Tito turns to America for help and lets his country enjoy a certain degree of decentralization 
as well as free market economy. Later, in November 1951, President Truman asks Congress 
to provide military and economic aid to communist Yugoslavia. Under the accusations of 
“homeless cosmopolitanism” and “national nihilism”, Titoism is declared treason. From the 
autumn of 1949, a big purge is launched in the communist parties throughout the Eastern 
Europe and even in the Soviet society itself: certain politicians and writers are accused of 
subversive actions and of collaboration with Marshal Tito and the Western intelligence 
services. In November 1949, the Cominform enforces the resolution “The Yugoslav 
Communist Party in the hands of murderers and spies.” Even sport becomes a part of the 
game: at 1952 Helsinki Olympics the Soviet football team is defeated by the Yugoslav. What 
follows is that the inglorious team is broken up, the coach and some players are taken back 
their previous awards for having “undermined the prestige of Soviet sport and Soviet state.” 
Records of the Ministry of State Security testify to Stalin’s plan to murder Tito (spraying 
bacteria of pneumonic plague!)
215
, but his death in 1953 left this plan unrealized. 
 
 The author of our case study, Orest Maltsev (1906-1972), was born in the region of 
Kursk. In 1920 he is a volunteer in the Red army. After he earned diploma in literature, 
Maltsev works for the newspapers Krasnaya Zvezda and Na strazhe. As a war correspondent 
he accompanies the Soviet troops moving from the North Caucasus until Belgrade, Budapest, 
and Vienna and takes part in the liberation of Western Ukraine. 
                                                          
215
 Mikhail Dubiniansky “Iosif vs. Iosip. 60 let nazad v SSSR startovala the anti-Yugoslav Campania” in Gazeta 
ZN,UA. 2008. September 
5. http://gazeta.zn.ua/SOCIETY/iosif_vs_iosip__60_let_nazad_v_sssr_startovala_antiyugoslavskaya_kampaniya
.html 
97 
 
 An opportunistic mind, as early as 1948, Maltsev seizes the Stalin-Tito split to begin a 
new novel following the Party line tenets. Three years later The Yugoslav Tragedy comes out. 
The plot is Socialist Realistically simplistic: the struggle of the Yugoslav resistance fighters 
against Hitler from the point of view of the lieutenant of the Red Army Zagorianov, a war 
prisoner who joined them. Due to the confrontation between Stalin and Tito, Moscow urgently 
needed to denigrate the importance of the action of the Yugoslav communists in their own 
liberation in order to establish its own authority. No wonder that the description of the fighters 
is unkind and even grotesque.  
 
The Yugoslavs, Tito in particular, are reproached for their nationalism which 
indirectly follows "the old plan of Hitler and Mussolini for the Balkans: to gather them as a 
colonial possession and turn into a huge military bastion to launch attacks on the European 
countries. The Balkan Slavs, as well as the Greeks, the Romanians and Hungarians would be 
employed as cannon fodder at the disposal of the “Aryan race.” Being under the Fascist boot, 
precisely in these conditions of tension and humiliation, local and even tribal, chauvinism was 
blooming as never before” (p. 280). In spite of their positive struggle against Hitler, they 
appear to be his strategic accomplices. Moreover they are described as primitive (“Thank you 
comrade Stalin for this rifle!”) and materialist, hypocrite and opportunistic: “Tito is a secret 
friend of the members of the Labor Party, but shouts from the rooftops his loyalty to the 
Soviet Union”, p. 222. Naturally, the book is full of American and British spies aimed to 
make profits of the war. 
 
Due to the acerbic condemnation of the “traitor” in the novel, along with several 
articles appearing in newspapers, the stalwart of Socialist Realism Maltsev is awarded the 
Stalin Prize (second grade) in 1952. Half a million copies are sold, the book undergoes more 
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than ten re-editions, and the author signs a contract for film adaptation.
216
 He becomes rich 
and enjoys a luxurious dacha in Peredelkino. 
A general reception of the book by the critics is positive. The playwright Georgi 
Mdivani (1905-1981), in his article “History of treason,”217 praises the veracity of the novel: 
“Using historically faithful and documentary means, the book explains that during the World 
War II Tito was an agent of the Gestapo <…> his action has contributed to remove a big part 
of the Nazi army from the Balkan and to direct it toward the Soviet Union <…> also the 
author gives an account on the true love of the Yugoslav resistance fighters for Comrade 
Stalin. He shows that the former were trapped in a network of treason. The tragedy of the 
Yugoslav people relies in the fact that at that time they kept believing in Tito’s clique, whereas 
he had destroyed national heroes and wanted to transform Yugoslavia into a bridgehead of 
American imperialism.” Besides his ideological approval, Mdivani points to some negligence 
in the style and regrets that the quantity of pages on the enemy camp prevails on the national 
theme. Ironically, five years before this criticism, Mdivani has been the scriptwriter of a film 
by Abram Room entitled In the Yugoslav Mountains (1946). The plot deals with… the 
common struggle of the Red Army with Yugoslav peasants and Tito’s fighters against the Nazi 
invader. Needless to say, the film was forbidden in the Soviet Union after the Stalin-Tito split. 
In an interesting manner, it was prohibited in Yugoslavia too during several decades, even 
after the settlement of the conflict by Khrushchev. A writer Yuri Libedinskii (1898-1959) 
shares Mdivani’s endorsement, stressing that the novel “answers to the readers’ demand for 
international events <…> and present the Trotskyite-spy Tito crew and their machinations to 
seize power.” To put it briefly, the book brings to light “truth, so to speak, from inside” 
(pravda, tak skazat, iznutri).
218
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But critics are not unanimous. In their “Remarks on the manuscript of the Yugoslav 
Tragedy,” 219  two members of the Znamia editorial board I. Medvedev and N. Bondar’ 
reproach Maltsev for repeating Tito’s arguments when he overestimates the extent of the 
liberation struggle in Yugoslavia (with a ratio of power of 6 against 1 in favour of the foe); the 
author fails to mention properly Stalingrad heroes, whose role is limited to create a diversion 
to draw the Nazis to themselves. The critics underline that, unlike the British policy in 
Yugoslavia, Maltsev characterizes the American one as “unclear” whereas “it was totally 
clear.” They also deplore many factual mistakes in the role of the Soviet mission, in 
translations of Serbian words, names of some villages and dates when certain regions were 
liberated, in the duties, actions or travels of personalities of that time. Andrich Ratomir adds 
to the list of grievance many other geographical and tactical mistakes.
220
 At the time of his 
criticism, he is the editor of the newspapers For a socialist Yugoslavia! In 1943 he was Major-
General Commandant of regiment resistant fighters in South Serbia and recommends the 
Writers’ Union to organize a meeting between himself and Maltsev to correct certain mistakes 
that diminish the weight and sharpness of the novel to the Yugoslav reader. To him, the author 
would be wise to remove the whole first part since it takes place in Eastern Serbia, although 
resistance fighters’ movements were active in the South of the country. By the way, it is 
noticeable that Ratomir’s paper dates from July 18, 1952, i.e. four months after the book was 
awarded the Stalin Prize. Such drastic critic of a work that has just been declared as the 
benchmark of the Party line testifies that relative amplitude exists in the postwar literary 
debates. At least, there is a debate. 
So, in spite of the prestige brought about by the supreme award, the book is roughly 
criticized by a part of his peers and some of them even “stopped greeting him when they meet 
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in the street.”221 Logically, some people suspect that with this book Maltsev is a Kremlin’s 
representative and the rumor even spreads that he resorted to a ghostwriter. The latter would 
be the war veteran Vladimir Gurvich, the son of Nicholas I. Hourwich (Americanized version), 
one of the founders of the American Communist Party. On the pretext of parasitism, MVD 
organized Gurvich’s removal from his job and from his Moscow flat. Then he may have 
written The Yugoslav Tragedy to earn his living.
222
 In 1955, when Khrushchev restores 
diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia, the book is withdrawn from all the libraries, the film 
project is dropped and the courtier Maltsev falls into disgrace and poverty. He becomes a 
casualty of the versatile Party line. 
 
 2- Faces of the Enemy Inside the Communist Movement 
 
It takes a certain time for the propagandists from both sides to shape the faces of “their” Cold 
War enemy. On the Soviet side, they do not emerge before mid-1948;  
Although the antagonism with the US is entrenched since the Zhdanov doctrine, the situation 
in the post-war world is still unsettled and the Soviet rulers of agitprop prefer to focus on 
objects and places of discord rather than targeting directly enemies. Schmitt would probably 
see here the incapacity to determine the national interests, hence a sign of political immaturity 
of the Cold War Soviet doctrine. But instead of the deficient strategy and ramshackle 
propaganda apparatus, there might be another reason behind this approach: cannot we read 
into the delay in defining the enemy an attempt to find a compromise on these issues before 
waging a total war? 
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 After 1945, attention of the public is driven on the atomic question and on local 
disputes: Greece, Turkey, and Iran until 1946 (all of these crisis end by the bitter failure for 
the Soviet side), Germany, and Eastern Europe. From mid-1948, from the Soviet point of 
view, we have four stable appearances of the enemy. The tightening of the screws on the 
ideological level creates the character of the cosmopolite (first appearance, mentioned above), 
but after the end of the Zhdanov purge (started in 1943) and the creation of NATO the 
cosmopolite tends to slide to the East European satellites to trigger in its turn a purge in the 
Kominform. At the same time the disappearing of the domestic enemy is meant to safeguard 
the homogeneity of the Soviet structure. The Stalin-Tito split is the very reason of this purge. 
Tito (second appearance) is considered as a traitor to the communist movement, “a Trotskyite 
who uses fascist terror against its people.” But the main enemy is without doubt the United 
States (third appearance, occasionally associated with the English), tainted with neofascism 
(fourth appearance) during the episode of the Nazi-Soviet Relations (1948), the Korean War 
and the European Defence Community process (after 1950). 
  
In our study, we will focus upon this sworn enemy of the Soviet Union and its 
“neofascist metamorphosis.” Then we look into its numerous auxiliaries, through the gallery 
of “traitors,” “robbers,” and other “sycophants” thronging the high floors of power. Finally, 
we will try to examine how Soviet power uses the enemy as a bogeyman to build a literary 
diplomacy. Beyond that, there are also different physical, moral, and psychological features 
such as fatness, devilish smile, greed, cowardice, dissimulation, hypocrisy, and cynicism as 
well as deceiving humanism, hatred of the people and bloodthirstiness that are common to all 
types of foes. 
 
A) The Sworn Enemy 
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From 1946 to 1950, “it is important to remember that most Soviet films [do] not deal 
with the conflict directly.” However, with the making of so called Soviet ‘Cold War films,’ 
“45,6 percent of screen villains [are] American and British, compared with just 13 percent 
British from 1923 to 1945.”223 
Needless to say, for a social-realist novel the United States is the “natural enemy.”224 In 
1947-1948 the question of American expansionism in Europe is the first thing the Kremlin is 
concerned about. On 20 September 1947 the Literaturnaya Gazeta publishes a pamphlet by B. 
Gorbatova entitled “Harry Truman” in which President is compared to the “little Munchen 
Gefreitor” and his activities radically oppose Roosevelt’s ones.225 The parallel is an explicit 
hint to the Nazi Germany’s annexation of the Sudetenland in 1938 meaning of course the 
American hegemonic appetite. If to put side by side this article and the same fear of the 
“imperialistic” enemy, articulated by President Truman ten days later, then Sam Keen’s 
expressions “paranoia à deux” and “prison of mirrors” 226  seem to reflect precisely the 
relationship between the Cold super-enemies. The Americans are reproached for their diktat 
to Italy and to its European allies in general: “the monopolists hold the country by its neck” 
(140). They are compared to an insect (“they caught our poor country as spider the fly”, 28). 
Considering the Soviet ‘Peace Offensive’ (see above), there is no surprise to find the issue of 
American imperialism at the core of both novels: Vuchetin, one of the Yugoslav resistance 
fighters, declares to the hero: “The Balkans is a powder keg…. For sure, it must be so… but 
no matter! Yours (the Red Army) and we will throw away the powder from the keg” (169) 
In Eriomin’s novel, the American ambassador is the very incarnation of the enemy: 
“squat, cumbersome like an old man, grey-haired with a rich farmer’s fleshy and coarse face, 
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he was on ease in the Vatican palaces like in his own Department of State” (4). His fatness is 
a sign of inextinguishable greed. Alliance with the Church is especially stressed when the 
author portrays the ambassador’s secretary: “Before he appeared in a Ministry, Coymans used 
to make the deal with his Vatican friends.” (19) So, a kind of “hierarchy of evil” is set up here, 
denouncing the Americans as the super-enemies and using an ineffable chain of command: 
from the spiritual power, to the political power and media. Eriomin plays with the name of the 
American President: he changes “Truman” to “Spellman” showing that the man’s power is 
not in the truth, as he pretends to be, but only in his political spell. The ambassador’s 
counterparts in Yugoslavia are the American colonel McCarver and the British colonel 
Maclean. Fitzroy Maclean (1911-1996) was a real soldier, writer, and politician who has 
abundantly recounted his memories about Marshal Tito.
227
 
Eriomin compares the United States to criminals (“American gangsters, 28 <…> the 
American businessmen behave like bandits,” 140), to war incendiaries (28, “the little boats on 
the military bases begin to give off steam,” 315), and to barbarian mercenaries (“boozes, 
brawls, robbery, violence, death came with the Anglo-American troops in this unlucky 
country already torn by fascism,” 53). The capitalists are accused of cynicism (“Truth does 
not reside in facts but in their interpretation”, says an American expert to the Prime minister, 
144). Tellingly, the Communists appear as brave, generous, sympathizing, fair, and pacifist. 
In order to survive in prison the workers’ thoughts drift towards Moscow and Stalin: “I 
know,” says one of them, “they fight for us there in freedom.” (249) 
                                                                            
B) The Neofascist Ghost 
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At the time of terrifying “balance of terror,” after the shock of Hiroshima and the new 
nuclear status of the Soviet Union, one will not be surprised to note that pacifism is the main 
topic of the literary production, in prose as well in essays and newspapers (see the Soviet 
‘Peace offensive’ above). Among other examples, we can mention the creation of the 
International Stalin Prize for Strengthening Peace Among Peoples on December 21, 1949 
by executive order of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. In their works the authors try to 
understand the causes of the previous war and to avoid a new one, perhaps the last one 
capable to end humanity as such. One temptation is to look for the responsible of the conflict 
and to turn the yesterday's guilty into today's enemies. The document of the US State 
Department The Nazi-Soviet Relations released in January 1948 and Stalin’s “reply” one 
month later, Falsifiers of History, are attempts to reconsider the war narrative: who made an 
alliance with Hitler and bears responsibility for the outbreak of the conflict? 
This phenomenon, not specific to this time nor to the Soviet Union, may be called the 
‘persistence of the enemy’; thus, like strategy is always “a war late,” according to Edward 
Luttwack,
228
 collective memory is always “an enemy late”. It appears nowadays, when at the 
least tension between the United States and Russia the press runs “a Cold War climate” as the 
headlines although the Cold War is finished since more than twenty years. It exists already at 
the turn of the 1950s, when Western diplomats are said to suffer from the “Munich 
syndrome”229 being afraid of making disastrous concessions to Stalin. Concerning the Soviet 
writers of that time, one could say that they suffer from the ‘SS syndrome,’ suspecting that 
any anticommunist agent has necessarily been trained in Western Germany by former SS 
officers. But since they can’t deny the reality of the Cold War, their enemies look like hybrids 
or transitional creatures between the SS soldier and the Cold War spy. After the summer of 
1950, the Schumann plan to remilitarize West-Germany and the outbreak of the Korean war 
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contribute to revive the leitmotiv of “American neofascism” among the headlines of Soviet 
press.  
Both novels appear in October 1951, at the climax of the first round of the Cold War: 
negotiations on the Korean conflict were broken in August; on October 10
th
 American 
Congress passes the Mutual Security Act and on October 27
th
 the famous issue of journal 
Collier’s offers the scaring scenario of a nuclear attack on Moscow. One month later, the 
article “Boots thirst for revenge”230 (Lackstiefel zhazhdut revansha) elaborates the thesis on 
the convergence of Nazi and American projects: anticipating German defeat, Himmler would 
have worked out a plan to safeguard a bulk of officers to conduct the revenge during the Third 
World War. The US have allegedly supported this plan by rehabilitating Nazi criminals in 
order to use them against the Soviet Union. Komsomol’skaia Pravda and Pravda take part in 
the campaign. From March to May 1952, Soviet diplomats transmit three concerned notes on 
the rearmament of the Wehrmacht.
231
 
 
In Storm over Rome, carabineri sent to crush workers’ revolt are systematically 
associated with SS soldiers: “Enrico Fecci was called to Milan as the main witness of the 
“rebellion.” Now standing in front of the policemen, he was nervously swinging from one 
foot to another. The unter-officer was keeping up smoking and nibbling his lips.” (119) Earlier, 
the reader has learnt that lieutenant Enrico Fecci just arrived from a special mission to 
Western Germany in the Anglo-American headquarter. “He remember[s] the teachings of his 
brave Major Master game” (78), a former Gestapo agent, full of nostalgia for “Fuhrer’s 
genius” (79) and vociferating that “emotions are the enemies of order” and urging to “an 
animal abidance” (79). The “willing minded pupil of the Nazi in an English form” (80) is 
eager to apply his new skills against the strikers and shoots on one of those who refuse to 
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open the door of the factory.  In other places of the novel, some public figures are declared to 
be fascists, such as the landlord Gaudio Cassino, the minister’s brother (90). Under the rule of 
Christian Democrats, former fascist elites do well to the detriment of the peasants (99). 
Unveiling the ideological nature of the regime, one peasant reveals that a hunter Ruffo 
Graniani, who was a resistance fighter during the war, now has to hide himself from the police 
for hiding strikers (122). On the contrary, the communists are always on the side of resistance 
to the Fascists and the Nazis (96). The Pope himself is said to have befriended Duche, Franco 
and Hitler (165); Vicar Giovanni sends his pray to the advent of a new Mussolini: “Oh, Lord! 
Please send to our poor Italy a strong leader again!” (228). 
 
 Since Maltsev’s novel takes place during the war, Nazis can be barely characterized as 
“ghosts.” However, all the cases of collaboration between Nazis and Tito representatives 
transform into an embarrassing shade on Tito’s regime in 1951. The American representative, 
Colonel McCarver, gets on with Colonel Von Holtz, the Gestapo head of intelligence service: 
“The sooner I will get from Von Holtz the list of Gestapo agents in the Army and the 
Communist Party, the better it will be” (p. 59), he reflects, letting the Throughout the novel, 
one discovers the legend shrouding Tito’s henchman and Minister of Interior Rankovitch. A 
good but naïve caretaker, Uncle Vuk, tells his nephew Iovan the “official story:” – "That’s 
Rankovitch. A kiddo! Escaped from the Gestapo! They shut down everyone who was with 
him. And he pretended to be ill, was placed in the hospital by the Germans and bugged out of 
there. What an artful dodger! Vuk's finger started twisting before his nose again. - That's a 
heluva dodger!... he would hack the fly !" (95) Later Rankovich’s golden legend is dissipated 
by Colonel McCarver: “from my conversation with Von Holtz I got to know precisely: 
Rankovich escape from the Belgrade prison hospital in the summer 1941, where he was 
transferred for medical reasons, was organized by the Gestapo.” (221)  
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The  narrator Nikolai Ustrialov himself is amazed at hearing Iovann’s words: “How is 
it possible for a high Party official like Tito, at the peak of the struggle with the occupier, to 
live overtly in Belgrade in the house of Ribnikar, just near to the German Major-General 
Commandant Schreder and next to the German barracks? How can the leading members of 
the Party – Rankovich, who escaped from prison, Djilas and Piadie – walk freely across the 
streets of Belgrade? All this happens at the same time when Gestapo throws in jail 
communists and hundreds of innocent people just on suspicion of being resistance fighters?” 
(96). For sure, in the writer’s mind, the answer concerning the relationships between Tito and 
the Nazis is already contained in this rhetorical question.  
Looking through the coveted list of Nazi agents in the Yugoslav Communist Party, the 
Congressman assistant Colonel Huntington and Colonel McCarver comment on the names: -
“ Oh, here it’s small fry! Dapchevich, Goshniak, Nadzh, Lekich and so on. The so called 
Spanish heroes. It seems that the Gestapo recruited them in France, in the camps for internees. 
Almost all of them occupy key posts. Each of them separately is not significant. But a 
hundred of these ones is already an important orchestra.” (222) To summarize: the novel 
presents the picture of Yugoslavia where the high leaders and most of the executives come 
under the influence of the Nazis. 
 
C) The Accomplices of the Devil 
 
No matter how strong the enemy over the Atlantic is, his actions would not present any 
harm to the Soviets if he had no found supporters in Europe. Since The Russian Question 
(Romm, 1946), the Soviet public is already aware of the “sold western press.” In January 
1948, an article in Pravda “On ‘democratic socialism’ of Clement Atlee” ushers the 
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beginning of the attack against the Western social democrats. Soviet propagandists consider 
them as “the most faithful servants of American imperialism.” On March 1st, it is Leon Blum's 
turn, the “patriarch of international Menshevism,” to become the target of Pravda. In his 
article “On Friends and Foes” Ehrenburg notes that “In Italy, the Americans have found shoe-
shine boys – I am not talking about the hungry kids, but about the ministers, prelates, and 
litterateurs.”232 
In Storm over Rome, the complicity as servility of the Italian politicians is highlighted 
when Minister Cassino “meets the ambassador as a good friend” (19) as well as “Mr. 
Coymans’ wish to talk to him as a great honour” (19). Later the author mentions the “overseas 
friends” (24, later “friends from over the Atlantic,” 150) and their Marshall Plan where they 
play the role of the monopolists’ carpet knights. The economic elites are also compromised. 
Contrary to the skinny workers and peasants, Pinchelli, director of San Carmelino factory, is 
“loaded” (35): “the director was afraid of the workers, he hated them; in return the workers 
despised and hated the director.” Out of his cowardice, he avoids any conflict with the 
workers, and when the strike begins, he thinks: “The hatred has to be witty. And if one puts 
the workers through the wringer, he should do it with a smile on his face.” (35). 
Smile, the devil’s notorious feature, is a recurring motive in all the descriptions of the 
enemy: the ambassador’s secretary gives the smile offering the car to the Pope, he says to him 
that the Italians don’t need to produce their own cars anymore (4); the American expert and 
adviser to the Prime Minister has a “thin smile” (144) praising his efficiency against the 
strikes. The two big landlords of the South or the Northern factory directors don’t hesitate to 
appeal to the bloodthirsty mafia (zgerri) to crush peasants’ or workers’ strikes. The chief of 
the mafia, Gulelmo Luzzati, offers a slow and sadistic smile before killing one man; “he 
taught such a smile everyone in his gang. The bandits from the lovely American movies smile 
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that way. He was just back from Chicago, nicknamed “Gully the American.” (181). The 
Yugoslav « colleagues » of the zgerri are the chetniki: bands of mercenaries implementing the 
orders from above and oppressing the population: “The Englishman Hudson ruled the chetniki  
who have slaughtered communists and other patriots in Serbia and Montenegro.” (100) 
 
The Italian elites are accused of supporting the slavery; the minister’s son with his 
friends wrote the treatise Philosophy of Constraint in which the authors abhor the poor 
showing their cynicism and arrogance: “Our first mission on this earth is to hate the pitiable 
people and pour their black blood <...> We are the people of sin. Standing on the peak of this 
sinful and catastrophic world, we proudly brave stars.” As genuine allies of the warmongering 
capitalists, their “philosophy” also praises war, “the only hygiene of the world.” (90)  
But the reaction appears soon. In the end of the novel the gathered crowd wishes to 
chase Prime minister. He is feminised; the crowd sings to him a famous ballade: “Don’t cry, 
my Ninetta, bye bye, bye bye!” (304). His cowardice is stressed time and again: “the minister 
wanted to take the French leave,” (303). As the only saviour, Stalin is opposed to the 
“patricians” (294), an obvious allusion to the Roman Empire. This allusion meets the 
“revolutionary-imperial paradigm”233 of the Soviet Union, drawing a clear parallel between 
the “red Czar” and Cesar. 
 
In Yugoslavia, the ‘Nazi-Americano-British coalition’ can rely on its vassal Tito, with 
the aggravating circumstance that he is a traitor inside the Communist movement. His lack of 
any moral virtue is stressed by a member of Ustrialov group of resistance fighters: - By the 
way, have you read Machiavelli’s work The Prince? Katnych nodded in approval. – This is 
Tito’s bedside book. (118) 
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I have already mentioned quotes on Tito’s alleged collaboration with the Nazis. 
Concerning his ties with the Anglo-Saxons, the responsible of the mine of Bor asks: “Can the 
idea to damage the interests of the Americans come to Tito’s mind?” (p. 25) 
Later Tito's close adviser Popovitch mentions “the recent Tito’s order, where he states about 
the necessity to “study the name list of American and English people in order to give them 
any aid when necessary.” (p. 46) 
Already in November 1949, Ehrenburg puts forward that the Italian “ruling class has 
forgotten what national independence is.” He is outraged by the way American press calls the 
Italians “lazy;” to the Soviet polemist, “they are workaholic (trudoliubiveishii) people.”234 In 
the Storm, we find: “Their special leaflets are full of lies. These provocateurs distort the fact. 
They pile up clumsiness on stupidity and stupidity on nastiness,” thunders the communist 
leader Serafino Visconti at the Parliament, “crumpling and throwing down the last edition of a 
Roman newspaper which condemns the “worker-murderers of San Carmelino” (153). The 
figure of the journalist is embodied by Emilio Marinucci, a famous reporter who serves the 
politicians. His servile and greedy behaviour is contrasted with his elder brother Pietro, a poor 
street artist always choosing “controversial subjects” (159). Sometimes Emilio sends him a 
client, who wishes to have his portrait, “never forgetting to deduce his thirty percent 
commission from the brother’s earnings” (158). Once upon a time they meet near a luxurious 
restaurant, the Lucul, while Pietro is finishing a copy of Leonardo Da Vinci's The Last Supper. 
“It was like a challenge: the Last Supper and the drunken rich men at the tables of the Lucul” 
(159). So, to illustrate the moral corruption of the journalist, the author resorts to a visual 
profanation (see below).  
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Concerning the Pope, he was “a cautious friend of the Duce, Franco and the Führer. 
Now he became the overseas President’s friend.”(165) The author refers to Pius XII (1939 -
1958) who is known for his sharp anti-communist views (on July 1st 1949 he 
excommunicated all the communist Catholics); his role during the World War II provoked 
many controversies.
235
 One may also notice that the character of Pius XII in Eriomin is 
opposed to the churchman in Roberto Rossellini’s movie Rome, Open City (1945) where the 
priest Don Pietro becomes a martyr of the anti-Nazi Resistance. The first reprint of foreign 
press criticizing the Vatican in the Soviet media dates back from September 1945. Attacks 
again the Pope intensify with the Communist defeat at the 1948 elections. Eriomin’s book is 
certainly the last and the sharpest one. 
 
D) The Enemy as a Tool of Literary Diplomacy  
 
ERIOMIN CODE 
 
Like Dan Brown in nowadays, Storm over Rome looks like an attempt to challenge the myth 
of the Vatican. Indeed, the stakes are high: the countries with the strongest communist parties 
in Europe (Italy and France) are at the same time the most important Catholic centres. But “in 
real life the Vatican proved its enmity time and again. Even though Roman Catholic priests 
were almost certainly not smuggling arms (The Conspiracy of the Doomed), they were openly 
opposed to communist regimes.”236 So the risk for the Kremlin is to lose its two key-allies in 
Western Europe. Hence the goal of Eriomin’s book is to show the Vatican in a rather 
unflattering light in order to belittle its credibility in the eyes of the Italian and the French 
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comrades; besides, translations in both these languages were planned if Détente had not arose 
in the late 1952. The main charges retained by the author are the greed of the Pope causing his 
submission to the Americans, and his contempt for his flock badly dissimulated by a cold 
hypocrisy. 
 
For this reason, profanation is a leitmotiv of the novel. The premiere of the movie 
“Ave Maria,” praising mercy and empathy of the Church for the poor, takes place in the 
Vatican. The Pope exclaims: “bless the release! (15) <...> and in apostolic manner raises his 
white hands” (17), demonstrating his devotion to the benefits from the movie rather than any 
interest in its topic. The Pope despises “downtrodden hillbillies” (15) and shows indifference 
to the workers during the strikes: - “There is no quietness in this world <…> in the times of 
Inquisition, one could burn these strikers as heretics!” (162) There is also the film Holy whose 
title seems inappropriate for the character of the Pope. The film is also an apparent allusion to 
Romolo Marcellini’s Pastor Angelicus (1942) portraying Pius XII. As a sign of the corrupted 
city, Ambroggio, the saint of Milan to whom many appeal in the novel, is the name of a nasty 
student (co-author of Philosophy of Constraint) who spends his spare time accompanying the 
zgerri in their criminal actions, “sitting and observing” (260). One of them, Evo Serrao, is 
surprised before the house of Romeo and Juliette in Verona: he can’t understand why this 
place is left empty. He would willingly set himself instead of Juliette’s grave (192), showing 
his lack of respect for any symbol of European literature. Later, minister Cassino commits 
perjury and shows his total amorality when, after the murder of a little factory owner who 
decided to support his workers, he swears “upon his mother’s memory” that the assassin will 
be found whereas he already knows his name (207). 
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The theme of profanation reveals enemy as the “enemy of God”237 in Sam Keen’s 
categorization; then the “war becomes a crusade, a Holy war against evil. Killing the enemy 
becomes a sacramental art.” To be sure, such descriptions shatter the basic values of the 
Soviet reader strengthening his stand against what he feels as a threat to civilization itself. In 
the ideological and ethical contest of the Cold war, “absolute weapons demand absolute 
enemies <...> in a warfare state, the warriors became the new priestly class. The holy man 
who reads the signs, passes on the esoteric language of the sacred, advises the tribe <...> the 
right side of God has been usurped by the intelligence agency (CIA, KGB).”238 This statement 
needs one clarification: in the Soviet Union the priestly class is the class of the writers. In this 
sense, the “priest” Eriomin leads the eighth crusade against the decadent Rome. And the 
reader is invited on board. 
 
THE TARPEIAN BOOK 
 
Let me now put forward my thesis and argue that Maltsev’s work is a ‘Tarpeian book’: 
like the cliff in the Roman Republic fiction is a place to punish traitors. First, again, we do not 
deal here with any kind of high literature but with a pure political text. It can be compared 
with the article by the same author entitled Tito’s Chronicler (1949), 239 where he points to 
several inaccuracies in Tito’s war diaries written by Vlado Dedijer, challenging, just like in 
the novel, his prestige as a resistance fighter. He charges Tito with intentional sacrifice of 
resistance leaders in order to get rid of potential rivals. Yet, he is a fervent Serbian nationalist 
who despises the Serb people. Maltsev considers Dedijer as an agent of the United States 
adding that the latter looked like an American gangster in his studentship. Furthermore, the 
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same cliché on the American influence in Eastern Europe and on “the Tito clique” can be 
found in the novel Plotters (1951) by Nikolai Shpanov. One can cite many other examples.
240
 
 
This political fiction fulfills the function of storytelling as defined by Brian Boyd 
(mentioned above). Following Michel Foucault’s bi-functional nature of power,241 we can 
argue that in Maltsev description of the Yugoslav enemy, not only the Soviet regime punishes 
the guilty behavior, but it also legitimizes itself by enhancing the Soviet prestige at war (the 
indisputable winner vs. the shameful resistant fighters) and so reinforcing the Soviet values. 
We can find an example in exchange between the Russian hero and Katnych, a resistance 
leader (p. 340-341). Katnych reads one of his texts exposing his political views and boasting 
about the situation of Yugoslavia, “at the heart of the heart of the world” (Europe), and 
pretending to be the best of the Balkan nations combining Western culture with communism. 
Then the narrator “sets the record straight” and mentions the Yugoslav debt to the Russian 
army in the 19
th
 and 20
th
 centuries to gain its independence, mocks at his cultural pretensions 
(“this half-feudal culture here where people still dig the earth with the wooden plough and 
maintain relations with each other by arbitrary rules and slavery”, p. 341).  This symbolic 
punishment reminds one of the “Tarpeian rock” in the Ancient Rome. Initially, the legend says 
that: “Tarpeia, one of the maidens of honorable estate, was the daughter of the guardian of the 
Capitol when the Romans were warring against the Sabines. She promised Tatius, the Sabine 
king, that she will give him access to the Tarpeian Rock if she received as a pay the necklaces 
that the Sabines wore for adornment. The Sabines understood the import and buried her alive 
[for treason in the rock that now bears her name].”242 Since then the traitors were executed by 
being thrown from the cliff, a shameful death. As we have already seen, this situation 
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corresponds to the Yugoslav case justifying the qualification of Maltsev text as a ‘Tarpeian 
book.’  
 
It is interesting to note that the aim of such a literary diplomacy is to have a specific 
impact on perception of the reader at the centre as well as at the periphery of the bloc. On the 
one hand, we have a strong effect on the people’s republics which can be measured through 
criticism and readers’ letters. For example, the novel spurred intense reaction in the Bulgarian 
press:
243
 “We read your novel with a keen interest, it galvanizes our patriotic youth in the 
struggle against the fascist Tito crew,” enthusiastically writes the journal Mladezh to the 
author. In the name of the Bulgarian frontier guards, a certain Nikolai Tsopev expresses his 
“satisfaction reading Maltsev book.” As the witnesses of the “tragedy of the Yugoslavs and of 
provocations at the boarder by Tito’s supporters, the novel strengthened [their] hatred toward 
the latter and urged [them] to defend [their] country and to fight against the war incendiaries 
in the Balkans.” A writer and radio advisor Bogomil Nonev thinks alike: Maltsev “is 
successful in showing the political motivations of the Yugoslav tragedy <…> the book sparks 
off love to the Yugoslav people and the inextinguishable hatred towards the traitors and the 
sold agents of imperialism.”244 
The same effect can be observed in the RSFSR, at the centre of the empire, where the 
perception of a periphery arouses in the Soviet readers shaping of an imperial consciousness. 
This process is carefully sustained by discussion groups on the local level. Thus the 
municipality library of Kokchetavo (Kokshetau since 1993), a city in a province of the 
Northern Kazakhstan, regularly organizes conferences and literary evenings dedicated to the 
Stalin Prize winners, including Orest Maltsev's Yugoslav Tragedy.
245
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Abroad, the propaganda machine resorts to its wide international networks; such is the 
case with Parallèle 50,
246
 a Franco-Czech journal which conveys Moscow’s message about 
Maltsev novel: “the novelist didn't produce a fiction but a documentary… on Tito’s 
conspiracy to seize power… after reading this book, we hope that the Yugoslav people will 
free from its today oppressors.” 247  In doing so Soviet power leads a literary offensive 
targeting readers of the Western bloc. The Soviet empire by fiction crosses over the 
ideological borders to challenge the European narrative on its own territory.  
The study of Maltsev’s novel gives us some insight into the imperial policy of the late 
Stalinist Soviet Union stressing out the specific way to avoid any “ideological dissonance.”248 
We call it “Tarpeian book” for it reminds of the punishment of the traitors in Ancient Rome 
playing the role of ostracism in the communist bloc. In this sense the Soviet ‘Empire by 
fiction’ demonstrates an undeniable symbolic component within its materialistic dimension. 
To put it differently, in Nye’s terminology, the Soviet Union is not less a soft power than a 
hard one. Indeed, the Party line is more decisive than any military goal per se. In the 
evolution of Soviet doctrinal debates, Tito’s official return to favour in 1955 is the prologue to 
the inversion of values that takes place at the XX Congress of the Party. 
As to the consequences for American policy, the Yugoslav crisis fed the diplomat 
George Kennan’s hope that other communist leaders “might already be infected by the Tito 
virus.” Hitherto, he recommends “fostering a heretical process” in Eastern Europe.249 Thus, 
maybe because he was reassured by the first cracks in the Eastern bloc, the inflexible author 
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of containment shows unusual appeasement and favours negotiations with Moscow. 
Unfortunately, at the turn of the 1950s he loses his influence within the Department of State 
and becomes powerless to stop McCarthyist purges. The cultural war will gather steam within 
the next decade. 
 
The Yugoslav Tragedy (1951), the Stalin Prize novel at the crest of the Cold War, 
offers an extraordinary example of how literature can be applied to geopolitics. Denying the 
role of the Yugoslavs in the liberation of their country, the book’s main goal is to legitimize 
Soviet hegemony over Yugoslavia as well as to comminate its integration with the West. This 
example shows the Soviet regime’s literary diplomacy at the time when “the ‘operational 
weapon’ [is] culture”.250  Our case study is focused on the Soviet attempt to “roll back” 
Western influence as well as to strengthen the socialist camp. Analyzing the use of novels by 
the regime, one can consider the Soviet Union as ‘Empire by fiction,’ to rephrase Geir 
Lundestad’s apt title.251 
Unlike the limpid and seducing also paradoxical meaning of "Empire by invitation," 
we assume an ambiguity of our own expression: on the one hand, ‘empire by fiction’ points to 
fiction, i.e. to literature as a vehicle transmitting the socialist values. As Hannibal had used 
elephants to lead his army, the Soviet system resorts to the narrative as an “empire-builder,” 
as the cement to maintain symbolically what was gained by the economical or military means. 
On the other hand, one can consider this concept not from the point of view of the ruler 
(Hannibal, Cesar or Stalin) but “from below,” as the perception of the new empire's subjects. 
If Lundestad says that the American empire is built on the democratic choice and consent, our 
expression suggests that holding sway over the satellites, especially after the occupation of 
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Eastern Europe by the Red Army at the end of the war, was to a certain degree successful 
owing to the communist narrative, to the political fiction, to the illusion whittled away in 
1991. Thus, the Yugoslav battle allows keeping both meanings to shed light on the Soviet 
imperial strategy as opposing to European integration. 
 
Following the Yugoslav and Italian defeats, Soviet political fiction was aimed to put 
the blame on the enemy’s illegitimate goals and immoral means: capitalists’ greed and will to 
exploit workers, the Neo-fascists’ will of revenge, and their respective allies’ materialistic and 
petty motivations (members of the mafia and Tito’s followers). In this sense, the two books 
have played the role of defence of the communist cause in the eyes of the Soviet and Eastern 
European readership. By showing the traitors and the enemy’s deceits, the Soviet novels have 
been warning and disciplining people inside the communist camp. The mythical function of 
literature (Clark) was pursuing the goal of edification of the masses. But only a few years later, 
the ‘super-ideology’ of Stalinism crumbled after the revelations of Khrushchev’s Secret 
Speech. Then, observing Schmitt’s theory linking the political to enmity, the trope of enemy 
began to weaken. This process would be completed only during Perestroika, with the end of 
Soviet ideology itsef. 
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Second Part. The Khrushchev Era 
The Ideological Enemy. 
 
Chapter 4. The making of the Thaw Enemy on the Cold War stage 
 
During the Thaw, the outside enemy vanished and the United States became a (too) 
seducing rival. ‘Peaceful coexistence’ was the time of intense cultural exchanges and 
diplomatic dialogue between East and West. However, such neo-Stalinist writers as Vsevolod 
Kochetov demonstrate that the conservative fringe of the Party was fearing the contamination 
by Western ideas, revealing cracks in Soviet ideology. 
 
4.1.‘Peaceful coexistence’ or the Vanishing of the Outside Enemy 
 
From the beginning of the Thaw period, the outside enemy begins to disappear due to 
the two converging phenomena: the declared friendship between the Soviet Union and the US, 
and the negation of the (political) enemy by post-war institutions. To be sure, relations 
between the two blocs were deprived of neither covert actions (including spying and cultural 
war
252
) nor of proxy wars (the Suez Crisis, the Korean War). But until the end of the decade, 
the US were no more seen by the Soviets as the enemy; they were rather perceived as a rival 
which must be “caught up and overtaken” according to Khrushchev’s promise.  
There are several explanations of the new ‘era of friendship’. First, the change of 
leaders of the two super-powers gave hope that a compromise could nevertheless be found 
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easier than between ‘Uncle Joe’ and the ‘petty shopkeeper’ (as Stalin and Truman scornfully 
called each other in private). Khrushchev and Eisenhower had never felt such personal 
hostility toward each other; besides, Eisenhower came into office as former commanding 
general of the forces in Europe during World War II and it revived the time when the US and 
the Soviet Union were victorious allies. Secondly, both the American and the Soviet people 
were exhausted after the first round of the Cold War.
253
 The Peace Movement had millions of 
supporters around the world, and the risk of propaganda saturation urged the governments to 
tune down their warlike rhetoric. Thirdly, politicians were limited by the costs of war. In 
order to avoid “an unbearable security burden leading to economic disaster,”254 President 
Eisenhower put forward in 1953 the ‘New Look policy’ based on the concept of massive 
retaliation so reducing military expenses to minimum. In his ‘New Course’ speech, given 
before the Supreme Soviet on August 8, 1953,
255
 Malenkov seemed to share the same idea. 
He cited light and food industries as a top priority of the Soviet economy; indeed, the July 
Plenum of the Party had underlined shortage of food and a structural housing problem.
256
  
This ‘compelled friendship’ was simultaneous to the negation of the enemy as a 
concept. Actually, according to Julien Freund’s theory,257 the post-war world and the United 
Nations were characterized by pacifist legalism which means that any conflict may be solved 
by a court. The political enemy, whose legitimacy comes from his power, was left aside; at 
the same time, nuclear deterrence dismissed strength as “the continuation of politics by other 
means.” Therefore, says Freund, superiority relied on legal and moral principles. The enemy 
fell into the realm of ideology. Last but not least, the very nature of the Cold War erased all 
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traces of the enemy. Originally, the expression “Cold War” was employed to describe the 
struggle between Christians and Muslims: “Cold war neither brings peace nor gives honor to 
the one who makes it.”258 For the Soviets, this new kind of war, this “war without war” must 
have been very deceptive. Even merciless former KGB vice-chairman Philip Bobkov recalls: 
“Neither the state nor the Party have attached much significance to the Cold War <…> we 
used to talk about it all the time <…> but no serious response, no serious counterpropaganda 
was implemented.”259  
  
Undoubtedly, Stalin’s death allowed the diplomatic Thaw. In 1953, the Soviets had 
already detonated the nuclear bomb and almost reached a military parity with the Americans. 
On March 15, Malenkov – considered at the time as Kremlin heir – delivered a speech before 
the Supreme Soviet, where he argued that conflicts between Moscow and Washington should 
“be decided by peaceful means, on the basis of mutual understanding.” At the same time, 
Washington seized the opportunity of brief power vacuum to engage in the path of Détente. 
On April 16, 1953 – only three months after his inauguration day – President Eisenhower 
delivered the ‘Chance for Peace Speech’ where he clearly expressed his will to reduce defense 
spending and warned against the dangers of starting the arms race; in December of the same 
year it was followed by the ‘Atoms for Peace Speech,’ pronounced at the United Nations 
General Assembly. In July 1955, Khrushchev and Eisenhower first met at the Geneva Summit, 
dedicated to disarmament and international security where the American President unveiled 
his ‘Open Skies’ plan, an aerial monitoring agreement. The summit enhanced communication 
and trust between the two states arousing the so called ‘Spirit of Geneva.’ Later, the XXth 
Congress of the Party made a decision that Soviet foreign policy should be based on the 
principle of ‘peaceful coexistence,’ articulated for the first time by Georgy Chicherin in 1922. 
                                                          
258
The author is the Spanish writer Don Juan Manuel (fourteenth century) see Paul Dukes, Superpowers 
(London: Routledge, 2000), 107. 
259
 Philipp Bobkov, Kak gotovili predatalei (Moscow: Algoritm, 2011), p. 227. 
122 
 
This principle was reaffirmed in the Third program of the Communist Party appeared in 1961. 
In September 1959, Khrushchev flew to the US, subsequently his visit was favorably 
highlighted in the books Living in Peace and Friendship,
260
 and Face to face with America.
261
 
Needless to say, the diplomatic progress during this trip was negligible for both sides (related 
to the temporary lifting of the Soviet ultimatum on Berlin), but the real result was that it 
showed the perception of the American people by the Soviet delegation summarized in 
Khrushchev’s address to Americans on television. After saying he was convinced that their 
president “sincerely desires an improvement of relations between [their] countries,” 
Khrushchev said: “Good bye! Good luck! Friends!”262 
 As a token of this warming in US-Soviet relations, cultural exchanges have been 
hugely fostered during the Thaw covering almost all aspects of cultural and social life: theater, 
music, books, newspapers, broadcasts like “Music USA”, museum, and exhibitions.263 In 
January 1956 the Soviets proposed a twenty-year treaty of friendship putting much stress on 
broader artistic contacts; later they advanced the idea of new film cooperation. On October 9, 
1956, an agreement was signed for renewed circulation of slick magazines in the two 
countries, such as Amerika and USSR. In return the United States Information Agency raised 
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the budget on cultural and information programs up to $325 million.
264
 This policy of open 
doors culminated in the cultural agreement signed on January 27, 1958 which implied the 
exchange of films, scholars, sportsmen, artists, and writers. 
 To be sure, such a non-zero sum game was not just initiated “from above,” the 
American citizens met it with eagerness too: there was an “outpouring enthusiasm for the 
American appearances of Soviet musicians Emil Gilels, David Oistrakh, and Mstislav 
Rostropovich in winter 1955 and spring 1956.”265 At the same time, about 2,500 American 
musicians, intellectuals and politicians visited the USSR.
266
 Reciprocally, far from being seen 
as an enemy, America was very popular among the Soviet population: “Embassy personnel, 
tourists, and other Westerners in Moscow received daily evidence, based on their contacts 
with Soviet citizens, of the growing appeal of Western ideas and information in the USSR.”267 
The proof that the American way of life was very attractive for the Thaw generation was, 
among other things, the American National Exhibition set up in Moscow in the summer 1959.  
Harold McClellan, one of its chief organizers, suspected that its actual attendance exceeded 
the official figure of 2.7 million: “They came in under the fence and over the fence. On one 
crowded day I checked what seemed to me as high as 20 percent pushing their way in with no 
tickets at all, simply because the guards and ticket takers at the gate were unable to restrain 
them.”268 Very early in the Thaw, and despite Kremlin’s official position, “embassy personnel 
monitored evidence in the Soviet press of increased sensitivity to the danger of ideological 
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contamination.”269 Another example is the World Festival for Youth and Students, held in 
Moscow in the summer 1957; “to reduce [the contacts between foreigners and ordinary 
people], the regime was successfully striving to occupy the foreign guests, so that they had no 
time left.”270 
 Depicted in the lexicon of virology, this “ideological contamination” was the core of 
the Soviet doctrine toward the US during the Thaw. The enemy was no more a spy aimed to 
cause material or physical damage to the country (like the saboteurs in the 1930s or the Nazi 
invaders); this new enemy was feared out of his subversive actions and possible impact on the 
imaginary world and moral consciousness of the Soviet people. Like the snake in the Garden 
of Eden, the threat coming from the US was no more destructive but seductive. 
 In spite of the regain of tensions at the beginning of the 1960s (like the U2 incident or 
the Cuban missiles), it has not changed much in the perception of the American world. 
Unexpected and paroxysmal, these crises left nothing more than a purely political, superficial, 
impact on the overwhelming majority of the Soviet people which then gradually has gone, and 
the US continued to hold the Soviet imaginary under their spell. Despite the official media's 
attempts to diminish the importance of the Western appeal to Soviet youth,
271
 these events did 
not alter its greed for American material goods neither dampened their enthusiasm for jazz 
music. As Pyotr Vail’ and Alexander Genis rightly put it, “the sixties did not know America, 
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but they believed in it <…> 1963 – Kennedy’s murdered is perceived in Russia like a national 
tragedy  <…> a cult book are the travel notes by Ilf and Petrov Little Golden America.”272  
 The Soviet leader was not an exception here; he too was hypnotized by his American 
counterpart. Without sometimes changing a Stalinist rhetoric, saying to his lieutenants that 
they won’t be able to stand against the imperialists, 273  Khrushchev developed towards 
Eisenhower and his people a complex of inferiority,
274
 a mixed feeling of fear and fascination. 
However, after the Soviet leader’s triumphal trip to the United States in 1959, he decided to 
befriend with the Americans.
275
 He happily welcomed Kennedy’s election in 1961. Victor 
Sukhodrev, a Soviet interpreter, who used to accompany Khrushchev to summit meetings, 
recalls that “Kennedy was the most impressive of all. No doubt he was an outstanding person, 
intellectual, handsome and charismatic <…> After his murder, Khrushchev was genuinely 
disappointed and sent his closest mate among the Soviet executives – Anastas Mikoyan <…> 
Shortly before his death, [Kennedy] delivered his ‘Peace Speech’ at the American University, 
where he pleaded for a turning point in the Soviet-American relations and for a kind of ‘reset’. 
This endeavor was positively met by Khrushchev <…> the ‘red phone’ was a result of the 
Caribbean crisis where each hour was crucial.”276 Paradoxically, the Caribbean crisis has 
drawn the enemies together making communication between the countries easier and still 
more necessary. 
Thus, during the Thaw the rules of the game have been changed: the enemy outside 
ceased to exist, the inside enemy appeared instead. But unlike in the Stalinist 1930s, the latter 
had no political dimension, he was no longer doomed to be exterminated or, as they used to 
say then, ‘uprooted.’ The new, inside enemy was ideological; he has not shared the moral 
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values established after the Twentieth Party Congress and so remained aloof from the radical 
turn towards the destalinization process.  
 
4.2. Case Study: The Enemy Within: V. Kochetov 
 
The intrigue of the novel is simple: the capitalists decided to undermine the Soviet 
Union from within. To achieve this goal, they resort to the services of various people who 
have personal reasons to settle accounts with the communist system: the CIA agent Portsia 
Brown, former SS Uwe Klauberg, who wants to take revenge after the lost war. His colleague 
- Peter Saburov, the son of a white emigrant, who is promised to return to former Russia, 
where he fled with his parents while still a small child. Implementing a UNESCO treaty in the 
field of cultural relations between the US and the Soviet Union, this uncommon team hides a 
Machiavellian plan. Under the pretext of the publishing order by the London based publishing 
house "New World", which wants to show the world pictures of the best icons that were 
created by the ancient masters of Russia (Kochetov, 190), to conduct a sabotage action. 
The story of the novel causes the reader to associate with the "Extraordinary 
Adventures of Mr. West in the Land of the Bolsheviks"
277
 (hereinafter: "Adventures"), whose 
hero, chairman of the Young Christians Society, is busy spreading Western values. However, 
in both cases, under the influence of what they saw in Russia, the enemy recognizes the 
superiority of communism and turns to communist faith: “Burn New York magazines 
[depicting Russia as a barbaric country] and hang a portrait of Lenin in my office !,” West 
cries to his wife on the phone, Admiring the parade of "real Bolsheviks" on Red Square. 
Kochetov has a team of "Apostles of Evil" going to the "cold" crusade. They plan not a 
violent aggression, but a soft conquest: They will go to Russia not with axes, not with gallows, 
but with banners of ideas of good, friendship of peoples (30). The London headquarters of the 
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"publishing house" reminds Saburov of the central leadership of the NDP in Hanover, which 
someone even considered a successor to the Nazi Party, hinting at a Nazi-capitalist plot. The 
brigade of "saboteurs" includes two comrades: Eugene Ross and Miss Brown. Eugene is a 
fine car driver and has many more excellent qualities to be an indispensable and pleasant 
companion for an expedition to such a difficult country as the Soviet Union (200). This 
character refers to the cowboy Jeddy at Kuleshov, who assures Vesta that he will be able to 
guard him in this barbarous country (the difference between them is that Jeddy is not driving a 
car, but a troika!). In a certain sense, Kochetov is the Soviet John Le Carré, which almost at 
the same time (six years earlier) published the novel "The Spy that Came from the Cold.” 
American Portia Brown, with her angelic right oval clean face (200) - an inverted "countess" 
from Kuleshov: the latter tried to tempt Vesta, while Miss Brown is the West tempting 
Russia. . Closing her skirt, on the platform, the most recent American dance was chopped off 
- who? Miss Brown! (399). 
Laughing at the spy-saboteur, Kochetov criticizes the anti-Stalinist artists: She knew 
some Soviet writers, artists, directors, artists. All those separate, on which the authors of the 
appeal hinted, were, in her words, precisely from this circle. Miss Brown spoke about them 
with great sympathy. (230) Among them are "modernist-abstractionists"; A scene where two 
heroes are invited to the office of the vice-director of the "publishing house": on the walls - 
abstract bright spots and gloomy chaos in frames and without frames. (196) The latter, 
perhaps, is the real enemy in the novel. The rest of the characters are just - consciously or not, 
as in the case of Saburov - the agents of Evil. The enemy's goal is the same: The best minds of 
the West are working today on the problems of the preliminary dismantling of communism, 
and, first and foremost, of modern Soviet society (206). Like an echo of the debate ten years 
ago on the secret report of Khrushchev, the enemy repeats, reminding the devil Archimedes: 
“Dethroned Stalin is the fulcrum for us to turn the communist world” (207). 
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Piotr Strokov, a literary critic and longtime Kochetov’s collaborator at the editorial 
board of the journal Oktiabr’, interestingly enough notices the resemblance between 
Kochetov’s novel and the Gogol’s Dead Souls: “Chichikov visits the landlords in order to buy 
them the dead souls of their peasants. Here Portsia Brown and co travel in order to deprave 
living souls.”278  However, initially the novel was meant to be modeled on Dostoevsky’s 
Demons. For both Kochetov and Dostoevsky, the issue of the usurpation of the sacred voice 
of the people (here epitomized by the traditional art of the icons) is central, as well as the 
concern of the worshipping of false gods. The desire of the enemy to debunk and profane the 
Soviet saint is emphasized in the novel repeatedly. Cynicism is one of the forms of profane 
attitude to the world, to its values. Kochetov shows cynicism with a smiling face. So, 
preparing for sabotage, Portia Brown smiles, cute and charming (341); Deputy director of the 
publishing house - also moderately smiling (196). Prof. Kondratiev (Golubkov), a former 
policeman, who is involved in an artel of defiant businessmen who sold icons to foreigners 
(284), and the liberal artist Sveshnikov. When the wife of one of the American diplomats who 
ordered a portrait of him saw herself on his canvas, almost mirrored in the manner that she 
used to see in the mirror every day, and at the same time subtly resembling the image of the 
Russian Virgin, she was delighted. She arranged a large cocktail party, to which her friends 
from dozens of Western and Eastern embassies accredited in Moscow gathered, and all of 
them amused with standing in front of the portrait, effectively placed in the living room, 
everyone wanted to meet an extraordinary artist (119). 
 
The enemy of Kochetov is a blasphemer. Selling icons, he trades the image of a saint, 
that is, eternity. In the Soviet perspective, time is a condition for the implementation of 
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communism, the promise of a long-awaited meeting between myth and the world. Any 
mythical struggle (and that was the case during the Cold War) is not so much about the victor 
as about the enemy. When the enemy disappears (is defeated), then the mythological language 
disappears, thanks to which we are only able to distinguish between the sacred and profane, 
eternal and temporary. That is why the enemy-profaner is always endowed with a dual nature: 
he is simultaneously menacingly dangerous and necessary. 
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Chapter 5. Khrushchev’s Apocrypha 
 
As Jones established, Khrushchev’s revelations during the 20th Congress brought 
about reassessment of the Stalinist past and the breakdown of communist ideology. The newly 
liberated speech began to condemn Stalin in a much more radical way than expected by the 
authorities: “in 1963, terror narratives continued to flood publishing houses.”279 Leaning on 
Jones’ findings, I identified the carnival as the main anthropological scheme the Thaw, 
characterized by the reversal of the former (Stalinist) values. It seems that the realm of 
carnival has also been serving as a release to overcome the delusions caused by the 
denunciation of Stalin’s cult. Following the thread of my thesis and Schmitt’s theory, one can 
notice that the ideological crisis was accompanied in parallel by the degradation of the enemy: 
the outside enemy vanished and the inside enemy turned into subversive ideas and values, 
sometimes hard to grasp, and carried essentially by ‘social parasites’ and the intelligentsia. 
 
The Thaw was the first long period of peace in Soviet history. It was the first time, as 
Vail and Genis notice, that the regime displayed relatively ‘vegetarian mores,’ which allowed 
realizing the potential of Soviet society, evoking a kind of Red ‘Victorian era.’280  
 Let me stress: the earthquake of the Twentieth Party Congress totally transformed the 
temporal and spatial bearings of the society.
281
 By Khrushchev’s historical speech in 1956 one 
can date a paradigmatic shift in the perception of history. Unlike the Stalinist model, which 
was in many ways performative, oriented toward the future, i.e. the enemy has remained 
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bounded to the present (he retards the “coming future,” he is a disturbing element of the 
progress, coming communism, etc.), the Thaw model is reflexive. Khrushchev’s political 
upheaval brought about an origin of historical consciousness as well as profound reflections 
on the previous history where Stalin himself became the enemy #1. In other words, 
Khrushchev began to create a history in order to announce its end. To think historically means 
to be an insider (ours) seeing the end of history; just to mention Khrushchev’s later promise 
(the Twenty Second Party Congress in 1961): “the present generation of the Soviet people 
will live in communism.” It is nothing else than a countdown that could be named “twenty 
years b.c.e.” (before communist era).282 Moreover, the very program of that Congress, the 
slogans “to catch up and overtake the US,” “we will bury you” are by themselves some kind 
of prophecies reminding of the ‘A Song About Five Minutes’, sung by Ludmila Gurchenko, 
(before the beginning of the New Year) from the The Carnival Night (1956, E. Ryazanov). In 
this film, the show performed by the “pensionaries’ band” anticipates the advent of 
communism (the members of the public see “themselves in twenty years”). No wonder that 
H. Schelsky, a leading German sociologist at the time, wrote that USA and USSR lived within 
our time but out of history.
283
 As a result, if the Stalinist enemy rejects the future, the Thaw 
one doesn’t accept such a revisited history where he is embedded: “Promise, it’s water under 
the bridge!” (Obeshanie, eto zvuk pustoi!) sings  one anti-hero in Spring on Narechnaya Street. 
To be sure, the reconsideration of history is the supreme power’s prerogative only. 
Boris Pasternak, who in his novel put into doubt the revolution (the Genesis), was flagellated 
in the press (1958) as nearly enemy of the people. To publish his novel abroad is also the 
enemy’s gesture since no right criticism can be given from outside. 
It seems natural that these processes provoke a (youth)-subculture which rejected “to 
think historically.” The best example of it is, perhaps, stilyagi who existed already in the 
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1940s but reached their apogee in the late 1950s-1960s (echoing in time the movement of 
hippies, beatniks, hipsters in the US and Western Europe). This “skeptical generation,” having 
looked disparagingly at history as the product of politics and vice versa, also disdained the 
Soviet regime as an unfinished project. Their idea was to live in their own (parallel) present 
free from any history and reflections on it. The stilyagi were certainly considered as the 
enemy even not because they criticized the regime (in a way the political dissidents do) but 
because they rejected (aesthetically, first of all) the regime’s legitimizing power. Ironically, 
among the reasons why the stilyagi have prospered in the 1960s is the increasing number of 
contacts between the Soviet Union and the US. The stilyagi’s America was a fantasy, as well 
as the American hippies’ Orient, however it was enough for being stigmatized as “non-ours.” 
Jazz, boogie-woogie, such films as Sun Valley Serenade (1941), Die Frau Meiner Träume 
(1944), The Roaring Twenties (1939) became cult references. In the mid 1950s many stilyagi 
were arrested for making recordings on “bones” (developed X-ray films). Those who were 
found guilty of manufacturing and distributing such recordings received from three to five 
years of imprisonment in labor camps for profiteering. The ideological hunting for the stilyagi 
was supported by L. Panteleev, A. Kozlov, D. Belyaev (the latter is of special interest, in his 
article he calls them “an outmoded type drowning into the history” <sic!>284). Along with the 
stilyagi, the hammer fell on formalism ("abstractionism," the stigmata for any non-Soviet 
artistic activity like, for example, the Lianozovo group appeared in the late 1950s). 
The Thaw enemy was presented both in literature and cinema. As Khurshchev did in 
1962 during his Manege meeting with the painters, one year later he lambasted the film I Am 
Twenty, directed by M. Khutsiev and showing the problems of “the skeptical generation.” 
Then the movie was expurgated due to the display of this skepticism and only a censored 
version eventually came out in 1965. 
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The first era of lasting peace since forty years, the Thaw was the time of stabilization 
of the Soviet State and society, and it changed the perception of space too. The shift from the 
revolutionary dynamic of the 1930s to a more static model was mirrored in the immediate 
environment of Soviet heroes. As Katerina Clark noticed, already in the prose of the 1940s, 
“the use of a special affinity for wild horses as a sign of the hero [had] been largely 
supplanted by a closeness to the birch tree or to the forest as a whole. The forest and the birch 
are both Russian symbols for the native land, and this change reflects the growing 
nationalism.”285 Indeed, during the Thaw, this ‘rooting’ of consciousness has strengthened 
and expressed itself in the rising of “country prose” (like V. Shukshin or V. Rasputin) in 
literature and in the nationalist political movement. 
 Unlike the Stalinist world that was a 'masculine territory’, a battlefield or the stage for 
Stakhanovite achievements, the Thaw is in many ways a feminine space. It was the time when 
the large-scale space of Stalinism reduced to a smaller and more secure, family space 
materialized, among other, by the massive construction of khrushchyovki, a low-cost, 
concrete-paneled apartment buildings, which followed the new housing policy launched by 
Khrushchev in 1957. In his attempt to modernize the country, the Soviet leader wanted to 
raise the living standard of his citizens, so he gave priority to foodand consumer goods: 
« Food is big politics », declared Nikolay Ignatov, chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme 
Soviet of SFSR, at the Twenty First Congress in 1959.
286
  No wonder that the Thaw was also 
a blossom of publications on how to organize your “home sweet home” covering such fields 
as fashion, cooking or interior design. In the foreword to these books, the authors insist on the 
necessity for the Soviet man to acquire the goods “not only of spiritual culture but of 
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everyday life culture as well.”287 Even politicians end up in the kitchen during the famous 
debate between Khrushchev and Nixon. 
 If, according to the film director Dovzhenko, “today space defines a new, coming into 
being psyche”288 then the comparison between the Stalinist and the Thaw spaces can help to 
understand better the main features of the Thaw mentality. Dovzhenko’s films illustrate and 
create at the same time the Stalinist space, a space of “total collectivization,”289 an infinite 
space of the kolkhoz fields (Earth, 1935) or of a stretch of water without shores (Poem of the 
Sea, 1959).  Like in Mandelstam's poem where "space is squeezed to a point,"
290
 within the 
Soviet space such a point was, undoubtedly, Stalin; a black hole around which the empire has 
been moving. Along with the denunciation of the cult of personality at the Twentieth 
Congress, the Stalinist galaxy has blown out into myriads of small localities of human size. 
This change of scale turned out to be crucially important, it allowed the emergence of private 
sphere. In cinema, for example, such a private space was visualized in the scenes of kiss or 
dance.
291
 
 During the Thaw, quite unexpectedly, cosmos plays its role in this reduction of space; 
contrary to Dovzhenko’s vision of an unfathomable universe in his film project “Depths of the 
cosmos” where the heroes were travelling during eight years. First, the flight of space of the 
dog Laika in 1957 contributed to ‘domestication’ of cosmos (whereas the Americans sent a 
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monkey, an exotic animal)
292
; second, the fact that Yuri Gagarin orbited the Earth within one 
hour and a half in 1961 made it humanly apprehensible;” third, any Soviet citizen identified 
himself with Gagarin supposedly feeling as if he were on the board of his narrow capsule 
(maybe a metaphor for the matrix of the Soviet New Man?): “A Soviet man is in the cosmos,” 
claimed the newspapers.
293
  In fact, the Soviet feat is less a space conquest (in the sense of an 
expansion) than an integration of cosmos into the familiar realm of the Soviet people: “the sky 
has become closer.”294 
 In the film Men and Beasts (1962), directed by S. Gerasimov, the feeling of the close 
space is reached by a haphazard meeting of the two main characters seventeen years later. 
Aleksei Ivanovitch Pavlov was a commanding officer of the Red Army when he saved the life 
of Anna Andreevna, a doctor, during the Leningrad blockade. A couple of days later, he was 
caught by the Germans. After the war, Pavlov could not set out to go back to the Soviet Union 
but he eventually decided to visit his brother living in Sebastopol. It is on the road from 
Moscow that he meets for the second time Anna Andreevna, also heading by car to the South 
with her daughter. He joins them and they travel together and talk about their lives. The 
Soviet space appears anew with finite and reduced limits when Anna Andreevna tells him that, 
following five years of searches among the country, she has found her daughter after they had 
been separated during the war. Since the Thaw split the large-scale Stalinist into numerous 
small spaces or localities, the latter took on different and often intimate shape such as a car or 
taxicab,
295
 kitchen or classroom where the new “productive relations” take place. The latter, 
based on "participation," as defined in the Third Program of the Party, contribute to the 
“formation of the new man happening during the process of his active participation to the 
building of communism.” Included to this program, the Moral Code of the Builder of 
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Communism was more precise on the modalities of this participation. Indeed, such an 
inclusive space was necessary for showing thought (point 3 of the Moral Code), loyalty (point 
1), compassion (point 6), and mutual help (point 5). In cinema, this shrinking of space was 
depicted by the shift from the predominance of outdoor scenes to indoor scenes. The Spring 
on Zarechnaya Street is very revealing of this evolution: when the teacher of the evening class 
Tatyana Sergeevna comes to the factory in order to convince her pupil Savchenko to come 
back to her classroom, the viewer is sized by the contrast between two worlds: the gigantic 
territory of the factory, belonging to men and machines, on the one hand, and the little 
resolute woman moving forward on the rails, on the other hand. Besides, the fact that she 
stands on a moving locomotive alludes in a quite direct way to the previous (Stalinist) epoch 
of industrialization without which the victory over the Nazis was barely possible. Yet, the 
scene is an illustration of Marx's well-know saying about revolutions as “the locomotive of 
history” underlining the revolutionary continuity of the Soviet history. But, in the end of the 
film, Savchenko comes back to the classroom out of love for her teacher Tatyana Sergeevna, 
handing victory to the microcosm of the classroom and its set of values. Those include 
spirituality, culture, sincerity, peace, morality, and family.  
 It is not a coincidence that the classroom has become the heart of the Thaw topology. 
The safe and feminine territory of the Thaw refers to the maternal sphere, which has 
necessarily educational and moral implications. The Third Program has precisely put as one 
of the main goals of the Party “the education of the new man, who combines harmoniously 
spiritual wealth, moral purity and physical perfection.” In order to reach this “moral purity,” 
the Thaw generation was given a ‘moral education’ in the spirit of Gustave Flaubert. A herald 
of the realist school with his thorough description of the social codes of his contemporaries, 
Flaubert is also a moralist whose cutting irony was displayed in his Dictionary of Received 
Ideas (1911). Like the Soviet Union in the 1960s, the Second French Empire had known 
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major political upheavals – from constitutional monarchy to Republic. So Flaubert has written 
Sentimental Education, a bildungsroman where the main character, Frédéric Moreau, is a 
young provincial who has come to Paris for his studies. In 1864, the French novelist said of 
his book: “I want to write the moral history of the men of my generation – or, more accurately, 
the history of their feelings.”296 For sure, those words may have been pronounced by the 
“poet-mouthpiece of the Thaw,”297 the author of “Here is what is happening to me” (1957). 
The ‘Thaw generation’298stepped on the stage of history scattered with the ruins of Stalinism 
and the war losses; all the previous benchmarks were put into question and Soviet youth had 
to give meaning to their lives keeping faith with the communist ideals. For that reason, “the 
Soviet culture entered a period of extreme morality <…> the thought about the choice 
between good and evil has penetrated the whole decade of the 1960s.”299 That is why many 
films of this period show heroes who are teachers or educators.
300
 Like Lenin on his pulpit, 
the teacher disseminates the new moral standards of the post-Twentieth Congress era. Then 
space became the place for the reversal of values, giving way to the beginning of the Thaw 
carnival. 
 
 Whereas Stalinism was a culture of the plot, the Thaw culture has practiced the ritual 
of carnival. Actually, the political narrative of the 1930s was relying on the silent threat of 
dangerous minority acting against the whole Soviet people, like the accused of the 1937 
process. The public space was a hunting ground where “those who concealed their past were 
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‘masked,’ in Soviet parlance. And once they were masked, it was necessary to ‘unmask’ 
them.”301 Lenin himself was praised for that he had “torn off the mask from doubleface 
Trotsky.” During the Thaw, on the opposite, the mask was a part of the social game; a masked 
majority was openly struggling against [also masked] isolated enemies – or at least opponents 
to the new values – “Look at this mask! says one character of the Carnival Night – “It’s the 
true copy of Ogurtsov! answers another – But I am Ogurtsov!” retorts the director. 
Khrushchev himself, with his famous mimicking and mood swings, was wearing a mask, 
cumulating at the same time the roles of the king and of the buffoon of the king.  
In the Venetian tradition, the anonymity of the mask was giving social immunity to the 
citizens. By allowing people to escape from the strains of public morality without 
transgressing respectability, the mask was building a “private space in the public space.”302 
Hence, the wearer of the mask was located in an “inviolable space.”303 However, anonymity 
here must not be confused with permissiveness; on the contrary, the mask has introduced 
moral codes into social life. First, in order to safeguard this inviolability insult was prohibited; 
second, it ensured the republican equality by limiting ostentatious wealth; third, since 
aristocracy and foreign public figures had to wear a mask, it has limited contacts with the 
foreigners and the transmission of secrets that could be damaging for the Republic. 
Analogously, Khrushchev who had condemned the terror and thus had given to the Soviet 
people political freedom has tried to codify public life with a set of moral values. During the 
Thaw, anonymity has existed due to the phenomenal homogeneity of the social body.
304
 
Indeed, if one referred to the readers’ letters or surveys of that time, he would discover an 
indistinctive polyphony made of the voices from the whole Soviet empire. As Yuri Aksiutin 
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has shown in his monograph on public opinion under the Thaw,
305
 worker A. S. Avilova from 
Mytishch, fireman in the brick factory M. I. Vozniuk from the Amur district or the school 
teacher P. I . Kondrat’eva from Novgorod disclose common concerns and resort to the same 
judgment criterions. To this extent, the very names of the respondents were seals of 
anonymity. As to the role of social mask, it was devoted to literature, sparking off an 
ambivalent situation; on the one hand, the debates around the books (criticism in the 
newspapers, readers’ letters, or just informal exchanges between the readers of official prose) 
have created a free space of thought; on the other hand, political and literary institutions have 
broadcasted a rigid official discourse on this books and a State discipline that have “oriented” 
the readers’ opinions and have restrained their freedom. So in the Thaw carnival, the ‘Bauta 
of literature’ was leaving the mouth of the Soviet people uncovered, allowing the expression 
of a made-up, but new subjectivity. 
 Apart from the mask, there are other allusions to the ritual of carnival. As Vayl and 
Gennis note, during the Thaw took place “the profanation of the king - up to the removal of 
his corpse from the Mausoleum, the triumph of the bottom above the top, the replacement of 
the solemn style with vulgar vernacular. Best of all, the situation developed according to the 
formula of the theorist of the carnival M. Bakhtin (his rehabilitated book was published in 
1965): "A world outlook that frees one from fear, bringing the world as close as possible to 
man and man to man."
306
 That ‘carnival intimacy’ between people was fitting into the human 
scale of Thaw localities. In addition, the climax of the carnival (be it the burning of a 
mannequin in the pagan tradition, or the advent of the New Year, the inauguration of a 
furnace in Soviet society) corresponds to the Thaw anthropological posture of expectation. 
With their exuberance, provocative “disguises” and make up, and ‘dirty dances’ from the 
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American 1940s, the stilyagi can be seen as participants of the Thaw carnival.
307
 Besides, 
scenes of collective festivity conclude or take place in several Thaw films.
308
 
The reversal of values, a typical feature of carnival, can also be observed in many of 
them. For example, the person in authority was laughed at and excluded from the group 
because he represents the old order of values.
309
 In parallel, yesterday’s pariah could become 
today’s hero, like Kostya Inochkin in Welcome; his name, with the prefix –in, is already a clue 
of otherness. After he was expelled from the camp for having transgressed the rules by 
swimming out of the authorized zone, he fears that his grandmother could be disappointed and 
have a heart attack at his return. He decides to come back at night and begins to live 
clandestinely in the basement of the stage on the gathering place of the camp. At the end of 
the film, the situation is reversed: instead of hiding himself in the dark, he replaces the child 
of a Party notable in the role of the “prince of the fields.” Also, once he is alone in his shelter, 
Kostya imagines that the director has been insulted and suffers from bleeding; Inochkin is the 
only person whose blood matches with the director’s, so he agrees to be a donor. During the 
transfusion of blood, the director tells him: “You were my bloody enemy, now you became 
my bloody brother” (“Ty dlia menya byl krovnym vragom, a seichas stal krovnym 
bratom”41’45); in this sequence, blood symbolizes the transfer of moral essence. The final 
scene of carnival, where the little boy becomes the hero of the feast, permits the fulfillment of 
Inochkin’s daydream.  
 
So, who are the Thaw enemies? Unity of time and space of the carnival presumes a 
closed society; for this reason, the Thaw enemy can be only the “inner adversary.” In this 
preserved and morally sane environment, the enemy is an agent of corruption, either by 
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transgressing the moral rules of the society (parasites), or by disseminating subversive ideas 
and trying to change these rules (the intelligentsia). 
But first of all, Khrushchev’s secret speech and the denunciation of Stalin’s crimes 
was the paramount carnival gesture. Indeed, the cherished leader in the name of whom 
soldiers were launching deadly attacks on tanks during the war has become the enemy #1; the 
victorious generalissimos, savior of the nation, was henceforth the culprit for countless and 
innocent victims among his citizens. In other words, the carnival reversal of values has 
transformed the worshiped semi-God into the state criminal. For sure, we are not arguing here 
that Stalin was innocent, but at least he was not the only one guilty for all the crimes 
committed during the 1930s. To this respect, he has performed the role of a carnival scapegoat. 
As René Girard elaborates in his book, after the collective violence of the 1930s, the role of 
the scapegoat is “to limit violence as much as possible but to turn to it, if necessary, as a last 
resort to avoid an even greater violence.”310 Moreover, “the effect of the scapegoat is to 
reverse the relationships between persecutors and their victims, thereby producing the sacred, 
the founding ancestors and the divinities. The victim - in reality passive, becomes the only 
effective and omnipotent cause in the face of a group that believes itself to be entirely 
passive.”311 When Khrushchev has pronounced his secret speech, Stalin had died three years 
earlier, so at this moment he was, in a way, “passive.” The prosecution of the previous leader 
was the essential prerequisite for the national reconciliation after almost forty years of bloody 
internal divides. However, after the 20th Congress which inaugurated the era of a political 
carnival, the figure of Stalin disappeared of the stage. Like Godot in Samuel Beckett’s play 
Waiting for Godot, he has remained an “unseen character” of the Thaw, whose absence has 
implicitly influenced all the debates until his official return under Brezhnev. 
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On the opposite of the invisible Stalin, the most visible enemies of the Thaw were the 
transgressors of the social order. The first of its rules, participation, appears in the Moral 
Code under the motto: “He who does not work, neither shall he eat.”312 As a consequence, all 
the people who were shielding themselves from the socio-economical system were deemed as 
parasites. As Miriam Dobson put it, “the vitriolic invective elaborated as part of the rituals of 
the Stalinist performance was now shifted from those once imagined as spies or saboteurs, 
modified and redirected towards those regarded as threats to social order and respectable 
conformity.”313 Among them, one can find the Stilyagi, the alcoholic, the speculators, and 
profiteers of all sorts. On May 4, 1961, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet RSFSR passed 
the anti-parasite law
314
 “For Intensification of the Struggle Against Persons Avoiding Socially 
Useful Work and Leading an Anti-social Parasitic Way of Life.” It has concerned the citizens 
that are reluctant to work according to their ability, avoiding socially useful work, undermine 
the work discipline, have their own private business, or live on unearned incomes. The law 
allowed exiling the undesirables for periods up to five years. Soon, the press has echoed this 
‘parasites hunt’ in such articles as ‘Parasite, get out of Leningrad!’ or ‘The people convict a 
parasite.’315 
  
With the intelligentsia, the risk was the contamination of Soviet society by western 
values. To begin with, the in-between status of the intelligentsia was problematic for the close 
space of the Thaw. Indeed, the intelligentsia belongs to the society and is cut off from it. Its 
very meta-position, where the writer looks at the society like a kind of entomologist does, puts 
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him apart from its object of study. Second, since the nineteenth century, the appeal of the 
intelligentsia for the liberal values of Enlightenment has encouraged its members to behave in 
a way, typical for the outcast (izgoï),
316
 or at least in a “sacrilegious way, contradictory to the 
main norms of society.”317 However, despite the mimicry of certain European habits (such as 
fashion, social rituals and intellectual positions), this borrowing of foreign mores has nothing 
in common with the cargo cult.
318
 The latter means the magic belief in the colonized people 
that reproduction of the exterior forms of the industrial colonizers’ civilization will arouse its 
material products. In the case of the Russian intelligentsia, the goal was totally different: it 
was to fertilize the national culture with the seeds of the universalistic principles of the 
Enlightenment, particularly the development of individual autonomy. 
Traditionally, the Russian intelligentsia has always claimed to be politically proficient 
and has pretended to be a teacher for the ruling power. There has always been a sort of 
concurrence for the political truth between the two. More precisely, the split between the 
liberal intelligentsia and power can be dated back to 1814. At the creation of the Holy 
Alliance, “the tsar ceased to be the symbol of progress and Europeanization <…> and the tacit 
union between the intelligentsia and the tsar broke-off.” 319  In the 1830s and 1840s, the 
political sensibility of distinct intellectuals has turned into a collective antagonism between 
the Slavophiles and the Westernizers. The latter, including among others Pyotr Chadaaev 
(1794-1856), Nikolay Chernyshevsky (1828-1889) or Alexander Herzen (1812-1870) have 
supported the abolition of slavery and the development of Russia following the European 
liberal principles. On the opposite, the Slavophiles have underlined the uniqueness 
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(samobytnost’) of Russia based on the spiritual legacy of orthodoxy. According to them, 
Russia must have its own set of values and its own fate, separated from Western Europe. 
Incidentally, the Westernizers have fathered the expression “the inner adversary” 
(vnutrennyi vrag). For them, it has referred to the “philistinism” of the Russian petty 
bourgeoisie they deemed an impediment to the propagation of liberal values.
320
 For example, 
this feature can be observed in the way of life of the family Negrov, a wealthy landlord, in the 
first part of Herzen’s Who is to Blame? (1846). For the Bolsheviks, the term was a political 
instrument used to homogenize the Party and, in the 1930s, a weapon aimed against the 
saboteurs.
321
 Paradoxically, from the 1940s it has pointed to the liberal intelligentsia itself. 
At that time, the main reproach addressed to the intelligentsia was its tendency to 
slavishly mimic the European trends and to convert to their values. This group has been 
considered as a potential traitor, vulnerable to ideological contamination. For this reason, the 
intelligentsia was the first target of the servility campaign, lasting from 1945 until 1949. 
However, let’s note that this campaign was led in a relatively discreet way. In the new contest 
of the Cold War, the Soviet Union could hardly criticize the European legacy since it has 
claimed to represent the very European traditional high culture: “Soviet cultural emissaries 
frequently reminded their French, German, British and Italian colleagues of shared European 
and cultural values which supposedly set them apart from the brash Americans (…) Soviet 
ideologists, critics and film-makers tended to depict America as uncultured.”322 In Stalin’s 
speech on May 13, 1947, he argued that, since Peter the Great, the Soviet intelligentsia has 
considered itself an eternal student of their European counterparts, showing an “unjustified 
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reverence toward foreign culture.” 323  The idea of servility toward the West was also 
elaborated in several newspapers articles
324
 and in the play “The Great Strength” (Velikaya 
Sila, 1948):
325
 “B. Romashov, for the first time in Soviet dramaturgy, has paid attention to the 
unveiling of the bowing low o the West and angrily condemned it through his positive 
heroes.”326 The plot deals with a Soviet scientist, Prof. Lavrov, a supporter of Lysenko’s 
theories, who succeeds in creating a new breed of highly-productive chickens. He brings into 
disrepute the Western scientists’ idealist theories on heredity as well. At one moment, 
Milyagin, the director of Lavrov’s Institute, states: “I want our science to follow its 
revolutionary path, not to trail behind the American obscurantist.” 
To be precise, this discourse of servility was borrowed from the Bolsheviks. They 
have opposed the revolutionaries to the ‘typical intelligentsia.’ who has let itself converted to 
foreign values. The epigone of such “iron revolutionaries” was Rakhmetov in 
Chernychevsky’s What Is To Be Done? (1863), the holy fool travelling and dedicating himself 
to the people. Not only he lives like an ascetic, practicing chastity and teetotal, but in order to 
strengthen his will he also imposes on himself self-flagellation, such as sleeping on a bed of 
nails. That metaphor of nails, which have contributed to the term of “iron revolutionaries,” 
was used anew by Nikolai Tikhonov to describe the communists: “One should make nails out 
of these people / There would not have been sturdier nails in the world”).327 Here the rigidity 
of the Bolsheviks’ faith is opposed to the flexibility of those ready to “bow low” (« idti na 
poklon »). Lenin himself has often resorted to this metaphor, for example with the “admirers 
of the bourgeois fashion among the intelligentsia” (“intelligentskie poklonniki burzhuaznoi 
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mody”).328 The gesture of bowing low reminds of a caricature of orthodox zealotry, mocking 
the religious tradition and simultaneously representing the intelligentsia as demented bigots. 
The revolutionary antagonism has found an echo during the Thaw with Vsevolod Kochetov, 
who has opposed the “worker-intellectual” (“rabochii-intelligent”) to the “educated bourgeois 
individualist” ( “obrazovannyi meshchanin-individualist”).329 
There is another echo of the servility motive among the intelligentsia in the past. It 
concerns the blame of the Slavophiles to the Westerners. As an example, Dostoevsky evoked 
Russia’s desire to “slavishly copy the European arrangements (which will collapse in Europe 
tomorrow)” and criticizes those who “want to develop the country by mimicking Europe like 
a lackey would.”330  So Stalin’s servility campaign is deeply-rooted in the history of the 
Russian intelligentsia. Unlike the prewar ideal of unanimity between the people, the power 
and the intellectuals, the postwar doctrine has prepared the ground for the designation of the 
pro-Western intelligentsia as the nation’s enemy. 
After the death of Stalin, who had full control over culture, the intelligentsia has 
recovered a part of its rights. Hence, under Khrushchev, in a typical carnival situation, the 
intelligentsia began to lecture to the political power (see the reassessment of the Bolshevik 
Revolution by Boris Pasternak and the criticism of the Gulag by Alexander Soljenitsyn). 
Reciprocally, the Soviet leader has improvised himself an art critic (for instance at the 
Manege Exhibition). Time and again, the members of the intelligentsia were considered as 
“unreliable elements.” In 1958, after Boris Pasternak was awarded the Nobel Prize, 
Literaturnaia Gazeta explained his expulsion from the Union of Soviet Writers by “[his] 
political and moral demise, his treason with regard to the Soviet People, the cause of 
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socialism, peace, and progress, which was paid for by the Nobel Prize for the sake of kindling 
the Cold War.”331 That same year, the main target was the “revisionists.” By “revisionists,” 
one implies those members of the Party who had taken advantage of Khrushchev’s 
denunciation of Stalin’s crimes in 1956 to attack the conservatives and ask for a relaxing of 
Party censorship. In September, 1957, Khrushchev had published an article "For a Close Link 
of Literature and Art with the Life of the People." Hitherto such attitudes were condemned as 
revisionists and suspicious. All the infringements on the official Party line must have 
deserved a social or at least a moral punishment by pillorying the guilty: “Each time, polemic 
has taken the shape of a campaign.”332During the Thaw, the function of ‘morality police’ was 
filled by literary criticism, namely the conservative journals Oktiabr and Molodaya Gvardia.  
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Chapter 6. The Literary ‘Morality Police’ 
 
This chapter argues that literature was playing the role of the ‘morality police.’ Indeed, 
as Jones notices, “attempts to control the range of domestic interpretations of Stalinism and 
de-Stalinization began very soon after the Secret Speech started to be disseminated to the 
Soviet population”333 In my sense, during the Thaw the attempts to control the debates on 
Stalinism and the hunt for the enemy were conducted through campaigns of calumny in 
literary press, thus orienting the ideological debates. 
 
As I said, the Thaw period was marked by white-and-black, rigid moral values through 
which the state held sway over public opinion. Modern history gives a number of examples 
when such rigid morality comes just after devastating terror and everyday fear. To explain 
why exactly it happened to the Khrushchev times, one can turn for a moment to eighteenth 
century France. It was known that Lenin liked to compare the French Revolution and the 
Bolshevik one. He considered it as one step of the working class toward maturation and final 
victory.
334
 Later in Soviet studies, a leading scholar Robert Conquest made the parallel 
between the “Great Terror” in revolutionary France and Stalin’s 1930s.335 So, in the same 
vein, one can be tempted to see similarities between the policing of public opinion by the 
French revolutionaries and during the Thaw; by the way, the executives under the Thaw 
(starting with Khrushchev and Mikoyan) were former revolutionaries too. Indeed, as shows 
Charles Walton’s book,336 the first years following 1789 were marked by two phenomena that 
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were common to both periods: the governmental project of moral regeneration and, as a 
consequence, the emergence of a structure meant to ‘engineer civic consciousness.’337 
Just a few words on the French historical context. After the fall of the monarchy and 
the Jacobins’ political victory, the newly elected National Convention still faced a strong 
antirevolutionary resistance jeopardizing its legitimacy. Fully aware of the situation, Minister 
of the Interior Jean-Marie Roland wrote: “Such is the kind of revolution still needed: that of 
mœurs.”338 Thus, he organized a propaganda bureau and a nationwide network of agents 
aimed at cultivating ‘public spirit,’ a concept he defined as “a natural tendency, imperious 
toward all that can contribute to the happiness of the country; it is a most profound and 
religious sentiment which places the interest of our common mother [the nation] above our 
[particular] interests” 339  In short, Walton sums up, “public spirit was “purely moral,” 
involving civic values, patriotism, and social discipline (…) [it] served as a normative ideal to 
guide [the revolutionaries] in monitoring and disciplining opinion.” 340 Such purposes can’t 
miss to evoke the words of the journalist Boris Agapov on Soviet literary press: “Our task is 
not at all to reflect the opinion that we receive via readers’ letters. . . . Our task is to influence 
this public opinion [obshchestvennoe mnenie], stressing what we consider correct and noting 
what we consider incorrect. Were we simply a mouthpiece [of readers’ attitudes], that would 
be wrong.”341 In the Soviet context, the ‘moral regeneration’ was urged by the turning point of 
the 20th Congress of the Party and the equivalent of the public spirit would be the Party line; 
on the opposite, the crime of lèse-nation which justified the repression of calumny echoes the 
article 58 repressing counter-revolutionary activities. An offence against the State too, the 
article 58 of the penal code of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic was in force 
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from 1927 until 1961. Moreover, Roland’s propaganda bureau has resorted to cultural 
patronage rewarding newspapers and theaters spreading public spirit, alike the Soviet ritual of 
literary prizes.
342
 
However, quite unexpectedly, this moralization campaign produced the opposite 
effect: “instead of securing civic mœurs, observes Walton, [the Jacobins] ended up 
exacerbating the revolutionary culture of calumny.”343A legislator also regretted: “Though 
their responsibilities are to improve public morality, [journalists today] know only how to 
calumniate, divide, and blacken reputations.”344 But what is exactly the ‘culture of calumny?’ 
In his study, Walton argues that it “involves the contradictory habits of expressing contest 
through calumny and of treating calumny as a criminal offense.”345 To Tom Paine, deputy to 
the National Convention, “calumny is a private vice productive of public evil.” As to the poet 
André Chenier, wise readers discern the moral intentions behind the words on the page. He 
called upon such readers to “denounce writers as public enemies if their doctrines tend to 
mislead, reduce, or deteriorate public spirit.”346It is sufficient to have in mind the stormy press 
campaigns during the Khrushchev era to understand that the ‘culture of calumny’ was a 
crucial feature of the Thaw, notably during the Pasternak affair: “the principal question, 
debated by both the poet’s accusers and his defenders, was whether Pasternak’s writings were 
Soviet or anti-Soviet, whether they matched certain uniform criteria of loyalty to the 
pervasive image of the Revolution-as-blessing, widely understood as a synonym of 
Sovietness.”347 As to the critic for the journal Oktiabr’ Yuri Idashkin, he is said to have 
“unveiled the role of Novy Mir, which provides a platform for the anarchists and the 
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slanderers.” 348  This aversion for calumny and trouble was shared by the French 
revolutionaries, who inscribed in the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789 the Article 10: 
“No one shall be disquieted on account of his opinions, even religious, provided their 
manifestation does not disturb the public order established by law.” One circumstance retains 
our attention: in both cases, moral regeneration was undertaken as an antidote against terror, 
be it an escape from vengeance and revolutionary slaughters or in the wake of the 
denunciation of Stalin’s crimes.349 Another similarity between these systems is the emphasis 
they placed on education to convey the new set of moral values; in 1792 François-Xavier 
Lanthenas from the propaganda bureau wrote, “it is necessary to find a mode of education 
appropriate for the teaching of morality — the most important science — and politics, which 
is simply a branch of the former.”350 Analogously, the Soviet Union has known a “postwar 
educational boom”351 that shaped the new generation of city youth. Like in Makarenko’s 
novel The Pedagogical Poem (1931) adapted for cinema in 1955, the so called 
shestidesiatniki were taught not only technical skills or academic knowledge, but first of all 
moral tenets to guide their lives. 
  
 A specificity of theThaw is that these principles were no more engineered nor 
disseminated in the official press (such as the Pravda) but in the literary one. To this respect, 
the journals Novy Mir and Oktiabr’ (established, respectively, in 1925, and 1924) were 
mirroring the two bounds between which the ideological debate was unfolding.
352
 Indeed, 
these voices have articulated the inner dialogue of power. They have coexisted simultaneously, 
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struggled with each other, nourished each other, and, ultimately, they have contributed to the 
constant evolution of the Party line. 
On the one hand, close to the left wing in politics and to the consciousness of the 
shestidesiatniki, Novy Mir has given way to the liberal tendency in the revolutionary tradition 
and displayed generous universal values. Alexandr Tvardovsky (1910-1971), the editor-in-
chief from 1950 to 1954 and from 1958 until 1970, was the kingpin of the journal who 
instigated, among others, the publishing of Ehrenburg’s Thaw (1954), then of his memoirs in 
1961, and of One Day of Ivan Denisovich (1962).  
On the other hand, Oktiabr’ was the mouthpiece of the conservative wing. In 1959, it 
became the writers of the RSFSR’s organ, aimed to counterweight the authors of liberal 
sensibilities. Its discourse was consisting of the Soviet Marxist ideology, basically the 
National bolshevism.
353
 In literature, it has recommended the upholding of the Socialist 
Realist canon. In 1961, the Stalinist orthodox Vsevolod Kochetov (1912-1973) was appointed 
an editor-in-chief; afterwards he has remained at this function until his death. This 
‘Kochetov’s rule’has marked the end of the literary campaigns with the liberals at the turn of 
the 1960s (Dudintsev in 1956, Pasternak in 1958); “it was a bridge between Stalinism and 
brezhnevo-suslovian restalinization.” 354 
Who was Kochetov? After he has spent World War II on the front line as a war 
correspondent, he began his literary career with military prose (On the Plains of the Neva, 
1946). Then he has written on the reconstruction of Soviet economy (Under the Sky of 
Fatherland, 1950) and on a workers’ dynasty (The Zhurbin Family, 1952). With The Brothers 
Yershov (1958) and What Do You Want Then? (1969), he has engaged in ideological debates, 
in the wave of the intense cultural antagonism with the West and of the technical revolution. 
In those two books, he displays the principles of socialist ethics and blames subversive action 
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of the imperialist camp against the Soviet Union. Concerning his other activities, from 1954 
he was a member of the Writers’ Union executive board. Later, Kochetov became the editor-
in-chief of the journals Literaturnaya Gazeta (1955-1959) before he joined Oktiabr’. Maybe 
because of his revolutionary idealism, it is characteristic that time and again, he was at odds 
with his contemporaries. In 1954, he had to flee from Leningrad after his fierce criticism 
against Panova’s last novel (Span of the Year, 1953), which he deemed “bourgeois 
literature.”355 At the Khrushchev gathering of the intelligentsia in March 1963, he criticized 
Evtushenko and Voznesenski for their blackening of Soviet reality. After the publishing of 
What Do You Want Then?, twenty members of the intelligentsia have signed a letter 
protesting against the “obscurantist novel.” Maybe, as argues Evgeny Popov, the rejection of 
Kochetov can be explained by the fact that “he was reacting too seriously at the strange time 
when Nikita Khrushchev had already ironically denounced Stalin’s crimes after having been 
himself one of his most loyal lieutenants” 356 To put it differently, nobody has wished to listen 
to  a Stalinist zealot during Khrushchev’s carnival; it is not a coincidence if Kochetov’s 
novels have aroused two parodies,
357
 as if the content of the novel were tuned to the only 
register fitting to that time. 
 
In addition to Novy Mir and Oktiabr’, the third voice in the literary polyphony of the 
Thaw was Molodaia Gvardia.
358
 Anatoly Nikonov (1922-1983) became the editor-in-chief of 
the journal in 1963 and soon he dismissed the most liberal fringe of the editorial board. 
Inspired by the ideas of the Slavophiles, the editorial line was genuinely patriotic. It was 
including the preservation of traditional architecture and monuments and the link between 
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man and earth and between literature and the people. The people (in the sense of the peasants) 
were considered as the bearer of the national values, a belief which would be illustrated in the 
phenomenon of the village prose later in the 1970s.  
Certainly not all the nationalists were anti-Semite; however some of them had taken 
part to – or at least had supported – the anti-cosmopolitan campaign; among them, the 
sculptor Evgeny Vuchetich was one of the leaders of the so called “Russian Party” (according 
to N. Mitrokhin). They were convinced of the importance to inform the Party about the Jewish 
influence on Soviet artistic life. In 1949, Vuchetich befriended the writer Ivan Shevtsov, after 
the latter had published an article “Against the antipatriotic critics in the battle 
painting.”359Afterwards, Shevtsov became one of the representatives of the “Russian Party.” 
Ivan Shevtsov (1920-2013) was also belonging to the generation of war. He has fought 
during the World War II as a border guard on the Prut river, next to Romania. Later he 
recalled: “I have always said that I have been physically and spiritually hardened and 
educated by the border.”360 To this respect, Shevtsov has perfectly fit to the Thaw space as 
defined above, i.e. closed on itself and morally well-delimited. After the war, he has worked 
as a special correspondent in Bulgaria and Poland, and then as a deputy editor-in-chief of the 
newspapers Sovetskyi Flot and Moskva. His journalistic career was put to an end following the 
scandal around the publishing of The Louse (1964), his novel targeting the Jewish liberal 
intelligentsia and its deleterious influence on Soviet society. To Yitzakh Brudny, The Louse is 
a “rabidly anti-intellectual, Stalinist novel.”361 Henceforth Shevtsov has spent his time writing 
other novels (twelve in total). At the beginning of the 1970s, Shevtsov built a dacha near 
today’s Sergiyev Posad and was joined by other friends from the nationalist circles, for whom 
he was a kind of guru: the writers Anatoly Ivanov, Efim Permitin, Arkadyi Perventsev, Piotr 
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Proskurin and others. Because of the conservative views of its new inhabitants, the village 
was called an ‘anti-Peredelkino,’ in reference to Pasternak. Shevtsov was eventually accepted 
in the Soviet Writers’ Union in 1980. 
 
* 
*     * 
 
So, during the Thaw, along with the social parasites, the main enemy was the liberal 
intelligentsia. A patchwork made of the bits of the Russian cultural history and consciousness, 
the Thaw enemy was a trope gathering arguments from the nineteenth century debate between 
the Westernizers and the Slavophiles, from Stalin’s views, and, in the case of Shevtsov, 
frankly anti-Semite clichés. The use of the Thaw enemy was directed toward a project of 
moral regeneration and to counter the influence of American values over the Soviet citizens. 
The liberal intelligentsia, with its appeal for Western values, stands apart from the 
Thaw carnival, it does not fall in the unity of time and space which the carnival implies. 
Neither has it belonged to the homogeneous closed space of the Thaw, nor to the 
Khrushchevian prophecy of the advent of communism in the short term. The obsession of the 
intelligentsia with culture (obrazovanshchina)
362
 has cut it from the people as the genuine 
source of inspiration; that’s enough to be suspicious to the supporters of the patriotic 
movements emerging from the mid 1960s, especially the heirs of the pochvenniki, the authors 
of village prose. 
At the same time, the Thaw enemy was carrying the seeds of the neo-Stalinist 
resurgence. Indeed, the paradox of the carnival performance relies in the fact that to reverse 
the rules of the society (namely the Stalinist system) eventually allows strengthening them; it 
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is a temporary suspension of the social strains which makes them more bearable in the long 
run. And, actually, we observe a neo-Stalinist turn a few time after the taking up of power by 
Brezhnev. Hence, the Thaw enemy embodies the negation of the post 20
th
 Congress values 
and at the same time prepares the ground for the stagnation. 
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Part 3: Brezhnev Era.  
Confronting An Invisible Enemy 
 
Chapter 7. The Brezhnev Doctrine 
 
 
 
If someone somewhere among us sometimes doesn't want to live honestly...
363
 
 
From the popular song “Invisible Battle” 
 
 
I.   Transit to a New Paradigm: A Brief Overview 
 
The Stagnation was the time of re-stalinization and stability. It was suitable for 
reassessment of the past and psychological introspection. As Yurchak put forward, at that 
stage the cracks in the ideology were irreversible and the language of power had nothing in 
common with reality anymore: “the more the immutable forms of the authoritative discourse 
were reproduced everywhere, the more the system was experiencing a profound internal 
displacement.” 364  Even as soon as twenty years later, the system would break apart. In 
compliance with Schmitt’s theory, the collapse of Soviet ideals was mirrored in the erosion of 
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the enemy. One can find some examples of the enemy’s erasure in Bondarev’s novels: there, 
the enemy has become invisible, hidden at the heart of the Soviet self. 
 
 Brezhnev's rise to supreme power in 1964 marked a turning point in the general 
conception of enemy. Although this change of the political paradigm and closure of the Thaw 
period might not seem abrupt and, perhaps, has been rather perceived by the majority of the 
Soviet people just as a next step to communism, the consequences of it were definite yet 
irreversible. With no revolutionary turn, like the XXth Party Congress, Brezhnev's peaceful 
coup d'état brought about a new set of values and concepts; close in time but distant in 
content from the preceding Khrushchev era, they will dominate the life of the empire nearly 
during two decades.  
 The most remarkable political feature of the Brezhnev rule is, perhaps, that his 
predecessor could drop out of politics and remain alive. Unlike many from Stalin's close 
circle, Nikita Khrushchev was neither judged nor killed. In his memoirs Khrushchev explains 
this phenomenon only as his own achievement, such is a more or less common opinion. 
However, one can think that the dethroned Soviet leader liked to overestimate his role. 
Speaking conceptually, the Brezhnev paradigm did not imply an "existential enemy" having 
no place in the new time. Unlike Khrushchev himself, who started his epoch by eliminating 
the most dangerous enemies, like Beria, Brezhnev most certainly did not want to spill blood. 
This is why a story told by former KGB director Vladimir Semichastny about their 
conversation sounds unlikely: Brezhnev asked Semichastny if he could find the way to 
eliminate Khrushchev physically.
365
 The kremnologist Fedor Burlatsky also puts into doubt a 
possibility of such a conversation; he considers it as rather Semichastny's fiction aimed at 
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making Brezhnev the only author of the coup d'état 1964.
366
 Having come to power, he was 
not about to seek for new victims but legitimate himself as a just and necessary ruler 
promising peace and prosperity.  
 Not only time makes people but also the people make their time. Being on the very top 
of the social hierarchy Khrushchev and Brezhnev, each in his own way, contributed 
personally to the shaping of the Zeitgeist of their epoch. According to many sources, 
including recently declassified Brezhnev's diaries,
367
 Khrushchev was quick-tempered, 
spunky, often testy, and at the same time an ascetic showing no real interest in accumulating 
different sorts of goods and having pleasure; he was ill-mannered, allowed himself to 
reprimand his closest colleagues never hesitating to use curses in whatever context. Unlike 
Stalin, whose tight smile on public and occasional chilly jokes hid the character of "an 
intellectual and a murderer"
368
, Khrushchev, as Edward Crankshaw aptly notes, was "the 
showman and the extrovert <...> a man born to supreme authority."
369
 Brezhnev presented a 
totally different type of man: in spite of his modest education, he was always polite with his 
subordinates; even at the summit of his power, he was attentive to the opinion of the others, at 
least seemingly; he was emotional, if not to say sensual, his public kisses became legendary, 
yet sentimental especially with his front-line friends.
370
 He loved pleasures and luxury, also 
gifts and adoration, no matter sincere or theatrically staged. So, if, as we said earlier, 
Khrushchev was at large a carnivalesque figure emanating simultaneously an energy of the 
"showman and supreme authority," that one can consider a turned inside down Stalinism, 
Brezhnev, being perhaps no less energetic than his predecessor, saw himself as the renovator 
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of justice as he understood it. The carnival named Thaw, in which he also took part, was soon 
over not even because it became annoying and harmful per se, although it did (keeping in 
mind Khrushchev's economic harum-scarum experiments), but first of all because, from 
Brezhnev's point of view, the Thaw period began to look more and more like what it 
anathematized, Stalin and his cult. As an example, one recalls the film Our Nikita Sergeevich 
(Setkina, 1961). 
 Thus Khrushchev was accused of voluntarism and of giving rise to centrifugal forces 
which have been destabilizing the whole country. Later Brezhnev will use the name of Stalin 
doing his best to clear it from the Thaw semantics. In 1965, on the occasion of the 20th 
anniversary of the victory in the World War II, when the General Secretary in his speech 
mentioned Stalin as Commander-in-Chief, the role of the debunked leader immediately 
became, once again, the subject of controversial public debates. Just after this speech the 
overwhelming majority of intelligentsia perceived the message from the Kremlin as an 
attempt to rehabilitate Stalin and his times, so the feeling of the end of Thaw was rampant. On 
14 February 1966 some of the most notorious representatives of the Soviet intelligentsia, 
among which Andrei Sakharov, Viktor Nekrasov, Mikhail Romm, Vladimir Tendryakov, 
Pyotr Kapitsa, Konstantin Paustovsky, signed a letter to Brezhnev (now known as a Letter of 
25), warning him not to rehabilitate Stalin since it may provoke the irreparable split in the 
society and bring to naught all the democratic tendencies appeared during the Thaw period.
371
 
In 1966, on the eve of the XXIII Party Congress opened on 29 March, Konstantin Simonov 
sends a personal letter to the General Secretary on the same issue; in it, the writer, 
acknowledging his own errors and illusions about the nature of Stalinism, appeals to 
Brezhnev's common sense not to make of Stalin an indisputable hero again and hide his 
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crimes. "We need neither to asperse Stalin nor declare him innocent. We only need to know 
the historical truth."
372
       
 Indeed, as we know now, there were the invisible, both political and cultural, reasons 
for such a “rehabilitation.” Following the carnivalesque logic, Khrushchev turned Stalin, a 
yesterday semi-God, into a scapegoat responsible for all the atrocities of the Great Purges of 
1936-1938 and violation of the very communist idea; within the Thaw frame Stalin became 
not just the incarnation of an abstract evil slowing down the coming of communism but the 
inside enemy whose presence has been felt everywhere. According to René Girard, the 
function of a scapegoat is to attract and absorb violence accumulated in an society and let it 
out preventing the society from self-destruction.
373
 So, if the Thaw Stalin was supposed to be 
the object of the common disdain and hate, and the carnival that followed was the time of joy 
and pleasure from such unleashed negative forces, the Brezhnev period endows Stalin with a 
certain positive content. Occasional reference to his name at the highest level was enough to 
make him back to literature, that proves once again that literary consciousness in Russia is 
intimately interwoven with politics. In such works as The Hot Snow (1976) by Yuri Bondarev, 
The Creation of the World (1956-1979) by Vitaly Zakrutkin, The Hade (1967) by Vsevolod 
Kochetov, The Victory (1979) by Alexandr Chakovsky the figure of Stalin takes on a new 
shape: he is neither the bloody murderer and director-in-chief of the Purges, nor a scapegoat 
but rather a supreme commander, a patriarch whose personal involvement in the fate of the 
country and decisions, however not always flawless, contributed much to the present super-
power position of the Soviet Union. In the post-carnival epoch, which followed the political 
downfall of Khrushchev, this is most certainly true that Brezhnev saw himself as such a 
patriarch directing his country to a stable prosperous life with no more carnivalesque empty 
promises, clumsy jokes, and bombastic threats peculiar to his predecessor, but in a much more 
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realistic way. Dmitry Likhachev makes an interesting remark that "the world of laugh is 
always on the threshold of vanishing <...> it exists only in the "laugh work"; it is impossible 
to repeat joke, it can’t be frozen, the joke has no duration.374" Putting aside all kinds of 
carnival laugh, the main goal was to de-carnivalize the country and restore its perception, 
both from within and outside, as a whole and vital system governed by the wise man. In his 
book Maisuryan gives interesting statistics: comparing to the epochs of Stalin and 
Khrushchev laugh in the official meetings was significantly reduced. In all Brezhnev's 
speeches between 1964-1982 the audience laughed only 10 times.
375
 Thus the post-Thaw 
return to Stalin was not really a rehabilitation of the past, or an undoing of the Thaw main 
enemy, as it seemed to many contemporaries, but rather a de-carnivalization, a jump into the 
future, the shape of the image of the new patriarch.  
 The Plenum of the Central Committee, held on 29 September 1965, basically approved 
the economic reform initiated by Alexei Kosygin. It gave a certain independence to enterprise 
within the plan economics.
376
 This liberalization of the economic life had by no means its 
counterpart in the cultural life what shows the Sinyavsky-Daniel trial. The trial that took place 
in Moscow in autumn-winter 1965-1966 was, perhaps, the most notorious case when the 
writers, Andrei Sinyavsky and Yuli Daniel, were charged for their literature. Officially they 
were not. Soviet law prohibited publication abroad, so having published their work in the 
West, the writers fell under the recently minted Article 70 of the RSFSR Criminal Code 
“Anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda. ”377 However, in terms of the new paradigm, the trial 
tellingly illustrates Brezhnev's harsh attitudes towards his predecessor and his 
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uncompromising turn from the Thaw and to the de-carnivalization. Daniel's Moscow speaks 
(1962) is a satiric carnivalesque short novel where the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the 
SSSR announced the “day of open murders.” In the beginning many believe this is the 
enemy's provocation but later they realize it is true. This monstrous festival day turns then to 
be a most difficult exercise for a good number of people. 
 Obviously, the official obstruction and severe judgment for the writer had a hidden 
reason: so by punishing Daniel, the new epoch squared accounts with the Thaw time when 
such a satire or even holy foolishness could pass with lesser consequences. At the symbolical 
level, Daniel was judged as if he were Khrushchev himself. To be sure, it was not “just a 
case” but the lesson to learn. Daniel's novel does show its author as a kind of holy fool who 
unabashedly tells the truth at whatever cost. Alexandr Panchenko notes that "the aim of the 
holy fool is blessing and weal, both personal and public."
378
 Some twenty years earlier, in 
1947, Daniil Andreyev was completing his Wonderers of Night, a novel with a non-linear 
structure, where events happen at the same time but in different places, also depicts the 
official reality something hideous and repugnant that the Russian people are challenged to go 
through. Like Daniel after him, Andreyev was arrested and charged for "Anti-Soviet 
propaganda", the majority of his works were destroyed by MGB (Ministry of State Security). 
Time and again this example proves that literature in Russia has been never perceived as a 
fiction or fantasy but as the reality expressed by others tools. Denis Kozlov is right in saying 
that "the affair [Sinyavsky and Daniel] was certainly a product of traditional Russian views of 
literature, but it also revealed many people's perceptions of their time, politics, and history."
379
  
 A small, however graphic detail of the Sinyavsky-Daniel trial was that two years 
before, in 1964, Isaac Budovnitz, an eminent expert in old Russian literature, published a 
paper on holy foolishness in which, contrary to the widely accepted conception, he tries to 
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prove that holy fools in Russia were nothing but the demented.
380
 Politically speaking, such 
an opinion about the dissidents, "Soviet holy fools," will become official, at least during 
Andropov's rule of the KGB, and so justify their psychiatric treatment. 
 On November 10, 1966 at a Politburo meeting Brezhnev appeared for the first time 
with a concrete and quite severe critique of ideological work. Basically, he said it is well-
known that during the last decade many serious errors have been made, and especially in 
ideology; to correct them is a hard and urgent work. Further, he dwelled upon literature 
mentioning some particular names, for instance, Konstantin Simonov. Simonov's war diaries,  
confessed the General Secretary, left him perplexed. As a consequence, the diaries, earlier 
accepted for publication in Novyi Mir, were put under a ban. At the same meeting Pyotr 
Demichev, a deputy Politburo member, named Novyi Mir a propagandist journal diffusing 
anti-Soviet, liberal values. Mikhail Suslov, a Politburo member and an ideologist-in-chief of 
the Soviet Union, complained that the Party demoralized intelligentsia letting them go in all 
directions far-off from the socialist moral. In a word, according to Suslov, the campaign of 
de-Stalinization was a big mistake. 
 This radical turn in cultural politics provoked waves of restoration both inside and 
outside the empire. One can consider the events of 1968 in Czechoslovakia as a somewhat 
direct consequence of this turn. Alexander Dubček, who dreamed about socialism with a 
human face, in April 1968 launched an Action Program of liberalization. The idea was to give 
more freedom to the press, freedom of speech and of movement with economic emphasis on 
consumer goods and the possibility of a multiparty political system. It also implied a certain 
containment of the secret police's repressive machinery and an incorporation basic democratic 
values as well as a bourgeois manner of life into socialism. The Soviet authorities realized, 
and not without reason, that in case of success the Dubček reforms could unleash dangerous 
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forces throughout the whole socialist camp. Reformed socialism is the dead socialism, as the 
same Suslov used to tell those days.  
 So, from the Brezhnev-Suslov point of view, to stop the process of reforms was an 
inevitable task, not only for punishing the Czechs but first of all for preventing all the others 
from such a political deviation. It is not surprisingly that the Prague 1968 events made a 
serious impact on the inner politics in the Soviet Union during all the Brezhnev period; it 
caused an almost immediate tightening the freedoms in cultural sphere (cinema, theater, 
literature...). Needless to say, what happened to the Dubček Czechoslovakia frightened 
Brezhnev and strengthened his disbelief in "socialism with a human face" as well as his role 
as a patriarch of the socialist camp is to protect this camp from the ongoing dangerous 
tendencies to put into doubt the socialist values. In a word, not only the Prague Spring 
disclosed the frail character of the socialist camp both at the political and ideological level, 
but also – what is more important for us – a crisis of the intelligentsia's values. If even close 
associates, like Dubček, also member of intelligentsia, in fact stood against the rest of the clan, 
nothing can prove the others' loyalty. Usually unnoticed but an interesting detail of the time is 
that the journal Istoria SSSR (5, 1968) published an article "Self-disclosure of the Enemies of 
Revolution" signed by G.L. Milaeva. She was Brezhnev's daughter Galina.  
 Let me stress: the Prague Spring seems to have shown quite clearly that Brezhnev and 
his lieutenants were afraid of whatever remake of the Thaw within the socialist camp first of 
all because it can conjure up the spirit of the Khrushchev time already doomed to go into 
oblivion.  
 And the consequences were not long in coming. The severe repressive means against 
Andrei Amalrik, the author of the essay Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984? (1970), 
show nicely one of the main features of the post-Carnival atmosphere: the society, entered the 
epoch of moderate consumerism, comfort, and self-assurance, doesn't need to indicate any 
166 
 
'precise dates' and needs no Khrushchev-like prophesies. Although Amalrik's fantasies were 
wrong, his book predicts the country's eventual collapse due to social and ethnic antagonisms 
and a disastrous war with China, Brezhnev saw in it – in the intelligentsia's free reflections in 
general – a threat to his main effort: stability. This is also important to note that the 
Khrushchev "Thaw" and the Brezhnev "stability" radically differ in their nature. The Thaw is 
a temporal phenomenon, it can last long and must one day come to an end; on the contrary, 
stability implies a long and smooth existence with no carnivalesque intemperance or 
revolutionary impulses. Thus within this new paradigm of stability it seems natural that any 
protervity of dissidents inside the country, be it political (Amalrik, Esenin-Volpin) or artistic 
(‘Lianozovo Group’), has been viewed as a potential danger.  
 Inevitably, intelligentsia in the Soviet Union becomes a subject matter of the KGB and 
draws a special attention of its Chairman Yuri Andropov. In 1969 Andropov created the 5th 
Chief Directorate to scan all signs of dissident movement and political unreliability, in it the 
10th Department is responsible for the Soviet intelligentsia; the 9th Direction was charged to 
suppress any unauthorized publishing (samizdat) of literature and journalism which can be 
viewed as anti-Soviet. It had to seek for samizdat printing presses, typewriters as well as 
investigate the unauthorized use of photocopy machines. Finally, the Jewish Department, 
established in 1971, was responsible for addressing Jewish dissidence, including discouraging 
emigration. 
 Whatever the Prague Spring consequences within the country, Brezhnev's diplomacy 
on the world scene, and first of all with the US, proved to be quite effective at the time. 
Unlike Khrushchev, he was against the politics of menace giving preference to diplomatic 
negotiations instead; Brezhnev's good personal relations with President Nixon contributed 
much to the disarmament reached in the mid-1970s. On 18 June, 1973 Brezhnev arrived in the 
US with his first official visit during which the leaders made a huge progress towards a more 
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peaceful coexistence. From Brezhnev's point of view, the negotiations were so successful that 
soon after his return home, the General Secretary stated: "the Cold War is over." It was 
followed by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe held in Helsinki during 
July and August 1, 1975 which ended by the Helsinki Accords when thirty five states, 
including the USA, Canada, and all European states, signed the declaration in an attempt to 
improve relations between the Communist world and the West. Interestingly that this peak of 
disarmament between the super-powers aligns with Brezhnev's most activity as a political 
figure. From 1975 onwards he begins to lose interest in international politics and in the 
external world as a whole more and more focusing on himself. Leaving apart medical causes, 
these significant changes in Brezhnev's personality resulted from the fact that, as he believed, 
perhaps, not without reason, that his mission as a patriarch of the socialist clan was largely 
completed. He brought the country to a peaceful co-existence with the main adversary, 
something that never happened from the summer of 1959, when the American National 
Exhibition was held in Moscow, and stabilized the economic growth.   
 Inasmuch as the official propaganda has not ceased to insist on evident achievements 
and visible progress made since Brezhnev came to power, the enemy inversely began to lose 
his visibility becoming more shadowy and discrete. The words from the song cited above 
nicely mirror this situation: unlike in the preceding epochs, "someone somewhere among us 
sometimes..." gives no precise indication of enemy but, instead, allows the space and time of 
the latter to be open.  
 On the 3d August 1972 The Central Committee's Directive concerning Jews who 
wished to immigrate to Israel, says that they have to refund the state expenses on their 
education. Jews were not, of course, the open enemy but nevertheless present a sort of 
invisible enemy whose reliability is – and always was for the nationalistically oriented camps, 
like the authors of the journal Nash Sovremennik – dubious. Brezhnev, who tried to follow the 
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"golden ratio" in his decisions, on the 6 October 1972 notes in his diary: "Directive about 
Jews let's leave as it is, but let's not apply it de facto." An important event happened when 
Alexandr Yakovlev, a high-ranked official at the CPSU's Department of Ideology and 
Propaganda and a future "godfather of perestroika," on 15 February 1972 published an article 
in the popular Literaturnaya Gazeta called "Against anti-historicism." In it Yakovlev openly 
criticized Russian and Soviet nationalism pointing to the dangerous tendencies of certain 
respected communists wishing to present the October Revolution as a Jewish complot and 
thus splitting the socialist multinational society into the warring ethnic groups. In spite of the 
fact that Yakovlev's article was written in an orthodox Marxist-Leninist tone, it cost him his 
job.  
 No wonder that Yakovlev was soon sent as an ambassador to Canada, indeed, in exile. 
His main mistake, in terms of the new paradigm, was not even to criticize a most powerful 
ideological camp (the nationalists), but to visualize the enemy. Such a visualization is peculiar 
to carnival with its necessary spectacular effects (Khrushchev's shoe-banging incident 
occurred during the Meeting of the UN General Assembly, etc.). Stability works differently; 
even if there are enemies "somewhere sometimes...", the general tendency is rather to make 
them as less visible as possible. This is why Yuri Bondarev, one of the 'the most perfect' 
Brezhnev writers, whose works we will consider below, instead of displaying the figure of 
enemy, places it within an inner field expressed in one's doubts, desires, intentions, etc. So 
enemy is no longer viewed, observed, but can be felt and seized by the protagonist within his 
own emotional world. 
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Chapter 8. Case Study: Enemy at Heart. Bondarev's The Shore 
 
  
 Let me start with the plot of the novel. The whole story is divided into three parts: 
Beyond, Madness, and Nostalgia. The time of the narrative is two-folded: nowadays (Beyond 
and Nostalgia) and the end of the World War II (Madness).  
 The forty seven year-old famous writer Vadim Nikitin and his friend Platon Samsonov, 
also a writer, but less popular, flew to Germany at the invitation of Frau Herbert, a fan of 
Nikitin's talent. She invited him to a conference of the German literary circle to exchange 
views on contemporary culture, and a discussion on the topic "Writer and Modern 
Civilization." Nikitin takes Samsonov with him as an interpreter since the latter has a good 
grasp of German. On the plane they discuss the last letter of Frau Herbert, in which she 
admired the talent of Nikitin and compared him to the great Russian writers. Samsonov feared 
that his dear friend can be corrupted by this glory. 
 At the airport they were met by Frau Herbert herself. She is surprisingly different from 
what they imagined. A slender, pretty and elegant woman skillfully emphasizing her natural 
attractiveness at the most luxurious Mercedes meets them warmly, takes them to the hotel and 
invites for breakfast. On her question whether Nikitin was ever in Germany, he replied that he 
had been besieging a small town in 1945. After breakfast, friends went for a walk around 
Hamburg. They inspected the monument to the soldiers died in the World War II, then 
unsuccessfully visit a snack bar, watch French porn and barely escaped from the prostitutes.  
 Nikitin recalls his first fee of three thousand rubles which he spent on drink with the 
poet Vikhrov, ran into a fight with the youngsters in the gateway and rattled the police for 
allegedly launching this fight himself. From the money there were only seven hundred rubles, 
which did not even have enough to pay for the apartment. 
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 On a visit to Frau Herbert Nikitin and Samsonov meet the journalist, the editor-in-
chief of Weber publishing house Dietzman, the publisher Weber and his wife, the famous 
singer Lotoy Tittel. They talked about politics, current relations between Germany and Russia. 
They talked about the past war, how it influenced the development of Germany, how Russian 
soldiers raped German women, and concluded that Nazism is not a uniquely German 
phenomenon. Tittel scolded Hitler's policy and claimed that he disgraced the German nation. 
Mr. Weber described how he was in a concentration camp and how the Americans liberated 
them. After the conversation Frau Herbert asked Nikitin to stay; she then shows him an old 
album where there is a picture of a young girl against the backdrop of a country house. "Do 
you recognize?," she asked. And Nikitin remembered that 26 years ago in May 1945 his 
battery was housed in this house in Königsdorf, and this girl, now Frau Herbert, was his lover. 
 
Madness 
 May 2, 1945. Berlin is half occupied by Russian troops. The battery, in which Nikitin 
commanded a platoon, took Königsdorf. After a hard battle everyone was asleep, Nikitin was 
also basking in bed, no orders were received. Senior lieutenant Granautov was in the hospital. 
The soldiers enjoyed a delightful feeling of the close victory. Inside the room Nikitin entered 
Sergeant Mezhenin, broad-shouldered, a bit overweight, a thirty-year-old, self-assured man. 
He found a broken German car nearby, and in it a safe with money and a clock. Mezhenin 
showed Nikitin a bag with clocks and bundles of money, asked if they could be worth 
something. Nikitin replied that the clock was cheap, and advised Mezhenin to give it to the 
soldiers, and to throw out the money. 
 Nikitin goes down for breakfast. Mezhenin told the soldiers about the find, they began 
to decide what to do with it. Nikitin ordered Mezhenin to give out the watch to the soldiers, 
and to pass the money to him. Mezhenin complied. Lieutenant Knyazhko, commander of a 
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neighboring platoon, came to them and brought a German cat, which Ushatikov, the youngest 
soldier began to feed porridge. Knyazhko and Nikitin went for a walk around the small town, 
they came across a drunk German who claimed that all Russians were good, and Russian 
vodka was even better. 
 They returned home in the evening. There the battalion commander Granaturov and 
Galya, an officer of the medical battalion, played cards. It turned out that Galya was in love 
with Knyazhko, however he cannot reciprocate her. Soon Galya decided to leave, Granautov 
offered to accompany her but Knyazhko said there is no need. Galya refuses his offer. Before 
the wicket, Galya was escorted by Nikitin, she complained to him that Knyazhko ignores her 
but she still loves him. 
 When Nikitin returned, he felt uncomfortable with the silence, and he ordered 
Mezhenin to check how the sentry was. Mezhenin was gone for a long time, then there was a 
noise on the second floor in Nikitin's room. Rising to his room, he saw that Mezhenin was 
about to rape a young red-haired German woman called Emma. Nikitin ordered to leave the 
girl alone. Mezhenin refused, and then Nikitin threatened to shoot him. 
 Emma was fetched to the first floor, into the drawing-room. There, the sentry led a 
young boy, about fifteen, frail with glasses. Granautov ordered Knyazhko to interrogate him. 
Emma cried and begged Kurt to tell everything. Emma and Kurt were a brother and sister, 
they came to collect some of their belongings and go to Hamburg to their grandfather. Kurt 
escaped from the German partisan detachment. This detachment consisted of the teenagers 
like him. The detachment commander, the corporal, recently killed the injured boy, so that he 
would not betray them. Granautov wanted to physically interrogate the boy in order to  
compell him to tell more but Knyazhko, as a senior in rank, ordered the release of both. 
 In the morning Nikitin awoke from a knock on the door. It was Emma who brought 
him coffee in bed. She began to pester him, he tried to decline, but Emma remained persistent. 
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Suddenly Nikitin remembered how he had done it with Zhenya for the first time. They did not 
know what it was obeying only their love impulses. Then the Germans attacked the village 
Zhenya was severely wounded and died two days later. 
 Ushatikov brought Nikitin water for shaving, Emma had time to leave. After a while 
Mezhenin entered the room and said he knew about Nikitin's connection with the German 
woman and will tell about this affair to his superiors. Nikitin, in his turn, reminded him that in 
Zhitomir Mezhenin refused to comply with Nikitin's order committing adultery with two 
nurses from the medical unit. 
 After breakfast their troops body was attacked by two German self-propelled guns, so 
they decided to take the fight. Knyazhko and Nikitin drove the soldiers forward but they 
refused to go. Mezhenin said that soldiers could die out of Knyazhko's and Nikitin's desire to 
replenish Knyazhko's collection of medals. Nikitin ordered him to shut up and go into battle 
with dignity. The Germans blew up the bridge, it was impossible to pursue the self-propelled 
guns further, the Russians retreated. 
 But then the body troops of the lieutenant Perlin rushed in with a request to help 
remove the Germans from the forestry. Knyazhko agreed. On the way they came upon the 
corpse of a young German about sixteen years old. Approaching the forestry, they accepted 
the fight. Mezhenin threw two bombs into the house that caused an explosion followed by a 
cry. Knyazhko realized that there were no soldiers in the house, only the youngsters Kurt was 
talking about who are frightened and don't know what to do. Knyazhko left the weapon, went 
to the house and asked the Germans to surrender. They raised a white flag and, using the 
moment, shot down Knyazhko. Finally, the Russians entered the forestry and captured the 
youngsters.  
 Mezhenin shot the German corporal who killed Knyazhko. Galya was crying 
inconsolably over his corpse. In the evening, at a funeral feast with vodka, Nikitin said that 
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they are all guilty of Knyazhko's death; he committed a brave and noble act, and they are 
cowards. Afterwards Nikitin took Knyazhko's belongings, his letter to Galya, and went to his 
room. In this letter Knyazhko wrote to Galya that nothing can be between them since the goes 
on and it doesn't allow pipe dreams.  
 In the morning Nikitin woke up in Emma's arms. They were again captivated by a 
strong feeling of love. After a while, Ushatikov told Nikitin that he was summoned by the 
battalion commander. Granautov asked Nikitin that letter for Galya. Nikitin replied  he has no 
letter but Granautov threatened Nikitin that he will write a report about his relations with the 
German woman whom he raped. Nikitin didn't answer anything. Galya went berserk asking 
both men to shut up saying to Granautov that she has no feeling towards him. 
 Nikitin told Mezhenin to go voluntarily under the tribunal. Mezhenin threw a chair 
into him furiously, Nikitin fired at him in return. Nikitin was arrested and Mezhenin sent to 
the medical unit. At night Nikitin asked Ushatikov, who guarded him, to let him meet Emma. 
When they met, they confessed in their love for each other and spent the night together. Next 
morning the Russians left Königsdorf. 
 
Nostalgia 
 In the middle of the night Nikitin returned to the hotel. Incapable to fall asleep he calls 
Samsonov and askes him to come in. Nikitin tries to tell his friend who is Frau Herbert in 
reality, however Samsonov turns it into a joke telling Nikitin to be more careful with the 
pretty nice looking dangerous woman. On the next day Nikitin participates in a discussion 
where he and Dietzman argued about politics, history, responsibility, and how both of them 
see the relations between German and Russian today. They also talk about the cult of Stalin 
and Hitler. 
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 After the discussion, the whole company went to the street prostitutes, then to the 
tavern "Joyful Owl" owned by a former prisoner of the concentration camp. Herbert and 
Nikitin dance and talk. She soon becomes tired, and they decided to find a calmer place. In a 
restaurant situated in a small Venice-like street thee they tell each other about their post-war 
lives. 
 Nikitin was married, he recently lost his six-year old son. Emma's husband died, her 
daughter lives in Canada. She told Vadim she still loves him, for her he is like a hero from a 
fairytale, a Russian butterfly. At the airport she rushed to his neck repeating again and again 
his name. On the plane he feels himself uncomfortable and decided it is because of cognac. 
Memories began to overwhelm him. He recalled how his son was dying, his wife nearly lost 
her mind out of grief, he recalled how he hunted squirrels in the forest, the shore from 
childhood, so dear and far away... Suddenly he felt himself very bad, Samsonov began to 
worry about his friend but too late. Nikitin dies from a heart attack being driven by a flow of 
remembrances. 
 
 In spite of its ideological righteousness and stylistic flawlessness from the Socialist 
Realist point of view, The Shore is nevertheless quite an unusual novel. It not only tells us a 
story about war and love, alluding to Leo Tolstoy's great classic, but also sets a task to study 
"the human subconscious, the hidden mechanisms of the I," as Bondarev says in one of his 
interviews." Unlike the overwhelming majority of the Socialist Realist heroes having a very 
simple, if not smooth psychological design allowing him or her to perceive the world mostly 
as black or white, Vadim Nikitin in Bondarev is rather a complex figure turned to himself, 
living in his own, created, world where reality and fantasy always overlap. As a writer but the 
Soviet writer first of all, Nikitin lives simultaneously "here" and "there," and "then" and 
"now;" to the standard task to depict reality as it is, defined already by Maxim Gorky and 
175 
 
other stalwarts of the canon, Bondarev's hero plunges into the realm of his own experience 
both past and present interwoven by his narration. His reality is not given, it is not an object 
of a depiction going from the fix first-person perspective, but rather a flow of emotions and 
perceptions resulting both from his war past and twisted presence which never gives him a 
feeling of security.  
 In the opening pages of the novel we read as follows: "he was starring at the washed 
but still not autumnal green grass of the cautiously cut lawns where the sulked gulls were 
strolling, and his subconscious as always tried to hold that sea-like humidity and the 
duskiness of the streets in autumn; and this gliding along the shop-windows displaying 
equally humid crepe umbrellas in the rain's light fog, the mechanical blinking of the traffic 
lights at the same time retaining and emitting in the ravines of the streets the possessed mobs 
of the cars. Involuntary memorizing, the egoistic work of the subconscious was Nikitin's 
second essence..."
381
 The settings of the main character are defined at the outset: on the one 
hand, Nikitin is an egoist who lives in the invisible world of his own and, on the other hand, 
an observer who perceives the external reality only as a series of emotions ruled by the 
subconscious, his "second essence." On 25 January 1978 during a TV-talk in Ostankino 
Tower Bondarev said: "I want to say that save consciousness there is also a field of the 
subconscious, those feelings that can't be explained by algebra and geometry, logic or by a 
general mathematical formula, and if it was otherwise, the man would have been a primitive 
machine. In order to comprehend the literary hero, to discover him for you not only by a 
verbal action but, if you wish, by his self-realization and self-punishment <sic!>, one should 
not disparagingly neglect this mysterious category of the subconscious <...> Literature is a 
study of the human consciousness and the human subconscious, opening the doors into the 
deep of the psycho and life passions."
382
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 Today Bondarev's words, of course, sound rather as a truism but then, in 1978, it was 
an unusual statement moreover made by one of the Olympic Soviet writers who had also an 
official power in the literary world. One can think that Bondarev willy-nilly grasped the spirit 
of the epoch, not only the 'approved' one but in more wider sense, something which already 
was in the air of the Brezhnev universe. It seems true if to remember that in the same 1978 in 
Georgia (Tbilisi) a group of the leading psychologists, such as Apollon Sherozia, Alexandr 
Prangishvili and others, published a three-volumes study called The Unconscious: Nature, 
Functions, and Methods. A year later, Prangishvili published his own study called Psycho. 
Consciousness. Unconsciousness. On the generalized Theory of Psychology.
383
 Yet, Bondarev 
had worked on his novel four years 1970-1974, undoubtedly the hard period for the Soviet 
intelligentsia because since then any artistic activity, no matter official or dissident, has been 
already monitoring by Andropov. Another interesting detail is that in 1973 a twelve-part 
television series Seventeen Moments of Spring (dir. Tatyana Lioznova) was released and soon 
became the cult film. The movie tells the story about Max Otto von Stierlitz, an SS-
Standartenführer in the Ausland-SD, who is in fact a Soviet spy Maxim Isaev, infiltrated into 
the German establishment twenty years ago. A few months before the end of the War World 
II Stierlitz received from Moscow a mission to determine who from the closest Hitler's circle 
conducts separate negotiations with the West. What made this film a cult is not the spy story 
or an action which, indeed, barely corresponds to a war detective but the figure of the main 
character who showed to then Russian spectators pretty much of what Bondarev spoke in his 
TV talk. Stierlitz from the Seventeen Moments of Spring incarnated the subconscious, more 
precisely, the Soviet subconscious that means a profound split between reality and the inner 
world of an intelligentsia member, and not only. Like Bondarev's Nikitin, Stierlitz lives 
simultaneously into two worlds: outward one in which he plays his role in a way nobody 
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notices his strangeness and enemy-like behavior, and in the inward world where he is left 
alone with his invisible feelings and emotions. Although invisible and subconscious, these 
feelings are flawlessly seen, felt by the Soviet spectators because the majority of them, 
especially those who felt themselves strangers and outsiders in the Brezhnev-Andropov closed 
world, suffer from the same split and thus easily recognized Stierlitz's experience. 
 Stierlitz, a super-intelligent spy, a real hero, a man who knows how to survive in 
extreme conditions, is an upgraded version of Nikitin capable to spy only for his own inner, 
subconscious and fragile emotional fluctuations. The unparalleled success of the Seventeen 
Moments of Spring can be thus explained by the fact that a Soviet man identified himself with 
this character in one way or another. In fact, the film showed how to survive within the hostile 
world whose rules one must accept. The Third Reich on the threshold of its destruction, where 
Stierlitz acts as an invisible enemy, was most certainly and subconsciously, to use Bondarev's 
terms, was associated by many intelligentsia members with the Brezhnev-Andropov Soviet 
Union they lived in.  
 Like Stierlitz, Nikitin, although not among the enemies, resides in the split world 
between the irreversible past, hovering over him time and again, and the present in which, in 
spite of a social success, he feels himself uncomfortable. To put it more precisely, the 
dramatic situation of Nikitin is that he cannot connect his past with his present. Nikitin 
understands that the past will never return, and the more he realizes this fact, the more is past 
seems an ideal time despite the war and deaths and the more the present becomes meaningless 
and uprooted. His love for Emma, for that helpless, sincere and astonishing girl, will never 
return again, she will remain the shore that he will never reach neither in the present nor in the 
future, he is a prisoner of "now," and if so, the only solution to this imprisonment is to be now 
and then at the same time.  
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 When they meet in Hamburg many years later, Emma speaks for him: "My God," she 
said, "and her face immediately lost the expression of the joyful game, a pale face, narrowed 
shoulders betraying her downtrodden mood. She bowed her front, squeezed her lips and, 
clenching her fingers, said: "my God! I was waiting for you... I thought you will come. You 
know what I prayed for? I am afraid to say what I have been thinking after the war. God, I 
prayed, let be the war again, let them shoot again, let them rape me again if only the Russian 
lieutenant has come back to me. Let him return to Königsdorf, to Hamburg with his guns and 
tell me: "Emma, I love you," and I would have replied: "I am dying without you." I have 
imagined it. What a fool I was? A mad, sentimental girl! It's funny to say it now..."
384
  
 An interesting detail, unlike Stierlitz's voice over in the film which articulates his inner 
true thoughts and feelings, Nikitin remains silent. Emma, his gone-forever past as if his "voice 
under" tells him what already cannot sound in his present: "A steel prong situated somewhere 
near his heart didn't let him reply; her words provoked in him a gloomy pain displaying her 
helplessness and fragile defense, something from the remote past suddenly burst out, 
something that let him come back in a moment to the past. Her sincerity was so unexpected 
that, he thought, he is unable to explain his post-war life to her, a whole eternity which 
elapsed since that time..."
385
 
 To be sure, this is not just a description of the love scene but what Bondarev calls "the 
subconscious" of the character or, more exactly, the conflict between the subconscious and 
the social (political, present). Again, subconsciously Nikitin remains in 1945 perhaps never 
really wishing to leave that moment of his life; even living in the social and much successful 
present where he reached an international recognition as a writer, first of all from his former 
enemy, the Germans, Nikitin lived in his memory or, more precisely, he made of his memory 
a living ever-present space. "Frau Herbert," said Nikitin trying to overcome his cogwheel 
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breathing, "in 1945 I believed that everything will change after the war, the world and all our 
life will be a continuous festival <...> Later the Cold War came and everything became split 
into two."
386
  
 Little doubt that the name of the heroine "Emma" alludes to Flaubert's novel Madame 
Bovary (1857) and the whole love story in The Shore is a somewhat response to one of 
Bondarev's favorite authors. Like Flaubert's Emma, Bondarev's one is fundamentally sole 
what represents the essence of the Western society the author criticizes. Bondarev insists that 
even he studies the inner, invisible part of the human existence, he remains a realist and in 
that sense continues the tradition of the French writer. One can even believe Bondarev since, 
like Flaubert, he wants to scan the woman's inward world too. If Flaubert anatomizes his 
Emma both on the sensual and physiological level, Bondarev remains exclusively in the 
framework of sensations. His idea, I think, is to show in Emma a continuity existing contrary 
to the world of men often torn by war and deaths. At a more symbolic level, Emma, an 
incarnation of what the woman should be, is what ablates the possibility of external enemy 
and, instead, gives the possibility of the internalization of enemy: enemy at heart. When the 
Russians entered her house and Granautov ordered the soldiers to interrogate her and her 
brother as the enemies, they failed. When Mezhenin tried to rape her, he failed too; this 
impossibility to harm Emma in one way or another betrays her quasi-sacred position in the 
novel. In a word, she is an anti-enemy.  
 Living in the memory as within the present influenced Nikitin's perception of reality. 
Often he experiences the attacks of hallucinations that drive him mad. Once he sees in a hotel 
room a tall man with unpleasant smile clad in black. "Who are you?," cried out Nikitin and 
the man disappeared like a bodiless ghost behind the door. And then with no understanding 
what is going on Nikitin got out of the bathroom, patches of foam fall down, and crossed over 
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the room towards the door. He checked the door, it was locked. Trying to calm his throbbing 
heart, Nikitin assured himself that it was just a hallucination, possibly the result of the stress 
<...> However, Nikitin could not settle nerves. No, it was not a hallucination, although he 
locked the door, he clearly saw the man in black... Who was he?"
387
 
 The change of in the literary paradigm is obvious. Bondarev's main character is far 
from being a good socialist writer, kind of Kochetov or Shevtsov, with neither existential 
doubts nor hallucinations. What, indeed, happened? A general answer to this question can be 
as follows: the Brezhnev stability reached in the middle of the 1970s its apogee and, 
paradoxically or not, cleared the Soviet psychological space from politics. Always good news 
on TV, also always positive speeches of Leonid Brezhnev himself, an official atmosphere of 
prosperity with the apparent impossibility to struggle against the system alone, created a 
nationwide hallucination of the secure world in which politics is just a matter of the 
professionals. In a certain sense Bondarev was right when he turned the writer's attention to 
the inner invisible world of the man because in the world deprived of political issues, at least 
at the officious level, the man was left with no other possibility save to plunge into his or her 
own feelings and see what is true and what is not about them. 
 However, this new situation created what we call the "invisible enemy" who lived and 
acted according to the rules of Stierlitz: play your role and never show what you are. Indeed, 
the split turned out to be so profound that, as the time showed, it became irreparable. The 
figure of the new enemy has been shaped by the power itself. 
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Chapter 9. Becoming Your Enemy: Yuri Bondarev’s The Choice 
 
 
In order to know your enemy, you must become your enemy.  
  
  Chris Bradford  
       The Way of the Dragon 
 
 
  
 It would be rather a safe guess to say that the literature of Yuri Bondarev (1924 -), 
including his short stories and scripts, is to the official Soviet ideology what the Rambo film 
series is to the Reagan Doctrine. If the Rambo films aim to create the world of a worn-out 
Vietnam War veteran having difficulty adjusting to civilian life and whose extraordinary 
skills of survival explicitly allude to America’s everlasting battle against communism, for 
democratic values, the Bondarev literature, especially his novels, creates the world of heroes 
who, like John Rambo, tormented by their military experience, try to find themselves in the 
new world came after the World War II. If Rambo uses his skills to save the lives of the 
others showing to the spectator that the values America stands for are universal, the Bondarev 
heroes, although having no super-man stature, struggle for the moral principles Soviet 
ideology was based on, at least rhetorically, both within themselves and in the world around 
them. Not haphazardly, as it seems, First Blood (the first film of the series) came out one year 
later after the publication of The Choice, in 1982. 
 The novel gained positive reviews from a variety of sources, and won the State Prize 
for Fiction in 1983 (also for his novel The Shore). The narrative structure of The Choice 
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resembles in many aspects that of The Shore, both novels are constructed as a sort of manifold 
where reality and remembrances, the present and the past overlap in such a way that the 
transit from reality to memories and back often occur unnoticed for the heroes themselves. In 
his interviews and critical remarks on what he has been up to Bondarev himself has stressed 
that in writing the novel his main interest was to plunge into the deepest realms of 
consciousness and try to understand profound truths about the human nature. In the recent 
preface to the collection of his early prose, Bondarev remarks: "In order to comprehend the 
literary character, to discover him not only by a verbal action, but, if you wish, by the way of 
his self-apprehension and self-punishment it is unnecessary to waft away the secret category 
of the unconscious."
388
   
 The plot of The Choice is quite simplistic. On the occasion of his exhibition, the 
renowned artist Vladimir Vasiliev came to Venice with his wife Masha. Unexpectedly he got 
a letter from his old friend Ilya Ramzin with whom they were struggling during the War 
World II, at the time Ramzin was also his commander. Twenty years passed after the war, the 
two men have never met ever since, and Ramzin asked Vasiliev for a meeting. During the 
meeting Ramzin tells Vasiliev his story, he was captured by the Germans in 1943 and after the 
end of the war could not return home because in the Soviet Union, according to Stalin’s 
notorious axiom, the hostages were equaled to enemies, the traitors of the motherland. 
Ramzin tells Vasiliev that he is seriously ill having no more than five or six years ahead of 
him. What Ramzin is concerned about at most is his mother, and when Vasiliev tells his 
former friend she is alive, Ramzin asked Vasiliev to speak to her. After a while Ramzin 
managed to obtain permission from the Soviet officials to visit his native country and see his 
mother. Upon visiting the Soviet Union Ramzin meets his mother in person, it is their first 
and last meeting after more than twenty years of silence. The Choice is also a romantic – or, a 
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socialist romantic – novel since the part of its narrative runs in the memories and dreams of 
the heroes who live in two worlds, real and imaginary, mythic, at the same time; as Northrop 
Frye points out, “what we call romantic is the tendency to suggest implicit mythical patterns 
in a world more closely associated with human practice.”389  
 The main characters of The Choice certainly create such "mythical patterns" in trying 
to preserve the real world they live in with its values and codes shaped basically by the war 
experience and sometimes badly suited for normal life. The discrepancy between the two 
worlds, war and civilian, as well as between two times, past and present, comes into clearer 
view when the hero sinks into his dreams and memories undergoing a dramatic change of 
feelings in a way the present reality looks odd and even perilous. Before his meeting with Ilya 
Ramzin, Vasiliev, as he was drowsing off, clearly feels “the moony gloom wrapping the 
house with the opaque web, and suddenly he heard cracks of window frame when someone 
square-cut with leaden steps began to move toward his work room. Silence has squeezed all 
the world disseminating such overwhelming and unbearable grief that he started suffocating 
in loneliness saying farewell to his failed life which his friends considered cloudless, 
successful and lucky <...>.”390 And when Vasiliev finally meets old former friend in person, 
he “well remembered but barely recognized his voice which has lost its former vividness and 
archness of the commander. Now Ramzin pronounced his phrases abruptly with the excessive 
correctness peculiar to many Russian who lived long time abroad, and what hurt Vasiliev the 
most was not Ramzin’s look, his grey hair, artfully cut costume, his meticulously cared nails 
and sleek fingers, but this abrupt speech that apparently concealed his anxiety of making a 
mistake in pronunciation. – How does he see me? – he asked himself. The question drove 
Vasiliev to despair, and the very thought about the years that passed made him quail.”391  
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 Time is an invisible but all-pervading character in Bondarev’s novel; it is divided into 
past and present, into what has indubitable values, as love, friendship and motherland, and 
what make these values obsolete: individualism, selfishness and indifference. Apparently, the 
latter is not compatible with communist ideology as a whole, neither with the moral 
presuppositions of Vasiliev who, despite his social and professional success, feels a stranger if 
not hostile to himself in the post-war situation.  
 On the one hand, Vasiliev is aware of the fact that the world of his youth, its ideals and 
principles is whittling away and nothing can preserve it in its initial shape; time passes and 
changes of all kind, including those of human relations, don’t go past this world. On the other 
hand, this obvious fact bothers Vasiliev the most, his inner world comes barely to terms with 
his outer one, his past with his present. Like other main characters in the novel, he suffers 
from inadequacy between what he believes in and what he sees, between what he has been 
taught as a young man and a member of communist and what he understands now as a mature 
man and artist. As the overwhelming majority of tragic figures, Vasiliev is torn between his 
ideals he has never renounced and the possibility of their embodiment. Here lies the most 
dramatic point which turns the novel into a specific Soviet tragedy: due to his communist 
upbringing Vasiliev can never leave what he believes and loves, what imbues his art and 
makes sense of his life, but living in the particular historical context he realizes that his ideals 
and views were possible only in wartime. The critic Vladimir Korobov notes that Vasiliev 
“can already neither return to former himself nor find his new, another self... he is full of 
doubts about what he does and what he lives for.”392 The war was a disaster, it cost millions 
of lives and havoc in the country, but it also was a period when in many ways the ideals and 
some communist ideas came true. Needless to say, this period was so intense and challenging 
that in any case it could not last long, yet it was so demanding from a psychological point of 
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view – it had turned people into accomplished heroes ready to sacrify themselves for the sake 
of the collective aim – that such ideal relations embodied in friendship, love and sublime 
patriotic feeling were inevitably exhausted.  
 Vasiliev is far from being so naive as to think that the principles and human relations 
on which war is based can be applied to civilian life, but this understanding does not bring 
him peace and comfort, or they are superficial. So was the Brezhnev stability, announced in 
the mid-seventies as a great achievement of the “New (Brezhnev) Deal,” that became a chief 
ideological mantra at the time. Nevertheless, this stability was something opposite to the war 
and Thaw periods, which were socially trembling and instable, each in its sense. In fact, 
however, the situation was quite to the contrary. What was proclaimed as permanent and the 
highest moral discoveries of communism, those that will conquer the world one day, turned 
out to be morally dubious and historically weak.  
 The Choice, published in 1981, one year before Brezhnev died, was a somewhat 
‘alarm novel’ within the socialist-realist movement drawing much attention to the deep and 
still unsolved existential problems peculiar to Soviet mind. Permanent ideals turned out to be 
temporal; moral values, served as a ground for the new communist society, unsustainable, and 
human enthusiasm, having nourished much of the Soviet success, including victory in war, 
exhausted. In spite of the official political statements, the beginning of the eighties, started by 
the 1980 Summer Olympics, boycotted, besides, by the United States to protest the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan, it was a time when the country looked more like a ramshackle house 
which shrank under its own weight. The country and let us say, collective sensibility bore a 
resemblance to the Soviet leader, an old and tired man who belongs to history much more 
than to the present.     
 Basically, the figure of enemy in the novel is two-level, we can tentatively call it 
“abstract” and “personal” or, if one prefers, “narrative” and “mythic.” Narrative in the sense 
186 
 
in use here is what happens without the hero’s participation and often against his or her will, 
what does happen and must be accepted; mythic is what characterizes the hero’s behaviour, no 
matter physical or mental. In the case of psychological prose, the characters construct their 
mythic world from their own past, from the memories, which is in many ways opposite or at 
best complimentary to the real one. Bondarev once noted that “the most secure instrument for 
time measurement is memory equipped with imagination.”393 In The Choice, both Vladimir 
Vasiliev and Ilya Ramzin create a mythic reality that protects them from a total clash with 
what they are now but, as it is often the case of tragedy or drama, the irony lies in the fact that 
is that the same mythic reality points to the enemy inside the hero, i.e. to his consciousness 
split between two different and hardly compatible selves, the past and present one. In such 
mythic construing of reality time itself becomes enemy but of the second, narrative type. The 
notorious Soviet literary critic Nikolai Fedj remarks: “time in Bondaev’s novel has two 
dimensions: specific, the time of the heroes’ life, and historical, that of big events such as war, 
post-war reconstruction, etc. The juxtaposition of these two temporal dimensions acquires a 
philosophical and psychological sense in the novel inasmuch as the writer shows the intimate 
connection between history and the life of a particular person.”394 Time brings changes, those 
changes willy-nilly concern all the aspects of life, social, private and inner, but in the mind of 
Vasiliev who, perhaps, learned better than others how to tarry with society, time is not the 
only all-powerful force, a destiny, compelling the people to obey, there is that mythic, a web 
of beliefs and values, that confronts any change.   
 Tellingly enough, in spite of Vasiliev’s artistic profession, liberal par excellence, the 
mythic aspects of his consciousness conflate with the official party line suggesting that the 
country finally came to the epoch of stability and prosperity, and so it will go. Curiously, 
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neither Vasiliev, a fictional character, nor Brezhnev, the supreme leader of the country
395
 did 
or, most probably, could remove this mythic veil and see reality as is. It was, as I have already 
noted, a private mythology which had to protect the holders of the unsustainable values and 
beliefs from self-destruction. In this sense, the mythic characterizes both the private person, 
usually a member of intelligentsia, as Vasiliev or Ramzin, and the collective state of mind, a 
sensible pattern of the society went out of use only with the collapse of the Soviet state.    
 Whether Bondarev fully realized what exactly the message he sent to his public, 
including, perhaps, Brezhnev himself, is a matter of conjecture. It is clear, however, that the 
writer pointed to a deep psychological problem – came out of the post-war experience and 
took shape after the Khrushchev Thaw – this problem primarily concerned Russian 
intelligentsia squeezed between what she sees and must accept as present, thus temporal, and 
what she believes being permanent and true. Bondarev, focusing attention on this inner and 
deep split of the intelligentsia of his generation, tried to go so far as to tell his readers what he 
thought was new, namely that today no enemy outside, West and its influence, is more 
dangerous than the enemy sheltered within ourselves, something that can diminish or even 
completely devaluate the traditional values of Russia.
396
  
 There is an eloquent passage in the beginning of the novel when Vasiliev and an 
Italian named Bozarelli, who wrote an article about Vasiliev’s exhibition, discuss the 
contemporary art: “I would call your style rather as the realism of socialism, not the socialist 
realism,” said Bozarelli. – “Does the terminology make any sense?, replied Vasiliev. – 
“Alas,” said Bozarelli, “today the rules of the game compel me to love everyone. Critic is a 
courtesan, he must love all. My tragedy is that can’t love all, some of the artists I even hate, 
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but must love them.” – “Regrettably, it is so everywhere in the world,” said Vasiliev unkindly, 
“Because the human life today is just a trigger for art, but creativity is something personal, it 
expresses personality. To hell with the courtesans, signor Vasiliev!” <...> The task of art is to 
save the human into human beings, without all these damn De Sads, Freuds, and Sacher-
Masochs, said Vasiliev.”397 The Italian critic is certainly a sympathizer of Vasiliev’s paintings, 
he shares with him his pessimistic thoughts on contemporary Western art making no 
exception for socialist realism. Vasiliev, in his turn, stresses the fact that the latter is the true 
art at least because it has never lost sight of the fundamental values common to humanity as a 
whole. Once again, Vasiliev speaks to Bozarelli from his mythic world coming with the same 
argument that painting, like other forms of art, should be concerned about the fundamental 
and eternal questions leaving aside all those gewgaws dear to contemporary vogue.   
 To put it another way, in the conversation with Bozarelli, Vasiliev defends the mythic 
against the narrative; the Italian art critic is not hostile to the Russian painter and to what he 
does, but as a man from the West he belongs to the present and narrative, i.e. to the world 
undergoing constant change and deprived of positive targets, the world governed by certain 
uncontrolled forces, like art market and vogue, thus dissolved to uncertainty. In opposing here 
the Western narrative to the Russian mythic, Bondarev offers his view on what the Russian 
choice is, making his protagonist, Vasiliev, the advocate of this view. Further, the fact that 
Venice has been chosen by the writer as the place of Vasiliev’s exhibition and his 
conversation with Bozarelli seems not to be random. Venice, a city renowned for its political 
freedom and social harmony, in 1309 anathemized by the Pope Climent V, is also a cradle of 
comedia dell’arte and mask festival, it is a place where everyone can chose his or her own 
mask and play the role he or she likes. Choosing Venice, Bondarev allegorically endowed his 
characters with its freedom and allows them to express any hidden thoughts and wishes they 
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could have. Thoughts and wishes come to light because, as Peter Ackroyd nicely noted, “there 
is no inwardness in Venice,” 398  and, hiding one’s face, masks let speak. Supposedly, 
Bondarev’s picture of Venetian carnival in the novel is an innuendo to the Khrushchev Thaw 
and its carnivalesque frame to teach his reader that the freedom carnival gives to its 
participants changes nothing in their true nature. Thus, in The Choice, the Thaw period is, 
once again, opposed to the Brezhnev stability as masks to the real face.  
 Whatever new tastes and settings, rules and players, the true art is salvation, like 
Soviet Russia itself whose role, in the writer’s eyes, is to keep untouched the human within 
human beings. It is not haphazardly that in 2015 Bondarev was awarded the Patriarchal 
Literary Prize, established for years earlier, for his contribution to the spiritual education of 
the Russian people and work on propagation of the Orthodox values.  
 The Prize will find Bondarev decades later, but now, in the beginning of the eighties, 
as a Soviet writer, always subject to the socialist literary standards, solving the problem of the 
choice for intelligentsia, Bondarev must take his own position both as a writer and citizen, and 
give his own answer to this problem. His answer is definitive: although he does not judge his 
heroes in a way the Stalinist writers did, the novel ends by the suicide of Ramzin who comes 
to realize the meaninglessness of his existence outside his native country. “My great 
motherland buried me long time ago in the soldier-like way or as an officer... But I am still 
alive. Fantastic isn’t it?” 399   Importantly, the conversation that follows reveals the clash 
between the narrative and the mythic as well as between two main characters of the novel 
who, after many years apart, look at the same things from different perspectives. Ramzin tries 
to explain to Vasiliev that, being captured by the Germans, he got no chance to return home, it 
was like a death sentence at the time. Vasiliev knows well the Stalinist rules showing neither 
approval nor disdain towards his former military commander; the story of Ramzin or, more 
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precisely, the way he tells his story is narrative in the sense I use this concept here because he 
feels and describes himself as a victim of circumstances, a set of tragic events happened to 
him without any possibility to change anything. What could he do if destiny, objective forces 
which made his history for him, were so powerful that no individual could do anything 
against them. Ramzin was bold and clever, he loved his motherland no less than his comrades, 
but when what must have happened happens, even the true love for your country, boldness 
and belief in communist ideals could not save one from misfortune. Vasiliev with his mythic 
view of things asks Ramzin how could the Russian officer nevertheless survive in the German 
captivity? “I will tell you,” Ramzin said, “I have grasped for any chance to live. Moreover, I 
will tell you, there I realized what life is and what is it like to be a worthless person. – Where 
did he get this scar on the temple?,” thought Vasiliev. He hated himself for this question 
trying to appease his doubts imagining Ilya had fallen unconscious due to the wound in the 
temple at that fatal night when they were ordered to fetch the weapon left in the occupied 
territory <...> And now, do you still fight for your life now? – Now my life is not worth 
living.”400 
 Becoming the enemy of their own, however at different levels, the narrative and 
mythic, both men realize completely that now the common past, happy youth and mutual 
values they ever had, matter little or nothing for them today; they became strangers not only 
to each other but to themselves. No attempt to rekindle the former friendship is already 
possible, it all had passed in irrevocable manner. Even their memories from the past do not 
speak to them in the same language. If Ramzin tries to find a justification of his choice and 
right to live seeing no reason to be morally punished by his former friend, Vasiliev, on the 
contrary, enjoying unchallenged moral stature, at least in his friend’s eyes, wants to justify his 
luck and social success that sometimes having hostile feelings towards himself. Yuri Idashkin, 
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another Bondarev scholar, is right saying that “among all Bondarev’s positive characters 
Vasiliev seems to be the least canonical one. Vasiliev permits the writer to highlight the most 
important social, ethical, and aesthetic problems worrying our contemporaries.”401 When Ilya 
Ramzin asks him for help in obtaining Russian visa, Vasiliev “began to hate himself thinking 
that now they both came to an abyss which in a moment will absorb the sacred and dear that 
was between them in the remote past, something that they will never have again.”402   
 As the last demonstration of his good will, Vasiliev agrees to accompany Ramzin to 
visit his mother, Raisa Mikhailovna, the only person on earth Ramzin still loved, a tired old 
lady who has never ceased to think of her son, their meeting is an easily readable allusion to 
Rembrandt’s The Return of the Prodigal Son (1669). Like in Rembrandt’s painting where the 
son has returned home in a wretched state from travels in which he wasted the inheritance 
received from his father, in The Choice Ramzin returns to his mother and, after a short 
exchange of words, understands that he lost her trust. He kisses her tenderly, wishing for 
forgiveness, and offers money, but she declined telling him that all she ever wanted from him 
was love. “Mother, I am not a poor man, believe me,” said Ilya. You will not make me poor. 
Every month I will send you money, you will be able to buy everything you wish in special 
shops reserved for foreigners... Raisa Mikhailovna took her hands off her face, gave Ilya a dry 
look, smiled gloomily:  – Too late, Ilyusha. Life passed. You came to the end of my life.”403    
 In a Rembrandt-like style Bondarev depicts the picture of irreversible events; if one 
made the wrong choice, becoming his own enemy, even the mother’s love can vanish and no 
salvation can be found in this case. Unlike in the preceding epoch of the Thaw, allowing the 
carnivalesque reversibility of time and values, the Brezhnev stability was the period when 
everyone was supposed to make the right choice, according to the mythic worldview shared 
by all who accepted or must have been to accept the Brezhnev shift in Soviet paradigm, even 
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those who, like Bondarev, sensed its unsustainable nature and tried to find a remedy, however 
in vain. 
 To that extent, Bondarev’s position is close to Yurchak’s one, when the latter argues 
that Soviet people “were reproducing the system and participating in its continuous internal 
deplacement.”404 Everybody was taking part to the meaningless rituals – or at least those 
rituals had different meanings than the original ones – and progressively the gap between 
Soviet myth and reality has become wider and wider. During Perestroika, the myth itself 
ceased to exist. 
.
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Conclusion 
 
At the term of this study on the enemy, one can be struck by the variety of his faces on 
the relatively short span of forty years. This diversity was aroused by the propaganda contest 
in the wake of the Cold War. But it was also an evidence of the fluid nature of the Party line. 
From the moment of the revolution, state ideology has constantly been changing and adapting 
itself to circumstances, so demonstrating its fundamental instability. The originality of my 
research lies in its interdisciplinary approach to decipher Soviet ideology, resorting to political 
scientists, historians and anthropologists. Moreover, it includes authors not previously studied 
(namely Shpanov, Kochetov, Eriomin, Maltsev, Bondarev and Kochetov), unpublished 
materials I collected in the archives of the Soviet Writers’ Union (Moscow), and the literary 
criticism of the epoch.  
 
Under Stalin, in the aftermath of World War II and concomitant to the first skirmishes 
of the Cold War, the enemy was highly political. He concentrated the features of the invader 
(the Nazi agents), of the spy (Shpanov’s ‘enemy with a cloak and a dagger’), of the political 
elites betraying their people (the French or the Italian politicians). The characters of the 
official prose were embodying the recent and actual history: the threat to the very existence of 
the Soviet Union and the setting up of the new world order. For example, the « Italian 
conspiracy scheme » I reconstructed in the text of Storm over Rome made the transition 
between the enemy-invader and the hostile influence. Moreover, the line of the alliance with 
the Nazis is another clue of the persistence of the former enemy in the shaping of the Cold 
war one; his profane nature anticipates the ethical dimension of the Communist dogma during 
the Thaw. 
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After Stalin’s death, the enemy paradigm was adjusted to the new moulds of ideology. 
The situation was totally different. Hitherto the country did not have any more the enemy at 
the gates and the Party leadership was aimed to enjoy the fruits of the hard and bloody last 
decades. According to Khrushchev prophecy, the Communist society was to be built. There is 
a rich body of scholarly literature on the question of the Thaw enemy. Miriam Dobson 
considers that “the vitriolic invective elaborated as part of the ritual of the Stalinist 
performance was now shifted from those once imagined as spies or saboteurs, modified and 
redirected towards those regarded as threats to social order and respectable conformity.”405 
Denis Kozlov brings some reservations to this statement, arguing that “changes in ideas of 
social membership during the 1960s went beyond “refashioning the enemy” and portended a 
gradual but noticeable decline in the exclusionary paradigm of social membership.”406 Apart 
from the social outcasts, the moral stance of the Thaw was castigating the liberal intelligentsia, 
suspected for conveying the ‘seeds of decay.’ The Thaw enemy, as he appears in the novels of 
Vsevolod Kochetov, was a threat to the communist orthodoxy. His mercantile or/and egoistic 
motives, despising revolutionary romanticism and the sacrifices at war, tends imperceptibly to 
seduce the young minds. 
Later, the period of Stagnation was dominated by a general feeling of loss and 
uncertainty: the war causalities echo the absurdity of mass murders (Bondarev’s The Choice, 
1981) and the losses of a heavenly Golden Age destroyed by modernization, mourned by the 
authors of the “village prose.” The Soviet writer was tempted to seek shelter in introspection, 
trying to struggle against the invisible enemy. 
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Through the evolution of the trope of enemy, one can observe a double phenomenon: as 
time goes on, the character of the enemy has become more interiorized and more abstract. 
Indeed, there was a tightening of the ‘hostile space,’ drifting away from the frontier of 
the empire towards the intellectual’s own consciousness and memories. For sure, the Stalinist 
enemy was a Nazi soldier on the battlefield or a spy trying to infiltrate the Soviet territory. 
Under Stalin, the enemy is from outside of the Soviet Union. As I tried to demonstrate with 
Maltsev and Eriomin, the enemy can be the enemy outside the country but inside the 
Communist movement. The denunciation of Stalin crimes was an earthquake which destroyed 
the Stalinist topology with its gigantic scale. It was replaced by reduced Thaw localities, 
allowing people to interact with each other and to participate to the life of small groups (the 
classroom, the kitchen, and so on…). This reduction has permitted the creation of inter-
personal intimacy and to foster friendship as a social and aesthetical category of the Thaw (I 
Am Twenty by Khutsiev, 1965, Walking the Streets of Moscow by Daneliya, 1964). As a 
consequence, the enemy can be only the enemy inside, threatening to contaminate these 
“morally pure” small spaces with subversive Western values.  
Once Brezhnev stability was reached, politics were expelled from the citizens’ concerns. 
The permanent illusion of a prosperous country conveyed by all the media and repeated in 
each Brezhnev’s speech along with the absence of any lever to conduct civic action has led 
the Soviet people to neglect the political arena. Without the possibility of involvement in civic 
life, the man has no choice but to seek refuge into introspection. This ultimate ‘mental space,’ 
the most reduced and the most hidden of hostile topology, is an oasis of freedom where the 
intellectual can give way to his doubts and remorse. After the Stalinist epics and the Thaw 
collective Bacchanalia, which left the bitter taste of unrealized utopias, the Stagnation was 
offering the more modest but glittering dream of private happiness. Such films as Duck 
hunting (Vampilov, 1967), The Irony of Fate (Ryazanov, 1976), Office romance (Ryazanov, 
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1977) do not show extraordinary heroes but, on the opposite, the average person and his inner 
circle, be it his beloved or his friends. Analogously, Bondarev’s heroes Nikitin and Vasiliev 
are condemned to struggle with their demons deep down inside themselves. 
 
In parallel with the reduction of the territory of enmity, the enemy has become more and 
more evanescent. The Stalinist enemy was a character of blood and flesh presenting the risk 
of political as well as physical damages: the Nazi officers or the agents of capitalism were 
aimed to cause human loss among the Soviet population and the ruin of the country. Of course, 
the ideological credo of these protagonists was totally different from the Soviet one, but the 
ideology per se was not at stake. That was a fight for survival.  
Under Khrushchev, things strongly differ. Several reasons explain the dematerialisation 
of the enemy. Firstly, victory over Nazism destroyed the physical enemy. Moreover, unlike 
the late Stalinism, the mid-1950s was already the time when Soviet people began to forget the 
persisting rear of German tanks and to come back to the ordinary life after reconstruction. 
Henceforth the threat was limited to the ideological sphere. This shift from the political to the 
ideological content of the debates appears in the ‘Problem of Generations’ as “one of the basic 
factors contributing to the genesis of the dynamic of historical development.”407 The children 
of war were the sons of the children of Revolution, they were the new men, the products of 
Communism; they epitomized this idea. Analyzing the film The Big Family (1954) based on 
Vsevolod Kochetov’s novel The Zhurbins (1952) which tells the story of the dynasty of 
steamboat manufacturers, Evgeny Dobrenko notices the difference in the cast of the actors 
between Zhurbin Jr. and Zhurbin Sr.: the choice of Alexander Batalov with his thoughtful 
face introduces a new type of “educated worker”408 in contrast with his father’s stakhanovist 
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stature, played by Boris Andreev. There is nothing surprising in it. As the author explains 
earlier, the new model is “the realized utopy hic et nunc.”409 Besides, in the overwhelming 
majority of the Thaw fiction the artists have replaced workers as main characters. From now 
on heroes and enemies epitomized ideas rather than the people itself. They were promoting an 
ethic of faith more than a social order per se.  
Finally, the reason for which the enemy has become more and more abstract in the 
course of the Cold War had to do with the evolution of the Party line. And here the circle 
comes back around. Carl Schmitt’s theory, used as the premise of our research, appears anew 
as the converse of his basic assumption: if, according to Carl Schmitt, the definition of the 
enemy allows the emergence of a politicized world, so in return, the weakened political 
doctrine can only cloud the outlines of the enemy, making them fuzzy and evanescent. And it 
was precisely the case during Brezhnev’s rule: half-a-century old Lenin’s testimony and its 
“revolutionary-imperial paradigm,”410 yet renewed by the Stalinist patriotic doctrine, became 
ramshackle. Its theoretical content, elaborated in the beginning of the twentieth century, had 
already nothing in common with the 1970s Soviet reality within the Cold War world 
(Yurchak). In 1975, after the Helsinki Accords marking the climax of the Détente, the Soviet 
Union has made the most of this atmosphere of appeasement to set back from an active 
involvement in the international affairs. At the same moment, Brezhnev himself began to 
retire from power. Despite the fact that he remained the General Secretary of the Party until 
his death in 1982, the Soviet leader has lost his interest in political affairs and was no more 
exercising power. The country was ruled by Brezhnev’s inner circle, beginning with Yuri 
Andropov. In addition, the inertial force of partocratia and, first of all, of the old Politburo 
barred any “fresh contact,” the “up-to-dateness of the Youth.”411 On the eve of Perestroika, 
the Soviet dissidents became in the majority of cases the mentally sick, “fools” who had to be 
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cured in psychiatric hospitals. The enemy just vanished, a few years before the Soviet Union 
did. 
 
Fearful and phantasmagorical, the enemy is surrounded by an inspiring universe which 
unleashes people’s imagination. Allowing projecting on himself the deep processes of 
sublimation, identification, and rejection, the enemy is the most effective tool to focus the 
attention of the masses and to mobilize their affects on the mottos dictated by the power. In 
the Soviet Union, the specific function of literature as the space dedicated for the political and 
ideological debates (Clark) has put the enemy at the centre of the readers’ interest. 
Hence, not only literature mirrors reality, it also changes history. Through novels the 
face of the Cold war enemy has conquered the Soviet minds which in their turn were involved 
in the shaping of the country’s policy. Then occurs what Sam Keen calls the “adversarial 
symbiosis,”412 an interdependent system where enemies need each other to define their own 
strategies and, eventually, themselves. In the Soviet Union the unsustainable nature of 
Socialist Realism has led to the entire evaporation of the enemy. Soon after the country itself 
vanished. Socialist Realism, the language of power, turned out to be the best proof of what 
Winston Churchill calls the “power of words.” The depositary of this sacred gift, the Soviet 
intelligentsia was called upon to perform the supreme task of author of his epoch. While 
Stalin was the conductor of the orchestra composed of professional writers, the score chosen 
by the power was thoroughly followed. However, in 1953, after the total control over 
literature stopped, to write the national narrative – with its mighty or modest protagonists – 
proved to be a too hazardous game for the power in place.  Eventually, the poet found himself 
an enemy of his own story.  
                                                          
412
 Ibid, p. 22. 
199 
 
Bibliography 
 
 
I- Primary sources 
 
1) Prose 
 
Bondarev Y. The Shore / Берег, М.: Молодая гвардия, 1975. 
________The Choice / Выбор, М.: Современник, 1980. 
Ehrenburg I. The Fall of Paris / Падение Парижа, «Знамя», 1941 № 3; 1942, № 3-4. 
________The Storm / Буря, «Новый Мир»,1947 № 4-8. 
Eremin D. Storm over Rome / Гроза над Римом, Znamia 1951 № 10-12 (М.: Советский 
писатель, 1953). 
Kochetov V. What Do You Want Then? / Чего же ты хочешь?, «Октябрь», 1969, № 9-11. 
Maltsev O. The Yugoslavian Tragedy / Югославская трагедия, Zvezda 1951 №11-12 (М.: 
Советский писатель, 1951). 
Shpanov N. Incendiaries / Поджигатели, М.:Молодая Гвардия,1949. 
_______Plotters  / Заговорщики, М.:Молодая Гвардия, 1951. 
 
2)  Party press on literature, criticism and archive materials 
 
PARTY PRESS 
 
За идейность и мастерство советской литературы. «Правда» 1954. № 251 (8/IX). Стр. 1. 
За дальнейший подъем советской литературы. «Коммунист» 1954. № 9. Стр. 12 – 27. 
Литература советского народа. «Правда» 1954. № 349 (15/XII). Стр. 1. 
Благородные задачи художников слова. «Правда» 1954. № 363 (29/XII). Стр. 1. 
К новому подъему идейно-художественного уровня советской литературы. 
«Коммунист» 1955. № 1. Стр. 14 – 22. 
К вопросу о типичном в литературе и искусстве. «Коммунист» 1955. № 18. Стр. 12 -23. 
Благородная задача советской литературы. «Правда» 1955. № 261 (18/IX). Стр. 1. 
Газета и писатели. Обзор печати. «Правда» 1955. № 341 (7/XII). Стр. 3. 
200 
 
Центральный Комитет Коммунистической партии Советского Союза. Второму 
Всесоюзному съезду советских писателей. «Правда» 1954. № 350 (16/XII). Стр. 1. 
Второй Всесоюзный съезд советских писателей. Центральному Комитету 
Коммунистической партии Советского Союза. «Правда» 1954. № 361 (27/XII). Стр. 1. 
Заботливо воспитывать молодых литераторов. «Правда» 1956. № 8 (8/I). Стр. 1. 
Высокое призвание советского писателя. «Правда» 1956. № 142 (21/V). Стр. 2. 
Советский писатель. «Правда» 1957. № 139 (19/V). Стр. 1. 
Партия и вопросы развития советской литературы и искусства. «Коммунист» 1957. № 3. 
Стр. 12 – 25. 
Неиссякаемый родник художественного творчества. «Правда» 1957. № 144 (24/V). Стр. 
1. 
Главная линия развития литературы и искусства. «Правда» 1957. № 241 (29/VIII). Стр. 1. 
Высокое призвание деятелей литературы и искусства. «Правда» 1957. № 244  (1/IX). 
Стр. 1. 
Слово писателя и деятелей искусства. По страницам газет. «Правда» 1957. № 244 (1/IX). 
Стр. 3. 
Высокое призвание советского писателя. «Правда» 1958. № 229 (17/VIII). Стр. 1. 
Литература, вдохновляемая идея ми коммунизма. «Правда» 1958. № 341 (7/XII). Стр. 1. 
Высокое призвание литературы и искусства. «Правда» 1959. № 44 (13/II). Стр. 1. 
Литература эпохи строительства коммунизма. «Коммунист» 1959. № 6 Стр. 13 – 21. 
Высокое призвание советского писателя. «Правда» 1959. № 91 (1/IV). Стр. 1. 
Съезд писателей Советского Союза. «Правда» 1959. № 138 (18/V). Стр. 1. 
Советские писатели – верные помощники партии. «Правда» 1959. № 143 (25/V). Стр. 1. 
Советская народная литература. «Правда» 1959. № 253 (10/IX). Стр. 1. 
Третий съезд писателей СССР 18 – 23 мая 1959 года. Стенографический отчет. М. 
Советский писатель, 1959. 
Современность – главная тема. «Правда» 1960. № 47 (16/II). Стр. 1. 
Главное русло творчества. «Правда» 1960. № 213 (31/VII). Стр. 1. 
Искусство, обращенное к народу. «Правда» 1960. № 255 (11/IX). Стр. 1. 
Великое искусство народа. «Правда» 1960. № 317 (12/XI). Стр. 1. 
Писатель и народ. «Правда» 1960. № 325 (20/XI). Стр. 1. 
Большую литературу – детям и юношеству. «Правда» 1960. № 353 (18/XII). Стр. 1. 
Герои наших дней – герои литературы и искусства. Правда» 1961. № 92 (2/IV). Стр.1. 
Коммунизм и искусство. «Коммунист» 1961. № 8. Стр. 3 – 10. 
201 
 
Радость творчества. «Правда» 1961. № 141 (21/V).  Стр. 4. 
Важные проблемы развития советской литературы. «Правда» 1961. № 325 (20/XI). Стр. 
4. 
Высокое призвание советской печати. «Правда» 1961. № 337 (2/XII). Стр. 1. 
 
Хрущев Н.С. За тесную связь литературы и искусства с жизнью народа. «Коммунист» 
1957.  № 240 (28/VIII). Стр. 3 – 4. 
______Служение народу – высокое призвание советских писателей. «Правда» 1959. № 
144 (24/V). Стр. 1 – 3. 
______Воля народов всех стран – обеспечить мир во всем мире. Речь на митинге в 
станице Вещенской Ростовской области 30 августа 1959 г. М. Госполитиздат, 1959. 
______Советская печать должна быть самой сильной и самой боевой. Выступление на 
приеме журналистов в Кремле 14 ноября 1959 г. М. Госполитиздат. 1959. 
______О литературе и искусстве. Сборник документов. М. «Советская Россия». 1959. 
______Высокое призвание литературы и искусства. М.: 1963. 
______К новым успехам литературы и искусства. «Коммунист». 1961 № 7. Стр. 3 – 16. 
 
CRITICISM AND ARCHIVE MATERIALS 
 
ЭРЕНБУРГ И. 
 
Эренбург И. «В опустошенном Париже». Беседа. Вечерняя Москва, 13.09.1940. 
______ Речь на массовам митинге в Стокгольме. «Поджигатели войны – злейшие враги 
народов». Правда, 21.03.1950. 
______ Совесть народов. М.: Советский Писатель, 1956. 
 
Архипов В. Уроки Эренбурга. Нева. 1958. № 6. Стр. 195-199. 
Белая Г.А. В поисках скромного новаторства. Новый Мир, 1960 № 8. 
______ Илья Эренбург. Октябрь. 1961. №1. Стр. 182 – 186. 
______  Борец за мир. Труд. 1961. №22 (26/I). Стр. 4. 
Вайнберг И. У Ильи Эренбурга. Литературная Газета. 1959. №72 (9/VI). Стр. 3. 
Книпович Е. Стендаль и Эренбург в кн. «В защиту жизни». М. Сов. Писатель, 1958. Стр. 
221-230. 
Корнейчук А. «Солдат мира». Огонек. 1961. № 4. Стр. 22. 
202 
 
______ Писатель – борец за мир. Правда. 1961 №26 (26/I). Стр. 4. 
Мацкин А. Эренбург в дни войны в книге «Образы времени». М. «Советский писатель» 
1959. Стр. 156-172. 
Симонов К.  Писатель – боец. Красная звезда, 12.04.1942. 
______ Илья Эренбург в книге «На литературные темы», М. Гослитиздат. 1956. Стр. 57-
61. 
Трифонова Т.К. Илья Эренбург. М., «Знание», 1954. 
 
Падение Парижа (1941) 
 
[Б.п.] Книги писателей лауреатов (о книгах ИЭ Падение Парижа, Война, Вперед), 
Красная звезда.1942 19/4. 
Бямик, Б. Литературный современник. 1941. № 2. 
Дымшиц А. Книга, которая многому учит. В книге «В великом походе». М., Советский 
писатель, 1962. Стр. 230-238. 
Гельфан. Литература и искусство. 1942. № 15. 
Лубэ С.М. О стиле романа И. Эренбурга «Падение Парижа». Ученые записки 
(Оренбургск. Пед. Инст.) 1958. Вып. 13. Стр. 183-216. 
Лежнев. Огонек. 1941. №14. 
Литературный современник. 1941. № 7-8. 
Мотылева. Литературная Газета. 1941. № 19. 
Песис, Б. Знамя. 1942. № 5-6. 
Рубашкин А.И. Публицистические истоки романа И. Эренбурга «Падение Парижа». 
Ученые записки (Ленингр. Пед. Ин-т им. А.И. Герцена) 1959. Т. 202. Стр. 259-278. 
Савич, О. Комсомольская Правда. 17/6/1942. № 140. 
Фадеев А. Замечательные произведения советской литературы. Правда, 12.04.1942. 
Филиппов, И. Известия. 1941. № 112. 
 
Буря (1947) 
 
Собрание сочинений в 9 Т. М., «Художественная лит.». Т.5 «Буря», 1965 с 
комментариями Г. Белой. 
Дмитревский. Звезда. 1948. № 6. С.174-180. 
Жданов, Н. Известия. 1948. № 24. С.1-3. 
203 
 
Иванов С. Два мира. Сов. Авиация, 03.10.1947. 
Икерин, М.Октябрь. 1948. № 1. С.183-191. 
Котляревская И.М. Главный герой романа И. Эренбурга «Буря». Ученые записки 
(Черновицк. Ун-т). Сборник научных работ аспирантов. 1958. Вып. 3. Стр. 105-109. 
Лаврова Кл. О творческих принципах И. Эренбурга в романе «Буря». Сборник 
«Советская художественная проза». М., Советский писатель, 1955. Стр. 395-458. 
Лукин, Ю. Правда. 20.02.1948. № 51 С.3-4. 
Отклик: Штут, С. Октябрь. 1948. № 2. С.183-188. 
 По поводу возражений С. Штут: Шкерин М. Октябрь. 1948 № 2, стр. 189-191. 
Макаров, А. Культура и жизнь. 1947. № 25. С.3. 
Образцов, С. Литературная Газета № 27. 03.04.1948. 
Савич О. Война и люди. Красная звезда, 25.09.1947. 
Симонов К. Праздник советской литературы. Правда, 02.04.1948. 
Скорино, Л. Роман о великой буре. Литературная Газета. 1947. № 36. С.2. 
______Патриотическая эпопея. Моск. Большевик, 25.04.1948. 
Шкерин М. Октябрь, 1948 № 1, стр. 183-191. 
 Отклик: Брайнина Б. Схема и жизнь. Новый Мир, 1948 № 8, стр. 211-212. 
 
ШПАНОВ Н. 
 
Шпанов Н.Н. Дипломаты плаща и кинжала, М.: Молодая гвардия – ЦК ВЛКСМ, 1952. 
________ Писатель и бдительность (статья), 1953 /РГАЛИ. 
________ Война невидимок. М.: Советская Россия, 1958. 
________ Письмо Семушкину Т., 1949 /РГАЛИ. 
________ Письмо Фадееву 1948 /РГАЛИ. 
 
Фадеев А.А. Записи о Шпанове, 1949 /РГАЛИ. 
Отправка Н. Шпанова в западные области и Прибалтику для работы над романом о 
католической церкви, 1948 /РГАЛИ.  
Заявление в секретариат ССП СССР о продлении творческой командировки во Львов, 
Унсюрод, Вильнюс, Ригу для работы по вопросам воинствующего католицизма, 
3.3.1950 /РГАЛИ. 
Елкин, А. Куда идет писатель Н. Шпанов? // Комсомольская Правда. 21/3/1959. 
Некролог // Литературная Газета. 5/10/1961 
204 
 
 
Поджигатели и Заговорщики (1949 и 1951) 
 
Шпанов Н.Н. Выступление на заседании секции прозы СП СССР по обсуждению 
романа « Поджигатели », 11/11/1949. Ф. 631 Оп.  20 Ед.Хр. 51 Л. 58-62. 
Обсуждение издательством «Молодая гвардия» в связи с выдвижением на сталинскую 
премию 1951-ого года /РГАЛИ. 
Обсуждение редколлегой журнала «Знамя» о «Поджигателях», 1949 /РГАЛИ. 
Дымшиц, А. Против поджигателей войны // Звезда. 1950. № 9. 
Письма Еремина Дымшицу /РГАЛИ. 
Крылов Б. Отзыв, 1949 /РГАЛИ. 
Леонтьев Б.Л. Отзыв, 28.2.1949 /РГАЛИ. 
Лепешко И.Г. Письмо в Правление СП СССР в связи с романом «Поджигателей», 1950 
/РГАЛИ. 
Мацкин А.П. Рецензия, 1949 /РГАЛИ. 
Прут И.Л., Ермаиль И.И., Евгеньев Б.С. Письмо в секретериат ССП по поводу романа 
«Поджигатели», 1949 /РГАЛИ. 
Толченов М. Роман о виновниках войны. Рецензия на роман «Поджигатели», 1949 
/РГАЛИ.  
Маркович А. «Интриганы», пародия на произведение Н.Н. Шпанова, вторая пол. 1950х 
/РГАЛИ. 
Шпанов Н.Н. и Прут И.Л. «Западная граница», пьеса по роману «Поджигатели», 1950-
51 /РГАЛИ. 
 Попов А.Д. Выступление по обсуждению спектакля «Западная граница» 
поставленного И.П. Ворошиловым, 30.5 и 01.6 1951 /РГАЛИ. 
Шпанов Н.Н. «Патриоты», пьеса по роману «Поджигатели», 1955 /РГАЛИ. 
 
ЕРЕМИН Д. 
 
Еремин Д. Выступление на XXом пленуме СП ССП. Стенограмма, 19.12.1948 /РГАЛИ. 
_______ Выступление на заседании кинокомиссии ССП СССР посвященном 
обсуждению плана сценарных заказов министерства кинематографии на 1948 г, 
9.1.1948 /РГАЛИ. 
205 
 
________ Выступление на заседательной  коммиссии секции драматургов по 
обсуждению тематического плана по министерству кинематографии на 1950 г. 
Стенограмма, 23.12.1949 /РГАЛИ.  
________  Письмо Панферову Ф.И. 20.6.1952 /РГАЛИ. 
________  Перевыртыши // Известия. 13/01/1966.  
 
Л. М. Вольпе. КЛЭ. Т. 2; Писатели Москвы. М., 1987. 
Савин, О. М. Еремин Дмитрий Иванович / Пензенская энциклопедия. М.: Научное 
издательство «Большая Российская энциклопедия», 2001. 
Симонов К. Письмо Еремину, 17.1.1948  /РГАЛИ. 
 
Гроза над Римом (1951) 
 
Сталин И.В. О романе Еремина. Высказывание в записи К.М. Симонова. 3.1951 
/РГАЛИ. 
Любимов Л.Д. Замечания по роману. 27.7.1952 /РГАЛИ. 
Олеша Ю. Письмо Еремину (начало 1950х) /РГАЛИ. 
Панова В.Ф. Отзыв. Начало 1950х /РГАЛИ. 
Потапова З. Рецензия. 19.2.1952 /РГАЛИ. 
Прокафьев А.А., Чирсков. Отзывы. 21 и 28 янв. 1951 /РГАЛИ. 
Симонов К. Глазами человека моего поколения. Размышления о И.В.Сталине. М.: АПН. 
1988. -- 23 марта 1979 года. 
 
МАЛЬЦЕВ О. ака Ровинский 
 
Ровинский «Титовский летописец. Владо Дедиер и его разоблачения» (статья). 
Литературная газета, 1949 /РГАЛИ. 
_______ Письмо Фадееву А.А., 23.8.1952 /РГАЛИ. 
_______ «Лучший хозяин пражского града. Говард Фаст снова перед фашисткой 
инквизицией (статьи), Литературная газета,нач.19 50х-1953 /РГАЛИ. 
_______ Автобиография. 27.1.1964 /РГАЛИ. 
Личное дело О. Мальцева /РГАЛИ. 
 
Югославская Трагедия (1951) 
206 
 
 
Сталин И.В. О романе «Югославская тетрадь». Высказывание в записи К.М. Симонова, 
март 1951 /РГАЛИ. 
Либединский Ю.Н. Рецензия на роман О. Мальцева. 1952 /РГАЛИ. 
Мдивани Г.Д. Отзыв. Литературная газета, 1951 /РГАЛИ. 
Ратомир А. Рецензия. 18.6.1952 /РГАЛИ 
Отзывы членов редколлегии журнала «Знамя» и читателей о повести О. Мальцева, 
1951-1952 /РГАЛИ. 
Отзывы в болгарской прессе на роман О. Мальцева, 1953 /РГАЛИ. 
Мальцев О. Письмо в редакцию журнала «Младеж» в ответ на письмо группы 
болгарских пограничников о романе «Югославская трагедия», 26.03.1953 / РГАЛИ. 
Рецензия на французском языке, 29.5.1952 /РГАЛИ 
Договор Мальцева на написание сценария «Двойное лицо» (Мосфильм), 19.10.1953 
/РГАЛИ. 
Информация газет о выставках книг писателей лауреатов сталинских премий, об 
обсужбении читателями произведений С.П. Злоюина, В. Лациса, О. Мальцева и других, 
16.3.1952 и 13.5.1953 /РГАЛИ. 
 
КОЧЕТОВ В. 
 
Кочетов В.А. Телеграмма Эренбургу, 24.01.1956 /РГАЛИ. 
________  Поздравительная телеграмма Твардовскому, 01.01.1958 /РГАЛИ. 
________ Голые короли (об агрессивной политике США). Литература и жизнь, 
22.5.1960. 
________  Письма Дымшицу А.Л., 15.09.1961 и ответ /РГАЛИ. 
________  К съезду партии. Октябрь, 17.09.1961. 
________  Кому отдано сердце. Публицистика. М.: Советский писатель, 1963. 
________  Публицистика. Воспоминания современников. Л.: 1976. 
 
Дымшиц, А. Современный роман // Звезда. 1958. № 10. 
Алексеев М. Всеволод Кочетов! // Москва. 1982ю № 2. 
Андреев, Ю. Революция продолжается! // Русская литература. 1959. № 1. 
Веленгурин Н. Всеволод Кочетов. Творческая биография. М.: 1970. 
Денисова И. Любмиый и главный герой. Знамя. 1970. № 3. 
207 
 
Эльяшевич, А. В разведке будущего (о творчестве Всеволода Кочетова) // Звезда. 1962. 
№ 2. 
Друзин, В. Творчество Всеволода Кочетова (к 50-тию со дня рождения) // Москва. 1962. 
№ 2. 
Дементьев, А. Полемические заметки, в его книге На новом этапе. М.; 1965. – СС. 162-
170 и 216-219. 
Кочетова, В.А. Воспоминания о Кочетове: сборник. М.; Советский писатель. 1986. 
Леонов, Б. Всеволод Кочетов: очерк творчества. М.; Художественная литература. 1981. 
Наполова, Т. О «верстовых столбах» и образе героя // Звезда. 1957. № 5. 
Паленов В. Раздумья и тревоги. Наш современник, 1972 №2. Стр.120-122. (о книге 
«Кому отдано сердце»). 
Строков, П. Всеволод Кочетов: страницы жизни, страницы творчества. М.; 
Современник. 1985. 
Воспоминания о Всеволоде Кочетове. М., 1986. 
 
Чего же ты хочешь ? (1969) 
 
Ампилов В. Неман. 1970 № 2, стр. 153-160. 
Андреев Ю. О романе В. Кочетова. Литературная газета, 11.02.1970. С. 4. 
Паперный З.С. Чего же он кочет? В сборнике «Музыка играет так весело...». М.: Сов. 
Писатель, 1990. 
Попов Е. Всеволод Кочетов как предтеча концептуализма, Октябрь 2004 №8. 
Смирнов С.С. Чего же ты хохочешь? Пародия, 1968 /РГАЛИ. 
Отклик читательских газет на итальянском. 2 окт. и 16 нояб. 1969. /РГАЛИ. 
 
БОНДАРЕВ Ю. 
 
Бондарев, Ю. Публицистика. Мгновения. К 85-летию со дня рождения великого 
писателя современности. М., Советский писатель, 2008. 
Бузник, В.В. Перечитывая заново. О ранней прозе Юрия Бондарева // Литература в 
школе 1995. № 3. С. 26-35. 
Быков, Л. Постижение сложной ясности. По страницам новых книг о Ю. Бондареве // 
Литературное обозрение, 1985. № 6. С. 24-29. 
Горбунова, Е.Н. Юрий Бондарев: очерк творчества. М.; Советский писатель. 1981. 
208 
 
Идашкин, Ю. Постижение подвига: рассказы о творчестве Юрия Бондарева. М.; 
Просвещение. 1980. 
________ Грани таланта: о творчестве Юрия Бондарева. М.; Художественная 
литература. 1983. 
Коробов, В.И. Юрий Бондарев. М.: Современник, 1984. — 368 с. 
Круглов, Ю. Война и мир Юрия Бондарева // Слово. 2004. № 1. С. 1-6. 
Михайлов, О. Юрий Бондарев. М.: Советская Россия, 1976. 134 с. 
Ланская, О.В. Роман Ю.В. Бондарева «Горячий снег»: художественная концепция мира 
(к урокам словесности) // Литература о Великой Отечественной войне: герой, жанр, 
стиль. Учебное пособие. Липецк. 2003. С. 205-215. 
Моисеева, В. Стилевые доминанты и «внутренняя» тема военных повестей В. 
Некрасова, Г. Бакланова, Ю. Бондарева, В. Быкова // Вестник Московского 
университета. Серия 9. Филология. 2005. № 3. 
Федь, Н.М. Художественные открытия Бондарева. М.: Современник, 1988.-464 с. 
 
II- Secondary sources 
 
References in English and French Languages 
 
Aho J. This thing of Darkness: A Sociology of the Enemy, Seattle: University of Washington 
Press, 1994. 
Allport G.W. The Individual and his Religion: a Psychological Interpretation, New York, 
Macmillan Publishing Company, 1950. 
Anderson R.D. Public Politics in an Authoritarian State: Making Foreign Policy during the 
Brezhnev Years, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993. 
Aron R., L'Opium des intellectuels, Paris, Calmann-Lévy, 1955. 
—— Paix et guerre entre les nations, Paris, Calmann-Lévy, 1962. 
Aronson J. The Press and the Cold War, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1990.  
209 
 
Bacon E. And Sandle M. Brezhnev Reconsidered. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002. 
Balakrishnan G. The Enemy: An Intellectual Portrait of Carl Schmitt, New York, Verso, 
2000. 
Barghoorn F. C. The Soviet Cultural Offensive: The Role of Cultural Diplomacy in Soviet 
Foreign Policy, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960. 
—— The Soviet Cultural Offensive: the Role of Cultural Diplomacy in Soviet Foreign Policy, 
Princeton UP, 1960. 
Barrett E.W. Truth is our Weapon, New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1953. 
Beam Eggers S. “Reinventing the Enemy. The Villains of Glinka’s Opera Ivan Susanin on the 
Soviet Stage” in Brandenberger D., Platt K.M.F. (ed.) Epic Revisionism. Russia History and 
Literature as Stalinist Propaganda, University of Wisconsin Press, 2005. 
Benoist, A.P. Weber, Imke Mieulet, Grèz-sur-Loing: Pardès, 1991. 
Bernays E. Propaganda , 1928. 
Bissel R. Reflections of a Cold Warrior: From Yalta to the Bay of Pigs, New York, Yale 
University Press, 1996. 
Bittner S.V. The Many Lives of Khrushchev’s Thaw: Experience and Memory in Moscow’s 
Arbat. Cornell UP, 2008. 
Bolsinger E. The Autonomy of the Political: Carl Schmitt's and Lenin's Political Realism, 
Wesport-London, Greenwood Press, 2001. 
Borkenau F. The Totalitarian Enemy. L, 1940.  
Brandenberger D., National Bolshevism: Stalinist Mass Culture and the Formation of Modern 
Russian National Identity, 1931-1956, Harvard University Press, 2002. 
Breslauer G.W. Khrushchev and Brezhnev as leaders: building authority in Soviet politics, 
London-Boston, Allen and Unwin, 1982. 
210 
 
Brown D. The Last Years of Soviet Russian Literature. Prose – Fiction 1975-1991. 
Cambridge University Press, 1993. 
Buchanan, W., Cantril, H. Psychology of ego-involvements: social attitudes & identifications, 
New York, J. Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1947.  
—— How Nations See Each Other, a study in public opinion, University of Illinois Press, 
1953. 
Burnham J. The Machiavellians. Defenders of Freedom, New York: The John Day Company, 
Inc., 1943. 
Cantril H. The Psychology of Radio (with Gordon Allport), New York and London, Harper & 
brothers, 1935. 
Caute D., The Dancer Defects: The Struggle for Cultural Supremacy during the Cold War, 
Oxford University Press, USA, 2003. 
_______ Politics and the Novel during the Cold War, New Brunswick-London: Transaction 
Publishers, 2009. 
Churchward, L. G. The Soviet Intelligentsia. An Essay on the Social Structure and Roles of 
Soviet intellectuals during the 1960s. London-Boston, 1973. 
Condee N. “Uncles, Deviance and Ritual Combat: the Cultural Codes of Khrushchev’s Thaw” 
in The Khrushchev Era: a Reappraisal. Ed. William Taubman, Serguei Khrushchev, and 
Abbott Gleason, 2000: 160-176. 
Clark E., The Soviet Novel: History as a Ritual. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981. 
Cronin R.C. Natural Enemies: The United States and the Soviet Union in the Cold War, 1917-
1991. Boston, Lexington Books, 2001. 
 De Custine A., La Russie en 1839, Paris, Actes Sud, 2005 (1st editon in 1843).  
Deriabin P.S. and Schecter J.L. The Spy Who Saved the World: How a Soviet Colonel 
Changed the Course of the Cold War, NY, Charles Scribner’s, 1992. 
211 
 
DeSantis H. The Diplomacy of Silence: The American Foreign Service, the Soviet Union, and 
the Cold War, 1933-1947, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979. 
Dobson, M., “Refashioning the Enemy: Popular Beliefs and the Rhetoric of Destalinisation, 
1953–1964” (Ph.D. diss., University College London, 2003). 
Donovan J.C. The Cold Warriors. A Policy-Making Elite. D.C. Heath and Company, 
Massachussets-Toronto, 1974. 
Dobrenko E., Balina M., Condee N. Enquote : Sots-Art Literature and Soviet Grand Style, 
Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1999. 
Dobrenko E. Stalinist Cinema and the Production of History, Edinburgh University Press, 
2008. 
Dobrynin A.F. In Confidence: Moscow's ambassador to America's six Cold War 
Presidents. New York : Times Books, 1995. 
Droit R.-P. Généalogie des barbares, Paris, Odile Jacob, 2007. 
Dunham V.S. In Stalin’s Time: Middleclass Values in Soviet Fiction, Cambridge University 
Press, 1976.  
Ebon M. The Soviet Propaganda Machine, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1987. 
Eagleton T., Ideology. An Introdction. London-New York, Verso, 1991. 
Ellwood David W., The 1948 Elections in Italy: A Cold War Propaganda Battle, Historical 
Journal of Film, Radio & Television, 13: 1 (1993), pp. 19-33. 
Ellul J. Propagandes, Paris: Armand Colin, 1962. 
Eschen P.M. von, Satchmo Blows Up the World: Jazz Ambassadors Play the Cold War, 
Harvard UP, 2004. 
Finlay D.J. and Holsti O.R. Enemies in Politics, Chicago, Rand McNally, 1967. 
212 
 
Freud S. Civilization, Society and Religion: "Group Psychology and the Analysis of the 
Ego"[1921], "Future of an Illusion" [1927] and "Civilization and Its Discontents"[1930] by 
Sigmund Freud and Albert Dickson. London, Penguin Books Ltd, 1985. 
Fitzpatrick S. “Social Parasites: How Tramps, Idle Youth, and Busy Entrepreneurs Impeded 
the Soviet March to Communism,” Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique 47:1–2 (2006). 
Fursenko A., Naftali T. Khrushchev's Cold War: The Inside Story of an American Adversary, 
Norton, New York, 2006.  
Gaddis J.L., Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security 
Policy during the Cold War, Oxford University Press, 2005 (first published in 1978). 
_________The Tragedy of Cold War History, Foreign Affairs, January/February 1994, pp. 
142-54. 
_________ We Now Know, New York, Oxford University Press, 1997. 
_________ The Cold War: A New History, New York, Penguin Books, 2007. 
Garrison J. & Shivpuri P., The Russian Threat. Its Myths and Realities, Gateway Books, 
London, 1983. 
Gienow-Hecht  J.C.E.,  Schumacher F. Culture and International Relations (Explorations in 
Culture and International History Series). New York: Berghahn Books, 2004. 
—— Transmission Impossible. American Journalism as Cultural Diplomacy in Postwar 
Germany 1945-1955, Baton Rouge 1999. 
Girardet R. Mythes et mythologies politiques, Paris, Seuil, 1990. 
Godet M., La pellicule et les ciseaux : la censure cinématographique du Dégel à la 
Pérestroïka, Paris, CNRS, 2010. 
Garrard J. And C. Inside the Soviet Writers' Union, New York: Freepress, 1990. 
Hosking G. Beyond Socialist Realism: Soviet Fiction since Ivan Denisovich, London: Granada 
/ Paul Elek, 1980. 
213 
 
Ilic M. and Smith J. The Soviet State and Society under Nikita Khrushchev. London: 
Routledge, 2009. 
Iriye A. « Culture and International History” in Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson, 
eds., Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991, pp. 214-25. 
Hixson W. L. Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945-61. New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1997.  
—— George F. Kennan: Cold War Iconoclast. Columbia University Press, 1989. 
Hoffman D.E. The Dead Hand: The Untold Story of the Cold War Arms Race and Its 
Dangerous Legacy, Anchor, 2010. 
Hooker M.T., The Military Uses of Literature. Fiction and the Armed Forces in Soviet 
Literature, Westport, Greenwood Publishing Group, 1996.  
Hosking G. The First Socialist Society: A History of the Soviet Union from Within, London, 
Fontana Press, 1993. 
Hunt M. Ideology and US Foreign Policy, New Heaven, CT, 1987. 
Hutchings S., Russia and Its Other(s) on Film: Screening Intercultural Dialogue, 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. 
Jackall R. Propaganda (Main trends of the Modern World), NYU Press, 1994. 
Johnson P., Ed., Khrushchev and the arts: the Politics of Soviet Culture, 1962-1964, MIT 
Press, 1965. 
Jones P. ‘Reimagining the Enemy. Soviet Images of the West after the Second World War’, in 
Drawing the Curtain. The Cold War in Cartoons, London: Fontanka, 2012. 
Jowett G.S. and O'Donnell V. Propaganda and Persuasion, Sage Publications, Inc, 2005. 
Keen S., Faces of the Enemy: Reflections of the Hostile Imagination, San Francisco: Harper 
and Row, 1986.  
214 
 
Kenez P. The Birth of the Propaganda State: Soviet Methods of Mass Mobilization, 
1917-1929, Cambridge UP, 1985. 
Kennan G.F. Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin, Boston: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1961. 
_____ The Marquis de Custine and his "Russia in 1839", Princeton University Press, 1971. 
Kennan G. Russia, the Atom, and the West, New York, Harper, 1958. 
______ The Nuclear Delusion: Soviet-American Relations in the Atomic Age, New York, 
1982. 
——— "The Sources of Soviet Conduct", Foreign Affairs 25 (4): 566–582, July 1947. 
______ Memoirs: 1925-1950, Boston: Atlantic – Little Brown, 1967. 
______ Memoirs: 1950–1963, Boston: Atlantic - Little, Brown, 1972. 
Kenneth Martin Jensen. Origins of The Cold War: the Novikov, Kennan and Roberts “long 
telegramms” of 1946. Washington, D.C. : United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993. 
Kissinger H.A. Diplomacy, New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 1994. 
Kozlov D. The Readers of Novy Mir: Coming to Terms with the Stalinist Past, Harvard 
University Press, 2013. 
Kozlov D. and Gilburd E. The Thaw: Soviet Society and Culture during the 1950s and 1960s, 
University of Toronto Press, Scholarly Publishing Division, 2012. 
Kozovoï A. Par-delà le Mur. La culture de Guerre froide soviétique entre deux détentes, 
Paris; Complexe, 2009. 
Krabbendam Hans and Scott-Smith Giles, The Cultural Cold War in Western Europe, 1945-
1960, London: Frank Cass, 2003. 
Le Bon G. Psychologie des Foules, Paris, Félix Alcan, 1895. 
Leffler M.P. and Westad O.A. The Cambridge History of the Cold War in 3 vol., Cambridge 
University Press, 2010. 
215 
 
Lippman W. Public Opinion, New York: MacMillan, 1922. 
Lodge M., Soviet Elite Attitudes since Stalin. Columbus, 1969. 
Lucas S., Freedom’s war. The US Crusade against the Soviet Union 1945-56, Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1999. 
Lovell S. 'Soviet Russia's Older Generations' in Generations in Twentieth-Century 
Europe Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, pp. 205-226. 
_______ 'From genealogy to generation - The birth of cohort thinking in Russia, 
KRITIKA, 9 (3), 2008, pp. 567-594. 
Macdonald D.J. Communist Bloc Expansion in the Early Cold War: Challenging Realism, 
Refuting Revisionism, International Security, Winter 1995-96, pp. 152-88. 
Malia, M. Russia under Western Eyes: from the Bronze Horseman to the Lenin Mauseleum, 
Cambridge, The Belknap Press of Harvad University Press, 1999. 
Mannheim K. “The Problem of Generations”, Essays in the Sociology of Knowledge, London: 
Routledge and Keagan Paul, 1952.  
Mastny V. The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity, New York, Oxford University Press, 1996. 
Midhurst M.J. Cold War Rhetoric: Strategy, Metaphor and Ideology. East Lansing: Michigan 
University Press, 1990. 
Mistry, K. “The Case for Political Warfare: Strategy, Organization and US Involvement in the 
1948 Italian Election”, Cold War History Vol. 6, No. 3, August 2006, pp. 301–329. 
________ “Re-thinking American intervention in the 1948 Italian election: beyond a success 
failure dichotomy”, Modern Italy, 16: 2 (2011), 179 — 194. 
Moscovici S. L’Âge des foules: un traité historique de psychologie des masses, Paris, Fayard, 
1981.  
Niekisch E. Hitler, une fatalité allemande et autres récits nationaux-bolcheviks, ed. A. de 
Benoist,Paris: Pardès: 1991. 
216 
 
Ninkonovich F.A. The Diplomacy of Ideas: U.S. Foreign Policy and Cultural Relations, 
1938-1950, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981. 
Nogee J.L., Donaldson R.H. Soviet Foreign Policy since World War II, New York: Pergamon 
Press, Inc., 1988 (first edition 1981). 
Ouimet M.J. The Rise and Fall of the Brezhnev Doctrine in Soviet Foreign Policy. Chapell 
Hill – London, The University of North Carolina Press, 2003. 
Parks J.D. Culture, Conflict, and Coexistence: American-Soviet Cultural Relations 1917-1958, 
Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 1983. 
Péteri G. Imagining the West in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 2010. 
Platt K.M.F. and Brandenberger D. Madison (eds), Epic Revisionism: Russian History and 
Literature as Stalinist Propaganda, The University of Wisconsin Press, 2005. 
Ponsonby A. Falshood in Wartime, George Allen and Unwin, 1928. Republished by the 
Institute of Historical Review, 1991. 
Popper K.R. The Open Society and its Enemies, London: Routledge, 1962. 
Prokhorov A. Inherited Discourse: Stalinist Tropes in Thaw Culture («унаследованный 
дискурс» in Russian). Diss. University of Pittsburgh, 2002. 
Puddington A. Broadcasting Freedom: The Cold War Triumph of Radio Free Europe and 
Radio Liberty. Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2000. 
Radway J.A. Reading the Romance: Women, Patriarchy and Popular Literature, The 
University of North Carolina Press, 1984. 
Raleigh D.J. Soviet Baby Boomers: an Oral History of Russia’s Cold War Generation. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2012. 
Rees E.A. Political Thought from Machiavelli to Stalin. Revolutionary Machiavellism, New 
York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004. 
217 
 
Reid S.E. (with Crowley D.) Style and Socialism: Modernity and Material Culture in Post-
war Eastern Europe. New York: Berg Publishers, 2000. 
_______ (with  Ilic M., Attwood L.) Women in the Khrushchev Era. Basingstoke, Palgrave, 
2004. 
_______ « Who Will Beat Whom? Soviet Popular Reception of the American National 
Exhibition in Moscow, 1959”, in David Crowley and Jane Pavitt, eds, Cold War Modern, 
London, V&A Publications, 2008, pp.141-6. 
_______ “In the Name of the People: The Manege Affair Revisited”, Kritika: Explorations in 
Russian and Eurasian History 6, n°4 (Fall 2005), pp. 673-716. 
Richter J. Khrushchev's Double Bind: International Pressures and Domestic Coalition 
Politics, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994. 
Risso L. Propaganda and Intelligence in the Cold War: The NATO Information Service 
(Studies in Intelligence), Oxford: Routledge, 2013. 
Robin R. The Making of the Cold War Enemy: Culture and Politics in the Military-
Intellectual Complex, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton UP, 2001. 
Robins R., Post J. Political Paranoia: The Psychopolitics of Hatred, New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1997. 
Rose, Clive, The Soviet Propaganda Network: a Directory of Organizations Serving Soviet 
Foreign Policy, London: Pinter Publishers, 1988. 
Sapir J. Les Fluctuations économiques en URSS, 1941-1985, Paris : Éditions de l'EHESS, 
1989. 
Sbardellatti, John, John Edgar Hoover Goes to the Movies: the FBI and the Origins of 
Hollywood’s Cold War, Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2012.   
Saunders F.S. Who paid the piper? The CIA and the Cultural Cold War, London: Granta 
Books, 2000. 
218 
 
Shaw, Tony and Youngblood, Denise J. Cinematic Cold War: the American and Soviet 
Struggle for Hearts and Minds, Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2010. 
Schmitt C. The Concept of the Political, University of Chicago Press, 1996 [Original 
publication: 1927].  
Shriver D. An Ethics for Enemies: Forgiveness in Politics, Oxford: Oxford UP, 1995. 
Simmel G. Le conflit, Paris: Circé, 2002 [1908]. 
Sorensen T.C. The Word War: The Story of American Propaganda, New York: Harper and 
Row, 1968. 
Taithe B. And Thornton T. Propaganda: Political Rhetoric and Systems of Beliefs, Sutton 
Publishing, 1999. 
Taubman W. Khrushchev: The Man and His Era, New York : Norton 2003. 
Taylor P.M. Munitions of the Mind: A History of Propaganda, Manchester University Press, 
2003. 
Timashev N.S. The Great Retreat: the Growth and Decline of Communism in Russia, New 
York: Dutton, 1946. 
Thompson N. The Hawk and the Dove: Paul Nitze, George Kennan, and the History of the 
Cold War, Henry Holt & Company, New York, 2009. 
Todd III W.M. Fiction and Society in the Age of Pushkin, Cambridge and London: Harvard 
UP, 1986. 
Voronina O. A Window with an Iron Curtain: Cold War Metaphors in Transition. 1945-1968, 
PhD diss, Harvard UP, 2010. 
Volkan V. The Need to Have Enemies and Allies, London: Jason Aronson Inc., 1997. 
______How Nations See Each Other, a study in public opinion, University of Illinois Press, 
1953. 
______Soviet Leaders and Mastery over Men, Rutgers University Press, 1960. 
219 
 
Walton C. Policing public opinion in the French Revolution : the culture of calumny and the 
problem of free speech. New York-Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.  
Ulam A. The Rivals: America and Russia since World War II. New York: Viking Press, 1971. 
______ Expansion and Coexistence, 2d ed. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974. 
Weber M. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, London: Allen and Unwin, 1930. 
Wilford H. The Mighty Wurlitzer: How CIA Played America. Cambridge, Mass. & London: 
Harvard UP, 2008. 
Williams, William A. The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, New York: Dell, 1962. 
Winkler A.M. The Cold War: a History in Documents, Oxford University Press, 2000. 
Woll J. Real Images: Soviet Cinema and the Thaw, London: IB Tauris, 2000. 
Yergin, D. The Shattered Peace: the Origins of the Cold War, London: Deutsch, 1978. 
Yurchak A. Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More: The Last Soviet Generation, 
Princeton University Press, 2006.  
Zacharias E.M., Farago L. Behind Closed Doors. The Secret History of the Cold War, New 
York: G.P. Putnam’s sons, 1950. 
Zubkova E. Russia after the War: Hopes, Illusions and Disappointments, 1945 – 1957, New 
York: M. E. Sharpe, 1998. 
Zubok V. A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev (New 
Cold War History), Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2008. 
—— Zhivago’s Children: the Last Russian Intelligentsia, Cambridge & London: The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 2009. 
Zubok V. and Pleshakov C. Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev, 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996. 
 
References in Russian 
220 
 
 
Агурский М.С. Идеология национал большевизма. Париж: YMCA Press, 1980. 
Аджубей А. Те 10 десять лет, М., 1989. 
Аксютин Ю.В. Хрущевская "оттепель" и общественные настроения в СССР в 1953-
1964 гг., М., Российская политическая энциклопедия, Фонд Первого Президента России 
Б. Н. Ельцина, 2010 г.  
Аксютин Ю.В., Волобуев О.В. XX съезд КПСС: новации и догмы. М.,1991; XX съезд 
КПСС и его исторические реальности. М.,1991. 
Алексеева Л.М. Поколение оттепели. М., Захаров, 2006. 
Андропов Ю.В. Коммунистическая убежденность - великая сила строителей нового 
мира. - М.: Политиздат, 1977. 
Аппарат ЦК КПСС и культура. 1965-1972, М., Росспэн, 2009. 
Арбатов Г.А. Затянувшееся выздоровление (1953-1985). М., 1991. 
Арнаутов Н.Б., Образ «Врага народа» в системе советской социальной мобилизации: 
идеолого-пропагандисткий аспект (декабрь 1934 г. – ноябрь 1938 г.), автореферат 
диссертации, Томск, 2010. 
Базанов В.Г. Русская литература и новый человек, «Русская Литература», Академия 
наук СССР – Пушкинский дом, 1959, №1. 
Барсуков Н. Провал "антипартийной группы" // Коммунист. 1990. 
Баталов Э.Я. Советская политическая культура // Общественные науки и 
современность. 1995. № 3. 
Беляев А.А.  Литература и лабиринты власти: от «оттепели» до перестройки, Москва, 
2009. 
Бережков В.М. Страницы дипломатической истории. М.:Международные отношения, 
1982. 
221 
 
Бернштейн Г.М. Агитационно-массовое искусство. Оформление праздников (1917-
1932), М., Исскуство, 1986. 
Бесчеловечность как система. М.: Военное издательство Министерства Обороны СССР, 
1959. 
Бобков Ф. Как готовили предателей. Начальник политической контрразведки 
свидетельствует... М.: Эксмо – Алгоритм, 2011. 
Борев Ю. История государства советского в преданиях и анекдотах. М., РИПОЛ, 1995. 
Боффа Дж. От СССР к России. История неоконченного кризиса. 1964-1994: Пер. с ит. 
Брежнев Л.И. Mолодым – строить коммунизм. М.: Политиздат, 1970. 
—— Актуальные вопросы идеологической работы КПСС. М.: Политиздат, 1979. 
Брусиловская Л.Б. Культура повседневности в эпоху "оттепели" (метаморфозы стиля), 
Общественные науки и современность, 2000 №1. 
Бурлацкий Ф. Хрущев: Иного не дано. М., 1988. 
Великанова О.В. Функции образа лидера в массовом сознании. Гитлеровская Германия 
и советская Россия // Общественные науки и современность. 1997. № 6. С.162-173. 
Веттиг Г.Н.С. Хрущев и Берлинский кризис 1958-1963 годов, М., Росспэн 2007. 
Власть и оппозиция. Российский политический процесс ХХ столетия. М., 1995. С. 273-
346. 
Вознесенский М.Б. На грани мировой войны. Инцидент «Пуэбло». М., Вече, 2007. 
Волобуев О., Кулешов С. История и перестройка. Публицистические заметки. М., 1989. 
Волобуев О. Советский тоталитаризм: образ врага // Тоталитаризм и личность. Пермь, 
1994. 
Глебкин В.В. Ритуал в советской культуре. М.: «Янус-К», 1998. 168 с. 
Горяева Т.М. Политическая цензура в СССР. 1917-1991 гг., Росспэн, 2009. 
Гриневский О. Перелом. От Брежнева к Горбачеву, М., ОЛМА, 2008. 
222 
 
Громыко А. 1036 дней президента Кеннеди. М., Издательство политической 
литературы, 1968. 
Грушин Б.А. Четыре жизни России в зеркале опроcов общественного мнения. В 4 
книгах. Жизнь 2-я. Эпоха Брежнева, М., Прогресс-Традиция, 2006. 
______ Четыре жизни России в зеркале опроcов общественного мнения. В 4 книгах. 
Жизнь 1-я: Эпоха Хрущева, М., Прогресс-Традиция, 2001.  
Гудков Л.Д. Негативная идентичность, М., НЛО, 2004. 
______  Образ врага, М., ОГИ, 2005. 
Дело оперативной подборки №1. Система безопасности СССР (1945-1991). Структура. 
Функции. Руководство, М., Раменская типография, 2010. 
Добренко Е,, Формовка советского читателя: социальные и эстетические предпосылки 
рецепции советской литературы. СПб.: Академический Проект, 1997. 
__________ Формовка советского писателя, социальные и эстетические истоки 
советской литератной культуры. СПб.: Академический Проект, 1999. 
__________ Политэкономика соцреализма. М., НЛО, 2007. 
Добренко Е., Tиханов Г. История русской литературной критики: советская и 
постсоветская эпоха. М.: НЛО, 2011. 
Дубунова М., Дубунов А. Танки в Праге, Джоконда в Москве. Азарт и стыд 
семидесятых, М., Время, 2007.  
Дымарский, В.Н.Времена Хрущева. В людях, фактах и мифах. М.: АСТ: Астрель: 
Полиграфиздат, 2011. 
Евсеева Е.Н. СССР в 1945-1953 гг.: экономика, власть и общество // Новый 
исторический вестник. М., 2002. № 1(6). С. 179-214. 
Жуков И. Фадеев. М.: Молодая Гвардия, ЖЗЛ, 1989. 
Захаров А.В. Народные образы власти // Полис. 1998. № 1. С.23-26. 
223 
 
Зорин В. Некоронованные короли Америки. М. Издательство политической литературы, 
1968. 
______  Владыки без масок. М., Дет. Лит., 1972. 
Зубкова Е.Ю. Общество и реформы, 1945-1964. М., 1993. 
______ Послевоенное советское общество: политика и повседневность. 1945-1953. М., 
1999. 229 с. 
Иголкин А. Пресса как оружие власти // Россия. XXI. 1995. № 11-12.  
Ильина Л.Л. Между двумя оттепелями. 1954-1982, М., СПб., Нестор-История, 2007. 
Ковалев В.А. и др. Очерки истории русской советской литературы. М.: Изд. Академии 
Наук СССР, 1955. 
Ковалев В.А. и Тимрфеева В.В. Советская литература и новый человек. Л.: Наука, 1967. 
Козлов В. Массовые беспорядки в СССР при Хрущеве. 1953 - начало 1980-х гг.Росспэн, 
М., Фонд Первого Президента России Б. Н. Ельцина, 2010. 
Козлов Н.Д. Общественное сознание в годы Великой Отечественной войны (1941-1945). 
СПб.: ЛОИУУ, 1995. 
Колесникова А.Г. Образ врага периода холодной войны в советском игровом кино 
1960-1970-х гг. // Отечественная история 2007 №5 -С 162-168. 
Колоницкий Б.И. «Политическая порнография» и десакрализация власти в годы Первой 
мировой войны (слухи и массовая культура) // 1917 год в судьбах России и мира. 
Октябрьская революция: от новых источников к новому осмыслению. М., 1998. 
Корниенко Г. М. «Холодная война». Свидетельство ее участника — М.: ОЛМА-
ПРЕСС, 2001 
Костерева O.A. Образ врага в отечественной политической культуре периода 
«холодной войны»: опыт анализа визуального источника, Российский Государственный 
Гуманитарный Университет. 
224 
 
Костырченко Г.В. В плену у красного фараона, М.: Международные отношения, 1994. 
_______Тайная политика Сталина: власть и антесиметизм. М.: Международные 
отношения, 2003. 
________ Тайная политика Хрущева: власть, интеллигенция, еврейский вопрос. М. 
Международные отношения, 2012. 
Косыгин А.Н. Избранные речи и статьи. М., 1974. 
Лейдерман Н.Л. и Липовецкий М.Н. Современная русская литература: 1950 – 1990 е 
годы в 2 т. – Т. 1968. – М.: Издательский Центр «Академия», 2003. 
Лисичкин В., Шелепин Л. Война после войны: информационная оккупация 
продолжается, М., Эксмо-Алгоритм, 2005. 
Литвинов Г. Стиляги. Как это было, СПб., Амфора, 2009 . 
Лурье Л., Малярова И. 1956 год. Середина века Издательский, СПб., Дом "Нева", 2007. 
Любимов Н.М. . Неувядаемый цвет. Книга воспоминаний в 3х томах. М.: 
Языки славянской культуры, 2000-2007. 
Марушкин Б.И. История и политика. М.: Наука, 1969. 
Медведев Р. Страницы политической биографии Н. С. Хрущева // Дружба народов. 
1989. 
Митрохин Н. Русская партия. Движение русских националистов в СССР. 1953–1985 гг. 
М., Новое литературное обозрение, 2003. 
Млечин Л. Фурцева. М.: Молодая гвардия – ЖЗЛ, 2011. 
—— Брежнев. М.: Молодая гвардия, 2008. (серия «Жизнь замечательных людей»). 
Молотов В.М. Враги Сталина – враги России. М.: Алгоритм, 2013. 
Наджафаров Д.Г. (сост.) Сталин и космополитизм. Документы Агитпропа ЦК КПСС. 
1945-1953, М.: Международный фонд Демократия, 2005. 
225 
 
Никитина М.Э. Идеологемы врага и героя и их внедрение в массовое сознание в годы 
Великой Отечественной войны (На материалах Пензенской области): Дис. канд. ист. 
наук : 07.00.02 Пенза, 2005. 
Озеров В.М. Пути развития современного советского романа, М. Академия Наук СССР, 
1961. 
Орлов И.Б. Политическая культура России ХХ в.: Учеб. пособие для студентов вузов. 
М.: Аспект Пресс, 2008.7 
Пеньков В.Ф. О политической культуре российского общества. Тамбов, 1996. 
Пивоваров Ю.С. Политическая культура. Методологический очерк. М.: ИНИОН РАН, 
1996.  
Пихоя Р. Москва. Кремль. Власть. 40 лет после войны. 1945-1985, М., Русь-Олимп, 
Астрель, АСТ, 2007. 
Пихоя Р. Г., Соколов А. К. История современной России. Кризис коммунистической 
власти в СССР и рождение новой России. Конец 1970-х - 1991 гг. Росспэн, Фонд 
Первого Президента России Б. Н. Ельцина, 2008. 
Полынов М.Ф. Исторические предпосылки перестройки в СССР. Вторая половина 1940 
- первая половина 1980-х гг, СПб., Алетейя, 2010. 
Попов Г. Реформирование нереформируемого. Попытка Алексея Косыгина, 
Издательский дом Международного университета в Москве, 2009. 
Пресса в обществе (1959-2000). Оценки журналистов и социологов. Документы. М., 
Московская школа политических исследований, 2000.  
Пропаганда и агитация в решениях и документах ВКП(б), Москва, Высшая Партийная 
Школа при ЦК ВКП(б), 1941. 
Пыжиков А. Хрущевская «оттепель». М.: Олма Пресс, 2002. 
226 
 
Пыжиков А.В., Данилов А.А. Рождение сверхдержавы. 1945-1953 годы. М.: ОЛМА-
ПРЕСС, 2002. 
Рыбас С. Громыко, М.: Молодая гвардия – ЖЗЛ, 2011. 
Семанов С., Председатель КГБ Юрий Андропов, М., Алгоритм, 2008  
Соболева Н.А. Из истории советской политической символики // Отечественная 
история. 2006. № 2. С. 89-109. 
История Коммунистической партии Советского Союза.  М., 1976 
КПСС в резолюциях и решениях съездов, конференций и пленумов ЦК, 1971. 
Семенов В.М. Власть в этноисторическом пространстве России, М.: ИФ РАН, 2006. 
Сенявская Е.С. Образ врага в сознании участников первой мировой войны // Вопросы 
истории. 1997. № 3. С. 140-156; она же. Образ врага в сознании участников Великой 
Отечественной войны // История. Еженедельное приложение к газете «Первое 
сентября». 1997. № 19. 
Сенявская Е.С. 1941-1945Соболева Н.А. Из истории советской политической 
символики // Отечественная история. 2006. № 2. С. 89-109. 
Соловьев А.И. Культура власти современного российского общества. М., 1992 С. 21-25. 
Тихонова В.А. Политическая культура российского общества: социально-философский 
аспект: Монография. М., 2001. С. 29-33. 
Турицын И.В. О методологии изучения политических аспектов советской ментальности 
в переходный период // Советский менталитет: проблемы методологии исследования: 
Тезисы докладов межвузовской научно-практической конференции. Армавир, 1995. С. 
60-63. 
Устрялов Н. “От нэпа к советскому социализму”, “Самопознание социализма”, “Наше 
время”. Шанхай, 1934. 
227 
 
Фатеев А.В. Как создавался образ врага: у истоков холодной войны // История. 
Еженедельное приложение к газете «Первое сентября». 1996. № 3 
_______ Литературная газета» в горячей купели холодной войны // Историческая 
газета. № 2. 1997. 
_______ Образ врага в советской пропаганде. 1945-1954 гг., Инст. Рос. Истории РАН, 
М., 1999.Шубин А.В. Золотая осень, или Период застоя СССР в 1975-1985 гг.М., Вече, 
2008. 
Хаустовой Л.Я. М., Междунар. отношения, 1996. 
Хрущев Н.С. Воспоминания. М., Вагриус, 2007. 
Хрущев С.Н.  Пенсионер союзного значения, М.: Новости, 1991. 
__________   Никита Хрущев: Кризисы и ракеты: Взгляд изнутри. М.: Новости, 1994. 
XX-ый Съезд Черепанов Ю. Репортаж из "Крокодила". М., Контакт-культура, 2009. 
Чубарьян А.О, Егорова. Н.И. Сталинское десятилетие Холодной войны: факты и 
гипотезы. М.: Наука, 1999. 
__________ Холодная война. 1945—1963 гг. Историческая ретроспектива: Сб. ст. / Рос. 
акад. наук. Ин-т всеобщей истории — М.: ОЛМА-ПРЕСС, 2003. 
Чуев Ф.И., Сто сорок бесед с Молотовым. Из дневника Ф. Чуева. М.: Терра, 1991. 
Шапиро Л. Коммунистическая партия Советского Союза. Лондон, 1990.  
Щербань Н.В. От романтизма к реализму (воспоминания и раздумья о послевоенном 
поколении) // Отечественная история. 2007. № 2. С. 180-195.  
Эндрю Кр., Гордиевский О. КГБ. История внешнеполитических операций от  
Ленина до Горбачева. [Б.м. изд.] Nota Веnе, 1992. 
Яковлев Н.Н. ЦРУ против СССР. М., 1985. 
1941-1945. Фронтовое поколение: Историко-психологическое исследование. М., 
Институт Российской Истории РАН, 1995. 
